and therefore, the district court did not in denying this portion of the
petition as procedurally time barred.
To the extent that appellant challenged errors arising from
entry of the second amended judgment of conviction on February 16, 2012,
the petition was untimely filed. See id. The one-year time period to
challenge a conviction does not automatically re-start simply because the
district court entered an amended judgment of conviction. See Sullivan v.
State, 120 Nev. 537, 541, 96 P.3d 761, 764 (2004). Rather, entry of an
amended judgment of conviction may explain a delay in filing the petition
if the petition raises claims challenging the amended judgment of
conviction or the proceedings leading up to the amended judgment of
conviction. Id. Even assuming without deciding that entry of the second
amended judgment of conviction would explain the delay in this case,
appellant failed to demonstrate that he would be unduly prejudiced by the
denial of his petition as procedurally time-barred, see NRS 34.726(1),
because his claims challenging the second amended judgment of conviction
lacked merit. Appellant was not required to be present for entry of the
second amended judgment of conviction granting additional presentence
credits. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying this portion of
the petition as procedurally time barred. Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.
Gibbons
J.
Douglas
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
2
(0) 1947A
cc: Hon. Doug Smith, District Judge
Julio Cesar Rosado
Attorney General/Carson City
Clark County District Attorney
Eighth District Court Clerk
SUPREME COURT
OF
NEVADA
3
(0) 1947A