Kexin Wu v. Holder

11-2597-ag Wu v. Holder BIA A088 777 215 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 10th day of September, two thousand thirteen. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 ROSEMARY S. POOLER, 8 PETER W. HALL, 9 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _______________________________________ 12 13 KEXIN WU, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 11-2597-ag 17 NAC 18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES 19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _______________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: Michael Brown, New York. 24 25 FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney 26 General; Alison Marie Igoe, Senior 27 Litigation Counsel; John M. McAdams, 28 Jr., Attorney, Office of Immigration 29 Litigation, United States Department 30 of Justice, Washington, D.C. 1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review 4 is DENIED. 5 Kexin Wu, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic 6 of China, seeks review of a June 2, 2011, decision of the 7 BIA denying his motion to reopen. In re Kexin Wu, No. A088 8 777 215 (B.I.A. June 2, 2011). We assume the parties’ 9 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history 10 of this case. 11 We review the BIA’s denial of Wu’s motion to reopen for 12 abuse of discretion, mindful of the Supreme Court’s 13 admonition that such motions are “disfavored.” Ali v. 14 Gonzales, 448 F.3d 515, 517 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam). 15 The BIA may deny a motion to reopen where a movant fails to 16 establish a prima facie case for the underlying substantive 17 relief sought. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104 (1988). 18 Because Wu failed to establish his prima facie 19 eligibility for relief based on his newly-commenced practice 20 of Falun Gong, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in 21 denying reopening. See Abudu, 485 U.S. at 104-105; Ali, 448 22 F.3d at 517. In support of his motion, Wu submitted a 23 notice from the Qida Villager Committee, which indicated 2 1 that the committee was aware of Wu’s Falun Gong activities 2 in the United States and ordered his wife to urge him to 3 stop participating in Falun Gong activities and return to 4 China to be punished. However, the BIA was entitled to 5 accord little probative weight to this village notice 6 because, as the BIA found, it was “unsigned,” “not 7 authenticated in any manner,” and “not sufficiently 8 reliable.” See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 9 F.3d 315, 342 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the weight 10 afforded to the applicant’s evidence in immigration 11 proceedings lies largely within the discretion of the 12 agency). Likewise, the BIA reasonably accorded little 13 probative weight to Wu’s wife’s affidavit because it found 14 that the letter possessed little indicia of reliability, 15 particularly in light of the fact that Wu’s wife admitted 16 that an unidentified person wrote the affidavit on her 17 behalf and because the affidavit merely described the 18 circumstances surrounding Wu’s wife’s receipt of the 19 unauthenticated village notice, to which the BIA already had 20 declined to give probative weight. See Xiao Ji Chen, 471 21 F.3d at 342; see also Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 22 (2d Cir. 2007). 23 Wu argues that the BIA abused its discretion by relying 24 on his failure to authenticate the village committee notice 25 and his wife’s affidavit. While Wu correctly asserts that 3 1 the agency errs when it rejects a document solely based on 2 an individual’s failure to authenticate pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 3 § 1287.6, see Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 428 F.3d 4 391, 404-405 (2d Cir. 2005), we find no abuse of discretion 5 here, where the BIA gave Wu’s evidence limited weight 6 because the notice was unsigned and unauthenticated and 7 neither the notice nor the affidavit possessed indicia of 8 reliability, see Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 342. 9 Finally, the BIA reasonably found that Wu’s claim — 10 that unknown individuals reported his Falun Gong activities 11 to Chinese officials after hearing of his activities from 12 other unidentified individuals with whom Wu had talked in 13 the United States — lacked specificity. See Abudu, 485 U.S. 14 at 110 (stating that an alien carries a “heavy burden” of 15 demonstrating that the proffered new evidence would likely 16 alter the result in his case). Accordingly, because Wu 17 failed to successfully establish his prima facie eligibility 18 for relief, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying 19 his motion to reopen. Id. at 104; Ali, 448 F.3d at 517. 20 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 21 DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion 22 for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. 23 FOR THE COURT: 24 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 4