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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-16250
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 5:04-cr-00022-CAR-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLEVELAND WEBSTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
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(September 13, 2013)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Cleveland Webster appeals pro se the district court’s denial of his 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) motion for a sentence reduction. After pleading guilty in 2004 to
distributing crack cocaine, Webster was sentenced as a career offender to 188
months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Webster argues that he is entitled to a sentence
reduction pursuant to Dorsey v. United States, 567 U.S. ___, ___, 132 S. Ct. 2321,
2335–36 (2012), the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (FSA), Pub. L. No. 111–220, 124
Stat. 2372 (2010), and Amendment 750 to the Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G.
App. C, Amend. 750. 1
We review de novo the district court’s legal conclusions concerning the
scope of its authority under § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Moore, 541 F.3d 1323,
1326 (11th Cir. 2008). The FSA, which became effective on August 3, 2010,
“lowered the statutory mandatory minimum penalties for crack cocaine offenses.”
United States v. Berry, 701 F.3d 374, 377 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). The FSA,
however, is not a guideline amendment by the Sentencing Commission, and cannot
serve as a basis for a § 3582(c)(2) sentence reduction. Id. The FSA does not apply
retroactively to sentences imposed prior to its enactment date. Id. at 377–78
(rejecting argument that, under Dorsey, the FSA’s lower mandatory minimums
applied to defendants sentenced before the FSA’s enactment). Amendment 750
1
Although Webster also challenges his career offender status, that determination was
made at the original sentencing. Because a § 3582 proceeding is not a de novo resentencing, we
do not have jurisdiction to revisit it. See United States v. Moreno, 421 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th
Cir. 2005) (per curiam); United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778, 781–82 (11th Cir. 2000).
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revised the crack cocaine quantity tables to conform to the FSA. See U.S.S.G.
App. C, Amend. 750. It was made retroactive by Amendment 759, effective
November 1, 2011. See id., Amend. 759.
A reduction under § 3582(c)(2) is not authorized where the applicable
amendment “does not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable
guideline range because of the operation of another guideline.” Moore, 541 F.3d
at 1327–28 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). This
includes situations in which the defendant’s applicable guideline range is
calculated through the application of the career offender guideline. Id. at 1328.
Moore remains binding precedent in this Circuit. United States v. Lawson, 686
F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 568 (2012).
Therefore, a defendant who was convicted of a crack cocaine offense but sentenced
as a career offender remains ineligible for a § 3582(c)(2) reduction under
Amendment 750. Id.
Here, the district court sentenced Webster for his crack cocaine offense as a
career offender. Webster was sentenced in 2005, long before the FSA’s 2010
enactment date. His argument that he is entitled to the lower mandatory minimums
based on Dorsey is foreclosed. See Berry, 701 F.3d at 377. Likewise, Webster’s
argument that he is entitled to a § 3582 reduction, despite his status as a career
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offender, is foreclosed by our decision in Lawson. 686 F.3d at 1321. Accordingly,
a sentence reduction is not authorized under § 3582(c)(2).
AFFIRMED.
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