Supreme Court
No. 2012-53-Appeal.
(PC 07-5827)
Cheryl Daniels, Individually and as Mother :
and Next Friend of Anthony Daniels, a minor
v. :
Zachery Fluette et al. :
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250
Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-
3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.
Supreme Court
No. 2012-53-Appeal.
(PC 07-5827)
Cheryl Daniels, Individually and as Mother :
and Next Friend of Anthony Daniels, a minor
v. :
Zachery Fluette et al. :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
OPINION
Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court. Cheryl Daniels (plaintiff), individually and as
mother and next friend of Anthony Daniels, appeals from a Superior Court judgment granting the
defendant Bishop Hendricken High School’s (school) motion for summary judgment. 1 The
plaintiff argues that the hearing justice erred in holding that the school did not breach its duty to
provide a safe learning environment. Specifically, she contends that the school failed to
supervise its students and failed to protect its students by using safety glass in a bathroom
window. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an order directing the parties to
show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. After
considering the parties’ written and oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that
cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing or
1
The Superior Court also granted summary judgment in favor of the school’s principal, Brother
Thomas R. Leto. However, Brother Leto was sued only in his official capacity, and plaintiff
offered no objection to the granting of summary judgment in his favor. Accordingly, he is not a
party to this appeal. Zachery Fluette also is no longer a party, having settled with plaintiff prior
to the hearing of this appeal.
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argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior
Court.
I
Facts and Procedural History
The facts underlying this case are not in dispute. 2 On January 12, 2006, after classes had
concluded for the day at Bishop Hendricken High School, Anthony Daniels, a member of the
school’s hockey team, remained on the premises to work out in the weight room. After leaving
the weight room, and while waiting for his mother to pick him up, Daniels spotted his friend
Oliver Goudiably. Daniels went over to Goudiably’s locker, grabbed his book bag, and ran to
the boys’ bathroom. Daniels entered a stall and pretended he was going to flush Goudiably’s bag
down the toilet, announcing that it was going into the drain. Goudiably gave chase and brought
in reinforcements, arriving in the boys’ bathroom accompanied by Zachery Fluette. Fluette
kicked the stall door, which hit Daniels in the head. Fluette then pushed him, causing Daniels to
stumble toward a window. Daniels instinctively put up his hands, shattering the glass and
causing a laceration to his wrist.
On October 31, 2007, plaintiff filed suit against Fluette, the school, and its agents,
alleging negligence. In 2011, the Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the
school and Brother Leto. Final judgment was entered and plaintiff timely appealed.
II
Standard of Review
This Court will review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, “employing
the same standards and rules used by the hearing justice.” Great American E & S Insurance Co.
2
Because the underlying facts are undisputed, we glean them from the hearing justice’s bench
decision in this case.
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v. End Zone Pub & Grill of Narragansett, Inc., 45 A.3d 571, 574 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Generation
Realty, LLC v. Catanzaro, 21 A.3d 253, 258 (R.I. 2011)). “We will affirm a lower court’s
decision only if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Generation Realty, LLC, 21 A.3d at
258). “Moreover, the nonmoving party bears the burden of proving by competent evidence the
existence of a disputed issue of material fact and cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials in
the pleadings, mere conclusions or mere legal opinions.” Id. (quoting Narragansett Improvement
Co. v. Wheeler, 21 A.3d 430, 438 (R.I. 2011)).
III
Discussion
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the hearing justice erred in granting summary judgment in
favor of defendant because the school had a duty to supervise its students, which plaintiff
contends it breached by neither discouraging nor detecting the horseplay in the boys’ bathroom.
The plaintiff asserts that the level of supervision required is a question of fact that should have
been determined by a jury. Further, plaintiff argues that the school had a duty to protect its
students from harm and that, because the horseplay in the boys’ bathroom was reasonably
foreseeable, the school had a duty to install safety glass in the boys’ bathroom window.
The defendant argues that, because the incident occurred after school and not at the
location of any after-school activity, the school did not have a duty to supervise Daniels.
Additionally, defendant asserts that even assuming it had a duty to supervise Daniels, schools
cannot be held to be insurers of their students’ safety and any liability should be limited to
injuries proximately caused by a lack of supervision. The school points out that there had been
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no complaints about Fluette’s conduct and that, therefore, there was no way to foresee this
incident. Further, the school notes that Daniels’s conduct in initiating the prank was the direct
cause of his injury. Finally, defendant argues that because safety glass was not required by the
building code in effect at the time the school was constructed and indeed is not required by the
present building code, the fact that the glass in the bathroom window was not safety glass is not
evidence of a breach of duty. Accordingly, defendant asserts that the hearing justice was correct
in granting its motion for summary judgment.
A
Duty to Supervise
“It is well settled that to prevail on a claim of negligence ‘a plaintiff must establish a
legally cognizable duty owed by a defendant to a plaintiff, a breach of that duty, proximate
causation between the conduct and the resulting injury, and the actual loss or damage.’”
Habershaw v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 42 A.3d 1273, 1276 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Holley v. Argonaut
Holdings, Inc., 968 A.2d 271, 274 (R.I. 2009)). The plaintiff argues that defendant’s duty is
established both by G.L. 1956 § 16-2-17 and by the school’s handbook.
Section 16-2-17(a) states that students have “a right to attend * * * a school which is safe
and secure, and which is conducive to learning, and which is free from the threat, actual or
implied, of physical harm by a disruptive student.” However, we consider the argument based
on § 16-2-17 to be meritless—since that statute clearly does not relate to non-public schools such
as Bishop Hendricken High School.
The Bishop Hendricken Student Handbook provides that:
“Designated supervisors of extracurricular activities are on duty for
necessary times before, during, and after their respective activities.
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“Parents can expect the official supervision of students during the
school day to begin at 7:15 AM until 4:30 PM. The time of
official supervision of students during extracurricular activities
begins at the moment when the first student arrives for the activity
until such time as all students have departed. After school,
students are limited to the cafeteria and the foyer area * * *.
Outside these times of official supervision, students who are on
campus must observe policies, regulations and procedures
governing our school community.
“Parents should be aware that the school will not be responsible for
students on campus outside times of official supervision.”
Daniels stated that he remained on campus to work out, as part of the school’s hockey
program, and that, after working out, was on his way to the cafeteria when he ran into
Goudiably. The evidence does not indicate whether the workout was a formal extracurricular
activity as opposed to an individual pursuit tangentially linked to the hockey team. The
questions of whether Daniels was participating in an extracurricular activity, and whether that
activity had ended are questions of material fact. However, the hearing justice assumed without
deciding that a duty existed. This is consistent with the summary judgment standard of viewing
all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, here, plaintiff. See Great American
E & S Insurance Co., 45 A.3d at 574. For purposes of our review, this Court will likewise
assume without deciding that a duty existed.
Determining whether the school breached its duty by failing to adequately supervise the
boys at the time of the incident requires us to determine the extent of supervision necessary in a
high school setting. This Court addressed this issue in Medeiros v. Sitrin, 984 A.2d 620, 626-27
(R.I. 2009). 3 In that case, a high school student was arriving late to class when he was injured by
two other students in an altercation that took place in a lab area just outside of the classroom. Id.
3
As in the instant case, in Medeiros v. Sitrin, 984 A.2d 620, 626 (R.I. 2009), this Court stated,
“for the purposes of this appeal, we will assume, without deciding, that [the defendant] had a
duty to supervise [the students] * * *.”
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at 623. The injured student filed suit against the teacher and the city, alleging that the teacher
failed to adequately supervise “foreseeably late students who would have to travel through the
lab to reach the classroom.” Id. at 624. However, because the plaintiff failed to identify “a
specific act or omission * * * that indicated a deviation from the proper standard of care,” we
held that the defendants did not breach their supervisory duties. Id. at 626 (quoting Morales v.
Town of Johnston, 895 A.2d 721, 732 (R.I. 2006)). We noted that “even the case law from other
jurisdictions * * * cite[d] to support the proposed standard of care for teachers in supervising
their students does not contemplate that a teacher’s physical absence from a student is
necessarily a breach of the duty to supervise.” Id. at 627.
Here, plaintiff offers no specific act or omission by defendant other than the fact that no
teacher or administrator was present to discourage or detect the horseplay. Absent a specific act
or omission, we are reluctant to impose upon schools a standard that would require them to post
monitors at each bathroom during after-school hours. We note that other jurisdictions have held
that “schools are not the insurers of the safety of their students, ‘perfection in supervision’ is not
required, and schools are not liable for ‘every thoughtless or careless act by which one pupil may
injure another.’” Armellino v. Thomase, 899 N.Y.S.2d 339, 340 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (quoting
Lawes v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 213 N.E.2d 667, 668-69 (N.Y. 1965)).
In determining the degree of supervision required, other jurisdictions have focused on the
foreseeability of the injury. In Miller v. Yoshimoto, 536 P.2d 1195, 1198, 1200-01 (Haw. 1975),
the Hawaii Supreme Court held that a school was not liable for injuries sustained by a student
who was hit by rocks thrown by another child in an area between two campus buildings. The
incident occurred just after the school day ended, as the children were walking home. Id. at
1196, 1198. There was no supervision of that area of the campus at the time of the incident. Id.
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at 1200. The court held that the absence of “personnel assigned specifically to supervise the area
in which [the student] was injured” was not sufficient to show a breach of the duty of reasonable
supervision. Id. Rather, the Hawaii court looked to the foreseeability of the injury:
“The duty of reasonable supervision does not require the
[school] to provide personnel to supervise every portion of the
school buildings and campus area. However, if certain specific
areas are known to the [school] as dangerous, or the [school]
should have known that a specific area is dangerous, or the
[school] knew or should have known that certain students would or
may conduct themselves in a manner dangerous to the welfare of
others, [the] duty of reasonable supervision would require specific
supervision of those situations.” Id.
More recently, a New York court employed a similar standard, holding that, in order to
find that a school breached its duty to supervise, a plaintiff must show that the acts of the
defendant students were foreseeable: “[T]o find that a school breached the duty to provide
adequate supervision ‘in the context of injuries caused by the acts of fellow students,’ it must be
demonstrated * * * ‘that the third-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated.’” Rose v.
Onteora Central School District, 861 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (quoting Mirand
v. City of New York, 637 N.E.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. 1994)). In Rose, 861 N.Y.S.2d at 443, the
plaintiff student was injured when a fellow student, as a prank, closed a classroom door on his
hand. The plaintiff student sued the school district, alleging negligent supervision. Id. In
holding that the school was not liable, the court noted that the incident was not reasonably
foreseeable because there was no history of disciplinary problems in the classroom where the
incident took place, nor was there a history of disciplinary problems among the students
involved. Id. at 444. The court noted that “constant supervision of students at the high school
level is not required” and concluded that the incident “was the result of a spontaneous and
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careless prank among high school friends such that [the] defendant could not have reasonably
anticipated its occurrence or prevented it.” Id. at 443, 444.
We agree that, rather than hold schools to the standard of being insurers of their students’
safety, a plaintiff seeking to hold a school liable for injuries resulting from the acts of another
student must show that such acts could have been reasonably foreseen by the school. Here,
plaintiff offered no evidence that there was a history of “horseplay” in the area where the
incident took place. 4 Nor was there any evidence offered that complaints had been made about
Fluette’s conduct. Absent even the allegation of such a history, it was not error for the hearing
justice to grant summary judgment for defendant, as plaintiff has not proven the existence of a
disputed issue of material fact.
B
Safety Glass
Alternatively, plaintiff argues that the school had a duty to protect its students and that its
failure to install safety glass in the boys’ bathroom window was a breach of that duty. Further,
plaintiff asserts that the school’s reliance on its compliance with past and present building codes
provides no defense to its negligence. In support of this argument, plaintiff offers several cases
in which courts have held that failure to install safety glass in heavily used doors may be the
basis of liability, notwithstanding the fact that safety glass was not required by the building
codes. See Johnson v. City of Boston, 490 N.E.2d 1204, 1205, 1206 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986)
(holding that the plaintiff had proven that a swinging door to the auditorium, used by students
who were likely to be “high spirited” or “distracted,” was a “recognizable hazard,” despite the
fact that the building code did not require the replacement of the door panel with safety glass);
4
Only if there were some evidence of such a history could the issue be beyond summary
judgment and subject to a determination by the trier of fact.
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Trimarco v. Klein, 436 N.E.2d 502, 503, 506 (N.Y. 1982) (holding that the evidence of custom
and usage of installing shatterproof glass in shower doors was sufficient to establish a question
of fact as to whether reasonable prudence required a landlord to replace the existing plain glass
door); Wheeler v. Jones, 431 P.2d 985, 988, 989 (Utah 1967) (affirming a jury verdict against a
defendant who failed to install safety glass in a sliding door to a pool area used exclusively by
children).
The plaintiff’s reliance on these “door cases” is misplaced. In each of these cases, the
hazard was quite foreseeable. In Johnson, 490 N.E.2d at 1205, 1206, the swinging door was
located in a high traffic location, and the pane of glass was situated such that the plaintiff, in
pushing the door, inadvertently put his hand through the glass. The glass at issue in Trimarco,
436 N.E.2d at 503, 504, was in a bathtub enclosure, long after the danger posed by using non-
shatterproof glass in bath enclosures was recognized. Similarly, the sliding glass door in
Wheeler, 431 P.2d at 988, was used by children as the entrance to a swimming pool, and the
hazard posed by the glass was readily apparent. By contrast, in this case there was no evidence
submitted that the window in the boys’ bathroom received heavy use or that it was situated in
such a way as to pose a particular danger. On the contrary, defendants offered an affidavit that
stated that the glass in that window had not been replaced since the school was built in 1959.
Unlike the “door cases,” here plaintiff presented no evidence at all that would tend to show that it
was foreseeable that a student could be injured as a result of the school’s failure to install safety
glass.
While compliance with building codes alone may not provide a complete defense, the
school had no reason to foresee that the window might pose a danger, and imposing liability here
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would be tantamount to making the school an insurer of its students. Accordingly, we find no
error with the hearing justice’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court. The record
of this case shall be returned to the Superior Court.
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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE: Cheryl Daniels, Individually and as Mother and Next Friend of
Anthony Daniels, a minor v. Zachery Fluette et al.
CASE NO: No. 2012-53-Appeal.
(PC 07-5827)
COURT: Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED: April 12, 2013
JUSTICES: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
WRITTEN BY: Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell
SOURCE OF APPEAL: Providence County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice Brian Van Couyghen
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For Plaintiff: Carl P. DeLuca, Esq.
For Defendant: Faith A. LaSalle, Esq.