UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4200
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JUDY MARIE LASSITER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:09-cr-00244-HEH-1)
Submitted: July 25, 2013 Decided: August 15, 2013
Before KING, AGEE, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Craig W. Sampson, BARNES & DIEHL, P.C., Chesterfield, Virginia,
for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney,
Alexandria, Virginia, Michael R. Gill, Assistant United States
Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Judy Marie Lassiter appeals the district court’s
judgment revoking her supervised release and imposing a thirty-
six-month sentence. Lassiter asserts that her sentence is
plainly unreasonable because: it is above her advisory
sentencing range and the district court’s explanation for the
sentence imposed allegedly did not justify such a high sentence;
she was not convicted of the state crimes of which she was
accused at the time of her revocation hearing; and she claims
that the district court “did not appear to lend any weight to
the fact that [her] child suffered from leukemia and might need
the assistance of his mother.” Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
In reviewing a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release, this court “takes a more deferential
appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of
discretion than reasonableness review for guidelines sentences.”
United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we will affirm a
supervised release revocation sentence if it is not plainly
unreasonable. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th
Cir. 2010). The first step is to determine whether the sentence
is unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 438
(4th Cir. 2006). Only if the sentence is procedurally or
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substantively unreasonable will the inquiry proceed to the
second step, which is to determine whether the sentence is
plainly unreasonable. Id. at 438-39.
A sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court has considered the policy statements contained in Chapter
Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines and the applicable 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2013) factors, Crudup, 461
F.3d at 440, and has adequately explained the chosen sentence,
although it need not explain the sentence in as much detail as
when imposing the original sentence. Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547.
When reviewing a sentence above the sentencing range, we “may
consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due
deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a)
factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall
v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). “The sentencing judge
should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he
has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis
for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” United
States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal
brackets and quotation marks omitted). Although the Carter
rationale applies to revocation hearings, “[a] court need not be
as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as
it must be when imposing a post-conviction sentence[.]”
Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (noting that a district court’s
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reasoning may be “clear from context” and that the court’s
statements throughout the sentencing hearing may be considered).
A sentence is substantively reasonable if the district
court states a proper basis for its imposition of a sentence up
to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. Ultimately,
however, the district court has broad discretion to revoke
probation and impose a sentence up to that maximum. Moulden,
478 F.3d at 657.
We conclude that Lassiter’s thirty-six-month sentence
is not unreasonable. To the contrary, the district court
correctly calculated the policy statement range, adequately
explained its sentence, appropriately relied on the § 3553(a)
factors, and sentenced Lassiter to the statutory maximum
applicable to her offense. Although the district court imposed
a sentence above the advisory policy statement range, the
district court noted that it was doing so because Lassiter
egregiously breached the court’s trust only five months after
her release from prison. Moreover, although the district court
heard Lassiter’s arguments for leniency, it nonetheless found
that the other factors in the case outweighed these
circumstances; in conjunction with the nature and circumstances
of Lassiter’s scheme to defraud, considering Lassiter’s criminal
history, and “considering the fact that a sentence of 36 months
previously had no deterring effect whatsoever,” the district
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court determined that a thirty-six-month above-sentencing range
sentence was “adequate, but not longer than necessary[.]”
We conclude that the district court’s rationale was
justified and discern no procedural or substantive error in the
imposition of Lassiter’s sentence. See U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b) (2012) (“[A]t revocation,
the court should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of
trust, while taking into account, to a limited degree, the
seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history
of the violator.”). Having discerned no procedural or
substantive error in the district court’s imposition of a
thirty-six-month sentence, “it necessarily follows that
[Lassiter’s] sentence is not plainly unreasonable.” Crudup, 461
F.3d at 440.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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