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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-13618
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:12-cr-00003-RH-CAS-9
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LATOSHA DAWN GLOVER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(August 20, 2013)
Before HULL, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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After pleading guilty to conspiracy to defraud the government, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 286, Latosha Dawn Glover appeals her 66-month sentence, which
the district court ordered be served consecutively to Glover’s undischarged three-
year state sentence. On appeal, Glover argues that her 66-month sentence is
procedurally and substantively unreasonable. After review, we affirm.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
We review the reasonableness of a sentence using a “deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591,
(2007). In reviewing sentences for reasonableness, we determine, first, whether
the district court committed any significant procedural error, such as
miscalculating the guidelines range, treating the guidelines as mandatory, failing to
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to explain adequately the chosen sentence. United States
v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008).1
Second, we examine whether the sentence was “substantively reasonable
under the totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Turner, 626 F.3d 566,
1
The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for
deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the
Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9)
the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to
victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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573 (11th Cir. 2010). The defendant bears the burden to show her sentence is
unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. Pugh, 515 F.3d at
1189. The abuse of discretion standard “allows a range of choice for the district
court, so long as that choice does not constitute a clear error of judgment.” United
States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
II. PROCEDURAL REASONABLENESS
As to procedural error, Glover argues that the district court erred by ordering
that her 66-month sentence be served consecutively to an undischarged three-year
state sentence without considering the § 3553(a) factors.2
Under 18 U.S.C. 3584, “if a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant
who is already subject to an undischarged term of imprisonment,” the district court
has the discretion to run the prison term “concurrently or consecutively.” 18
U.S.C. § 3584(a). Further, “[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different
times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run
concurrently.” Id. In deciding whether to impose a concurrent or consecutive
term, § 3584 requires the district court to “consider, as to each offense for which a
term of imprisonment is being imposed,” the § 3553(a) factors. Id. § 3584(b).
2
When Glover committed the instant federal fraud offense, she was serving five years’
probation for a 2009 Florida conviction for cheating by passing bad checks. In March 2011,
after Glover’s February 2011 arrest on the federal fraud charge, a Florida state court revoked her
probation and sentenced her to three years’ imprisonment.
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Likewise, under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, “the sentence for the instant offense may
be imposed to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior
undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a reasonable punishment for the
instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c). Both 18 U.S.C. § 3584 and U.S.S.G.
§ 5G1.3 “evince a preference for consecutive sentences when imprisonment terms
are imposed at different times.” United States v. Ballard, 6 F.3d 1502, 1506 (11th
Cir. 1993).
Here, the record reflects that the district court considered the § 3553(a)
factors before ordering Glover’s federal sentence be served consecutive to her state
sentence. After Glover requested that the district court order her federal sentence
to run concurrently with her state sentence, the district court stated that it had
considered the § 3553(a) factors and discussed several of them, and then imposed a
66-month sentence. Glover then asked whether the sentence was to run
concurrently with her state sentence, to which the district court replied, “It is not.
It’s a separate offense. The law in general provides that it’s a separate sentence, it
will be served separately.”
Although the district court, in clarifying that the sentence would run
consecutively, did not repeat its explanation of why the § 3553(a) factors supported
Glover’s sentence or specifically discuss how the § 3553(a) factors justified a
consecutive sentence, Glover cites no authority requiring the district court to do so.
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This Court has concluded that an acknowledgment by the district court that it has
considered the § 3553(a) factors is generally sufficient. See United States v. Scott,
426 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2005). Moreover, as the district court noted, the
general preference for consecutive sentences in separate criminal cases militated in
favor of consecutive terms in Glover’s case. Accordingly, Glover has not shown
that the district court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors in determining
whether to run her federal sentence consecutively or concurrently to her state
sentence.
III. SUBSTANTIVE REASONABLENESS
Glover also has not shown that the district court’s 66-month federal
sentence, run consecutively to her three-year state sentence, was substantively
unreasonable.
Glover participated in an extensive fraud ring in which the members
obtained identification information, electronically filed tax returns, and opened
checking accounts at banks to receive the fraudulently obtained tax refunds. As
part of this scheme, Glover: (1) supplied her sister, the ringleader of the
conspiracy, with names and social security numbers with which to file false tax
returns; (2) copied identification information into notebooks and added fictitious e-
mail addresses to facilitate electronic filing; and (3) prepared false tax returns
using the information from the notebooks.
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In 2011, Glover and her sister filed 211 fraudulent tax returns, claiming
$1,136,888.00, and the IRS issued them $326,149.00 in refunds. These tax returns
involved the identities of 176 individuals who died in 2010. The deceased
individuals’ identities were obtained via the website ancestry.com, which afforded
access to the Social Security Death Index, and the fraudulent tax returns were filed
in close proximity to the individuals’ deaths to help conceal the fraud.
In addition, Glover filed fraudulent tax returns in 2008, 2009 and 2010 in her
own name, for a total fraudulent tax refund of $20,937.00. Glover also has an
extensive history of theft- and fraud-related crimes, including grand theft, petit
theft, five separate convictions for uttering a forged check and convictions for
obtaining property for worthless check, using a counterfeit payment instrument and
cheating by passing worthless checks.
At sentencing, the district court granted the government’s U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1
motion and departed downward from the advisory guidelines range of 84 to 105
months to 66 months based on Glover’s substantial assistance.
The district court then stated that it had considered Glover’s role in the
offense and “all of the circumstances,” and that “there are factors that cut each
way.” The district court noted that Glover had a “difficult background,” with a
mother who had a gambling problem and an abusive father, but she also had a
significant criminal history involving fraud-related crimes. The district court
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stressed the seriousness of Glover’s offense, stating that Glover had abused the tax
system, which created the infrastructure supporting the U.S. economy and relied on
honest tax returns to function successfully. The district court likened Glover’s
offense to “walking into the government office and taking money out of the till.”
The district court explained that “[w]hen people can steal 300,000 or more dollars
in a couple of years with a whole lot less work than it takes to do it honestly, there
has to be a punishment for it.” The district court stated that while it did not “like
sentencing a parent to prison,” a “substantial” sentence was appropriate under all
the circumstances. The district court also stated that it had considered all of the
§ 3553(a) factors and, while it was “not going to go through each of the 3553(a)
factors” separately if the parties wanted the court “to address anything specifically,
[the court will] do it.”
In short, the district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and concluded
that a 66-month sentence, to be served consecutively to Glover’s unexpired state
sentence, was the appropriate sentence. In light of the seriousness of Glover’s tax-
fraud conspiracy and her extensive criminal history of other fraud-related offenses,
we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in running Glover’s 66-month
federal sentence consecutive to her three-year state sentence.
AFFIRMED.
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