UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4082
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TRENTON JAQUAN RALEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:11-cr-00293-MOC-2)
Submitted: September 9, 2013 Decided: September 16, 2013
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Aaron E. Michel, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne
M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, Melissa L. Rikard,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Trenton Jaquan Raley pled guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to Hobbs Act robbery and aiding and
abetting same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 & 2 (2006), and
brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence and aiding and
abetting same, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) & 2 (2006).
The district court granted a downward departure and sentenced
Raley to sixty-seven months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Raley
raises two constitutional challenges to his convictions.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Raley first contends that, by charging him with Hobbs
Act robbery, the Government deprived him of due process by
interfering with his right to a speedy trial in state court.
Raley’s due process claim essentially is a claim of pre-
indictment delay; to the extent that he raises a claim of
infringement on his right to a speedy trial in federal court
under the Sixth Amendment, any “delay is wholly irrelevant”
because “only a formal indictment or information or else the
actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a
criminal charge engage the particular protections of that
provision.” United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788 (1977)
(internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted). Moreover, we
conclude that any claim under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment fails because Raley has not demonstrated that he
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was actually prejudiced by any delay between the date of his
offenses and the federal grand jury’s indictment, see id. at
789-90, and because, “where a defendant violates both state and
federal laws, either or both can prosecute the defendant.”
United States v. Smith, 30 F.3d 568, 572 (4th Cir. 1994).
Raley also contends that the Hobbs Act as applied to
his case was unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause and
thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction over his case. The
Hobbs Act provides for the punishment of anyone who “in any way
or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement
of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion
or attempts or conspires so to do.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). This
statute applies to all commerce between states, United States
possessions and territories, and the District of Columbia. 18
U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3). The Hobbs Act “speaks in broad language,
manifesting a purpose to use all the constitutional power
Congress has to punish interference with interstate commerce by
extortion, robbery or physical violence. The Act outlaws such
interference in any way or degree.” Stirone v. United States,
361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
conclude that the indictment alleged a sufficient nexus to
interstate commerce to prosecute Raley under the Hobbs Act,
satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of that statute. See
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United States v. Williams, 342 F.3d 350, 354-55 (4th Cir. 2003)
(discussing Hobbs Act).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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