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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-10975
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:12-cr-00014-BAE-GRS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIAM LUTHER DOUGLAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(September 9, 2013)
Before DUBINA, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Appellant William Luther Douglas appeals the district court’s imposition of
a 56-month sentence after he pled guilty to one count of being a felon in possession
of a gun, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2). The presentence
investigation report (“PSI”) determined his guideline imprisonment range to be 18
to 24 months. However, the probation officer recommended a sentence of 48
months’ imprisonment on the bases that (1) the offense involved eight guns, six of
which were hidden in the wall behind a bookcase; and (2) Douglas had three prior
convictions: a 1983 grand larceny conviction, a 1994 sexual offense in the third
degree conviction, and a child molestation conviction, for which he was not
imprisoned and he did not count in his criminal history score. The probation
officer also noted that each of the sexual offenses involved Douglas’s underage
daughters. The district court sentenced Douglas to 56 months’ imprisonment
based on the nature and circumstances of his offense, the need for adequate
deterrence, and the need to protect the public from Douglas.
On appeal, Douglas argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable in
light of the sentencing factors. He contends that his prior felonies are substantively
unrelated to the instant offense and asserts that there is no evidence of any
wrongdoing beyond his possession of the guns. He additionally argues that his
prior felonies are too remote in time to be related to the instant offense and
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emphasizes that he did not have any intervening convictions. Thus, he submits that
the district court erred by overemphasizing his criminal history.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591
(2007). “We may set aside a sentence only if we determine, after giving a full
measure of deference to the sentencing judge, that the sentence imposed truly is
unreasonable.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1191 (11th Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
The district court must impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), including
the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,
provide just punishment for the offense, deter criminal conduct, and protect the
public from the defendant’s future criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In
imposing a particular sentence, the court must also consider the nature and
circumstances of the offense, the history and characteristics of the defendant, the
kinds of sentences available, the applicable guideline range, the pertinent policy
statements of the Sentencing Commission, the need to avoid unwarranted
sentencing disparities, and the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
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If the district court determines that a sentence outside the applicable
guideline range is appropriate, it must consider the extent of the deviation and
provide sufficient justification for the degree of the variance. United States v.
Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008). Likewise, although sentences
outside the guidelines are not presumed to be unreasonable, “we may take the
extent of any variance into our calculus.” United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230,
1237 (11th Cir. 2009). However, we “must give due deference to the district
court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the
variance.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597.
“The party challenging the sentence bears the burden to show it is
unreasonable in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v.
Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). In determining a reasonable
sentence, the district court may consider facts that have already been taken into
account in calculating the defendant’s guideline range. Williams, 526 F.3d
at 1324. The district court is free to consider any information relevant to a
defendant’s background, character, and conduct in imposing an upward variance.
Tome, 611 F.3d at 1379.
We reverse only if “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district
court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by
arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by
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the facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different
sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597. A sentence imposed well below the
statutory maximum penalty is an indicator of a reasonable sentence. See United
States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the district court
adequately discussed the sentencing factors and determined that they required an
above-the-guidelines sentence. Douglas’s offense of unlawfully possessing eight
guns and concealing six of them was very serious. Additionally, his history of
sexually abusing his daughters demonstrated that he was a threat to his family and
society. Thus, the district court appropriately concluded that Douglas’s sentence
needed to provide adequate deterrence and protect the public from him; therefore,
the sentence was substantively reasonable. See Tome, 611 F.3d at 1379; Gall, 552
U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Additionally, Douglas’s sentence was well below the
10-year statutory maximum sentence, which is an indicator of the reasonableness
of his sentence. See Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. For the above-stated reasons, we
affirm Douglas’s sentence as reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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