UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4155
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHERRILL MILLER PANAYOTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:11-cr-00057-MOC-1)
Submitted: August 22, 2013 Decided: August 26, 2013
Before MOTZ, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Randolph M. Lee, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy
Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sherrill Miller Panayoton pled guilty pursuant to a
plea agreement to one count each of conspiracy to defraud the
United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006), and
conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18
U.S.C.A. §§ 1956(h), 1957 (West 2000 & Supp. 2013), and was
sentenced to forty-one months in prison. Panayoton’s counsel
filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738 (1967), stating that, in counsel’s view, there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but asking this court to
determine whether Panayoton received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Panayoton has not filed a pro se supplemental brief,
despite receiving notice of her right to do so, and the
Government has declined to file a responsive brief. We affirm.
Counsel questions whether Panayoton received
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel because
defense counsel failed to rebut the Government’s argument at
sentencing that Panayoton did not voluntarily disclose her
crimes to law enforcement. In the absence of conclusive
evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel on the face of the
record, however, such claims are not cognizable on direct
appeal. United States v. Powell, 680 F.3d 350, 359 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 376 (2012). Rather, “[c]laims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are normally raised before the
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district court via 28 U.S.C. § 2255[.]” Id. Because the record
does not conclusively establish that counsel rendered
ineffective assistance at sentencing, we decline to address this
claim on direct appeal. Although Panayoton’s claim is
premature, she may, of course, reassert it in a § 2255 habeas
motion.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Panayoton, in writing, of the right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Panayoton requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Panayoton. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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