Filed 9/19/13 P. v. Naranjo CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E056725
v. (Super.Ct.Nos. SWF10002347
& SWF1101798)
ROBERT PATRICK NARANJO,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Michael B. Donner and
Michele D. Levine, Judges.1 Affirmed.
Nancy S. Brandt, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, and A. Natasha Cortina and
Christine Levingston Bergman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
Judge Donner presided over sentencing in case No. SWF10002347; Judge
Levine presided over the plea agreement in case No. SWF1101798.
1
Following a jury trial, defendant Robert Patrick Naranjo was convicted of
unlawful possession of metal knuckles. (Pen. Code,2 former § 12020, subd. (a)(1).3) In a
bifurcated trial, the court found true a prior strike conviction. Defendant was sentenced
to four years in state prison. In a separate proceeding, defendant pled guilty to cultivating
marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11358) for which the trial court sentenced him to two
years in state prison, to be served concurrently with the weapons possession case.
I. FACTS
On June 30, 2010, defendant willfully and unlawfully planted, cultivated,
harvested, dried, and processed marijuana.
On November 18, 2010, Riverside County Sheriff’s Deputy Thomas Davis
searched defendant’s home in Lake Elsinore and found a black mechanic’s-type tool bag
on the top of the bed. The bag contained metal knuckles, along with some knives,
including two “throwing knives” and Swiss Army knives. The deputy testified that the
metal knuckles were “kind of . . . decorative” because there were wings on them. They
also had a small, concealable two-inch blade on the side. Defendant told the deputy they
were a gift and he thought it was legal to possess them.
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
3 Former section 12020, subdivision (a)(1) was renumbered as section 21810
operative January 1, 2012. (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, § 6.)
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II. PHOTOGRAPHS DEPICTING KNIVES FOUND TOGETHER
WITH THE METAL KNUCKLES
Defendant contends the trial court erred by allowing photographic evidence of two
large knives that were found with the metal knuckles.
A. Further Background Information
The prosecution offered four photographs as exhibits. Two of the photographs
showed the metal knuckles pertinent to this case lying on top of two throwing knives
inside a small bag. A third photograph showed the knuckles were fashioned in the shape
of an eagle and ornately inscribed. A further photograph depicted the knuckles lying next
to the two knives and a ruler.
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to exclude, on the grounds of relevance, all
evidence concerning the knives that were discovered with the metal knuckles. The
prosecutor opposed the motion, arguing the photographs were relevant and necessary to
rebut the anticipated defense that the metal knuckles were merely decorative and not a
weapon. The trial court agreed with the prosecution and found that the knife evidence
was “relevant and more probative than prejudicial if that decorative nature of the
knuckles is alleged” by the defense because the metal knuckles were found in the same
case as the knives.
During trial, defense counsel again objected to the photographs of the knives;
however, the objection was overruled. Thus, the four photographs were admitted into
evidence via Deputy Davis’s testimony. On cross-examination, Deputy Davis
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acknowledged that he also found Swiss Army knives in the bag but he did not take any
photographs of them.
B. Standard of Review
We review the trial court’s admission of evidence over relevance and undue
prejudice objections under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v.
Carrington (2009) 47 Cal.4th 145, 195.)
C. Analysis
Evidence may be unduly prejudicial if it “‘“uniquely tends to evoke an emotional
bias against a party as an individual,”’” or if it may cause the jury to “‘“‘prejudg[e]’ a
person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors.”’” (People v. Cowan (2010) 50
Cal.4th 401, 475.)
“[Former] [s]ection 12020, subdivision (a)(1) prohibits the possession of ‘any
metal knuckles,’ defined in [former] section 12020, subdivision (c)(7), as ‘any device or
instrument made wholly or partially of metal which is worn for purposes of offense or
defense in or on the hand and which either protects the wearer’s hand while striking a
blow or increases the force of impact from the blow or injury to the individual receiving
the blow. The metal contained in the device may help support the hand or fist, provide a
shield to protect it, or consist of projections or studs which would contact the individual
receiving the blow.’” (In re Martin Alonzo L. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 93, 96.) Former
section 12020, subdivision (a)(1), was a general intent crime. (People v. Rubalcava
(2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 326-330.) Thus, the People are not required to show the possessor
intended to use the object in a violent manner. (Id. at p. 329.) However, the statute does
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contain a knowledge requirement. (Id. at pp. 331-332.) “A defendant who does not
know that he is carrying or wearing the weapon or that the instrument may be used for
purposes of offense or defense is thus not guilty of violating [former] section 12020.
[Citation.]” (People v. Gaitan (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 540, 547.)
Here, defendant challenges the relevance of the photographs depicting the metal
knuckles in the same case as the knives on the grounds that such evidence was irrelevant
and prejudicial. However, the defense theory was that the prosecution was unable to
prove the defendant “was solely in possession of those metal knuckles as a weapon.”
Given the defense’s theory, the fact that the knuckles were found in a bag with knives
was highly relevant. If the knuckles were merely for decorative purposes, they would
have been treated like a piece of art and displayed in a case or on the wall. The fact that
they were not was highly relevant.
While the photographs of the knives were prejudicial, we cannot conclude that the
prejudice outweighed the probative value. There were no charges against defendant
involving the knives. There was no testimony suggesting defendant had used the knives
as weapons, or that it was illegal to possess them. The prosecutor argued, “There were
knives there, fine. I’m not asking you to convict the defendant of being in possession of
those stainless steel knives. He’s charged with one count of possessing the metal
knuckles, that’s it.” Given defendant’s possession of the metal knuckles, it is unlikely
that the evidence regarding his possession of the knives would be unduly prejudicial. In
short, we cannot say it was “‘palpably arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd’” to have
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permitted the admission of the photographs which defendant objects. (People v. Lamb
(2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 575, 582.)
III. IMPOSITION OF RESTITUTION AND PAROLE REVOCATION
RESTITUTION FINES
Defendant claims that when the court imposed restitution and parole revocation
restitution fines totaling $480 ($240 per fine in the individual cases), it applied the
version of sections 1202.4 and 1202.45 that became effective on January 1, 2012.
However, since defendant committed his offenses in 2010 before the amended law took
effect, the fines are an ex post facto violation and should be reduced to $200 each. He
further claims his failure to object to the fines did not forfeit the issue on appeal because
the fines were unauthorized. We disagree.
When defendant committed his offenses in 2010, the minimum restitution fine
under former section 1202.4, subdivision (b), was $200, respectively. Section 1202.4
was amended effective January 1, 2012, and the minimum fine under each statute was
increased to $240. Defendant argues that the $240 restitution and parole revocation
restitution fines were not authorized by the version of sections 1202.4 and 1202.45 that
were in effect at the time of his crime. However, the trial court had the discretion to
impose a restitution fine and a parole revocation restitution fine ranging from $200 to
$10,000 in 2010, and the $240 fine was well within that range. (Former § 1202.4, subd.
(b)(1).) Thus, while the prohibition against ex post facto laws applies to restitution fines
(People v. Valenzuela (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1248), the trial court could have
imposed a $240 restitution fine in 2010. Thus, it was not an unauthorized sentence.
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Furthermore, defendant raised no objection in the trial court to the amount of the
fines. Defendant claims that even though his trial counsel did not object, the error is
cognizable on appeal because the imposition of the fines was unauthorized. However, as
discussed, the $240 amount was authorized; thus, defendant forfeited his right to
challenge the $240 restitution amount by failing to object below. (People v. Garcia
(2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1218 [Fourth Dist., Div. Two].)
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
HOLLENHORST
Acting P. J.
We concur:
MCKINSTER
J.
MILLER
J.
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