GLD-352 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-2489
___________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ROBERT F. SKEFFERY,
a/k/a Clyde Ferron
ROBERT F. SKEFFERY,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal No. 3:05-cr-00002-001)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 25, 2013
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 6, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Robert Skeffery is a citizen of Jamaica whose criminal and immigration histories
are somewhat convoluted. For the purposes of this appeal, we look to his 2006
conviction (in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania)
for possession with intent to distribute less than fifty kilograms of marijuana, which we
affirmed in 2008. See generally United States v. Skeffery, 283 F. App’x 75 (3d Cir.
2008). Skeffery has filed a belated petition for writ of coram nobis, arguing that this
conviction and sentence are “constitutionally invalid due to” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c),
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations. He alleges that he was not properly
informed of the immigration consequences of his decision to plead guilty. The District
Court denied relief, and Skeffery now seeks our review.1
The District Court’s decision was proper. As the District Court pointed out,
Skeffery specifically waived his right to collaterally attack his plea,2 and we see nothing
in the record that would suggest either that the waiver was infirm or that enforcing it
would work a miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Mabry, 536 F.3d 231, 237–39
(3d Cir. 2008). And there would be no injustice because the theory upon which Skeffery
1
“In federal courts the authority to grant a writ of coram nobis is conferred by the All
Writs Act, which permits ‘courts established by Act of Congress’ to issue ‘all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions.’” United States v.
Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 911 (2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)). “The District Court
had jurisdiction over the petition under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), in aid of its jurisdiction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
the District Court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.”
Mendoza v. United States, 690 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
2
In its decision, the District Court emphasized that coram nobis is a rare remedy only
available in limited situations, and is not coterminous with relief available under 28
U.S.C. § 2255. We agree that obtaining coram nobis relief is a more-daunting task than
succeeding under § 2255. See, e.g., Mendoza, 690 F.3d at 159. However, in light of
2
relies is no longer valid; as the Supreme Court recently held, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.
Ct. 1473 (2010), announced a “new rule,” and “defendants whose convictions became
final prior to Padilla therefore cannot benefit from its holding.” Chaidez v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 1103, 1113 (2013). Thus, regardless of whether he was fully apprised by
counsel of the immigration consequences of his plea, Skeffery has no colorable claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
Because no substantial question is presented by this appeal, we will summarily
affirm the judgment of the District Court. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d
Cir. 2011) (per curiam); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
Skeffery’s waiver and the invalidity of his claim, we do not reach the issue of the scope
of coram nobis.
3