UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4814
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LEMAR RAYMOND DASHER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:12-cr-00128-BR-1)
Submitted: July 19, 2013 Decided: August 14, 2013
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Joshua L. Rogers, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
In July 2012, Lemar Raymond Dasher pled guilty without
a plea agreement to one count of bank robbery, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2006). The district court sentenced Dasher
to 78 months’ imprisonment, the top of the applicable Guidelines
range. Dasher timely appeals, arguing that the 78-month
sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is greater
than necessary to comply with the purposes of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2006).
This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness,
applying a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Where, as here, the
defendant does not challenge the procedural reasonableness of
his sentence, we review the sentence only for substantive
reasonableness under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Id.;
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010). The
sentence imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes [of sentencing].” 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a). In reviewing a sentence for substantive
reasonableness, we “examine[] the totality of the
circumstances.” United States v. Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212,
216 (4th Cir. 2010). If the sentence is within the properly
calculated Guidelines range, we presume on appeal that the
sentence is substantively reasonable. United States v. Susi,
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674 F.3d 278, 289 (4th Cir. 2012). Such a presumption is
rebutted only by showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (2006) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Dasher argues that the totality of the circumstances
in his case do not warrant a sentence at the top of the
Guidelines range. Dasher concedes that a three-level
enhancement for possession of a weapon was properly applied to
him. He argues, however, that the fact that he did not actually
possess a weapon, but only created the appearance of a gun in a
bandaged hand, should have weighed more heavily in his favor.
“[D]istrict courts have extremely broad discretion
when determining the weight to be given each of the § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir.
2011). In imposing a sentence at the top of the Guidelines
range, the district court focused on the violent threat made by
Dasher during the bank robbery and on his past criminal history.
Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in
according significant weight to these factors, we conclude that
Dasher has failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness
accorded his within-Guidelines sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm Dasher’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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