FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION AUG 13 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
DEAN FRANCIS PACE, No. 11-57203
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 2:11-cv-02184-CBM-
JEM
v.
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION MEMORANDUM*
and FIA CARD SERVICES N.A.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Consuelo B. Marshall, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Submitted August 9, 2013**
Pasadena, California
Before: SILVERMAN and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges, and GEORGE, Senior
District Judge.***
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Lloyd D. George, Senior District Judge for the U.S.
District Court for the District of Nevada, sitting by designation.
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Dean Francis Pace appeals the district court’s order dismissing his first
amended complaint and denying his motion for leave to file a second amended
complaint. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm in part
and reverse and remand in part.
Pace, appearing pro se, filed a complaint claiming that Bank of America
Corporation, and its wholly owned subsidiary FIA Card Services N.A., violated the
Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), by inaccurately reporting two
of his credit card accounts as delinquent and then failing to correct the error.
Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), Appellees’ obligation to correct an error is
triggered only if they receive a notice of a dispute from a credit reporting agency.
See Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1154 (9th Cir. 2009)
(explaining that the § 1681s-2(b) “obligations are triggered upon notice of
dispute—that is, when a person who furnished information to a CRA receives
notice from the CRA that the consumer disputes the information”). Pace did not
make this allegation. The district court properly held that Pace’s claim, based the
allegation that he personally sent his dispute to Appellees, failed as a matter of law.
Id. (“[N]otice of a dispute received directly from the consumer does not trigger
furnishers’ duties under subsection (b)”).
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However, the district court erred in denying Pace leave to file the second
amended complaint. The second amended complaint alleges that Pace sent dispute
letters to the credit reporting agencies and Pace deletes the allegation that the credit
reporting agencies did not notify Appellees of the dispute. Under § 1681i, the
credit reporting agencies were required to notify Appellees of Pace’s dispute
within five days of receiving his dispute. 15 U.S.C § 1681i(a)(2)(A). Viewing the
complaint in the light most favorable to the pleader, it is reasonable to infer that the
credit reporting agencies obeyed the law, and that Appellees received notice of
Pace’s dispute from the credit reporting agencies. See Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ.
Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) ("A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged."). This, in turn, would have triggered Appellees’
obligations under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). Pace adequately alleges that Appellees
did not meet those obligations, and otherwise has stated a prima facie claim for
relief under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b).
We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of Appellees’ motion to dismiss
and REVERSE and REMAND the district court’s denial of Pace’s motion for
leave to file a second amended complaint. Each party to bear its own costs.
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