FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 05 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
BERNADINE SMITH EPLING, No. 12-55249
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:10-cv-05862-GAF-
RNB
v.
OFFICER KOMATHY, MEMORANDUM *
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 24, 2013 **
Before: ALARCÓN, CLIFTON, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
Bernadine Smith Epling appeals pro se from the district court’s summary
judgment in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging false arrest and excessive force.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Toguchi v.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Epling’s excessive
force claim because Epling failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether defendant’s use of force in handcuffing Epling was unreasonable. See
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (an officer is allowed to use
reasonable force during an arrest); see also Kennedy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 952
F.2d 262, 266 (9th Cir. 1991) (a party cannot create dispute of fact by an affidavit
contradicting prior deposition testimony); Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp.
Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 922 (9th Cir. 1989) (summary judgment is proper on an
excessive force claim arising from application of handcuffs where plaintiff did not
provide any medical records to support her claim that she suffered an injury as a
result of being handcuffed).
To the extent that Epling challenges the district court’s denial of her motions
to compel discovery of phone and employee records, the district court did not
abuse its discretion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (discovery requests must be
“reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”); Hallett v.
Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and
describing district court’s broad discretion to permit or deny discovery).
AFFIRMED.
2 12-55249