FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 05 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
NYLES LAWAYNE WATSON, No. 12-15687
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:07-cv-01871-LKK-
KJN
v.
GARY SWARTHOUT, Warden; et al., MEMORANDUM *
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Lawrence K. Karlton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 24, 2013 **
Before: ALARCÓN, CLIFTON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Nyles Lawayne Watson appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
indifference to his serious medical needs, retaliation and violations under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo. Morrison v. Hall, 261 F.3d 896, 900 (9th Cir. 2001)
(summary judgment); Nelson v. Heiss, 271 F.3d 891, 893 (9th Cir. 2001)
(dismissal). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Watson’s Eighth
Amendment claims because Watson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether defendants were deliberately indifferent to his degenerative disc
disease. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (setting forth elements
of a claim for deliberate indifference); Berry v. Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1057 (9th
Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (to establish deliberate indifference based on a delay in
medical treatment, plaintiff must show the delay itself caused harm); Sanchez v.
Vild, 891 F.2d 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989) (a difference of opinion about the best
course of medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Watson’s First
Amendment claims because Watson failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether defendants’ actions did not reasonably advance a legitimate
correctional goal. See Brodheim v. Cry, 584 F.3d 1262, 1269 n.3 (9th Cir. 2009)
(setting forth the elements of a retaliation claim in the prison context); Pratt v.
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Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff bears the burden of pleading
and proving the absence of legitimate correctional goals for the conduct of which
he complains).
The district court properly dismissed Watson’s ADA claims because the
claims were based on inadequate treatment. See Simmons v. Navajo County, 609
F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The ADA prohibits discrimination because of
disability, not inadequate treatment for disability.”).
We do not consider Watson’s arguments concerning retaliatory transfer and
destruction of property as they were raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett
v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Watson’s request for judicial notice is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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