opportunity to be heard, but largely chose not to participate in the divorce
trial based on his belief that the discovery process was not complete. See
Callie v. Bowling, 123 Nev. 181, 183, 160 P.3d 878, 879 (2007) (noting that
procedural due process is satisfied when a party has notice and an
opportunity to be heard).
Further, to the extent that appellant contends that the district
court judge was biased in refusing to allow him additional discovery, and
thus, should have recused himself from the case because appellant never
properly sought the disqualification of the district court judge by filing an
affidavit specifying the basis for the disqualification, he has waived this
issue, and thus, we will not consider it in resolving this appeal. See NRS
1.235(1) (requiring a party seeking disqualification of a district court judge
to file an affidavit detailing the facts demonstrating that disqualification
is necessary); Brown v. Fed. Say. and Loan Ins. Corp., 105 Nev. 409, 412,
777 P.2d 361, 363 (1989) (explaining that a party waives the issue of
disqualification on appeal if that party does not properly request
disqualification). Under these circumstances, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
LCO (44-42 , J
Dougl
elL •••••s••s•••••.•
j
Saitta
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
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cc: Hon. T. Arthur Ritchie, Jr., District Judge, Family Court Division
Chris Schumacher
Margaret Marie Schumacher
Eighth District Court Clerk
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
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