Appellants are real estate brokers and agents who allegedly
entered into a one-year exclusive listing agreement on September 1, 2006,
with respondents Brent and Jill Thompson to list a commercial property.
The Thompsons owned 50 percent of the property, and respondents Eric
and Tammy Carlson owned the other 50 percent. After the exclusive
listing agreement expired, appellants procured Environmental
Management of NV, Inc. (EMI), as a buyer. The Thompsons and EMI
signed a purchase and sale agreement, but the deal fell through. Shortly
thereafter, EMI contacted the Thompsons regarding purchasing the
property, and the Thompsons expressly terminated appellants' services,
entered into a new contract with EMI, using respondents Colliers
International; Colliers Nevada, LLC; Colliers Nevada Management, LLC;
Chad G. Guldin; and Aaron W. Somer (collectively Colliers) as an agent,
and sold the property to EMI. Appellants initiated the underlying
litigation, arguing that they were entitled to a commission.
Although the district court found that the exclusive listing
agreement was void ab initio, this finding is not supported by the
evidence. See NRS 645.009 (defining "client" as "a person who has entered
into a brokerage agreement with a broker"); NRS 645.320 (specifying a
signature by a "client"); NRS 645.8735 (defining "owner" as "a person who
holds legal title to or any interest in any commercial real estate"); cf. Haas
v. Cohen, 295 N.E.2d 28, 31 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973) (holding that a partial
owner a property is liable to a broker for commissions arising from a
listing agreement signed only by the partial owner); Rodgers v.
Baughman, 342 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Iowa 1983) (interpreting Iowa rules
similar to Nevada statues and holding that a listing agreement is valid
when signed by a partial owner of the property); Littlefield u. Lamphere,
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422 A.2d 929, 931 (Vt. 1980) (holding that a listing agreement signed by a
husband but not his wife was valid but only bound the husband).
Nevertheless, the exclusive listing agreement expired on September 1,
2007, and while appellants attempted to extend the agreement, the
extension did not comply with NRS 645.320(2), which requires a definite
termination date, and it was therefore unenforceable. Bangle v. Holland
Realty Inv. Co, 80 Nev. 331, 334-35, 393 P.2d 138, 140 (1964). As to the
EMI purchase and sale agreements, the district court found no evidence of
fraud in the exclusion of appellants from the second transaction, and
substantial evidence supports its findings. NOLM, LLC v. Cnty. of Clark,
120 Nev. 736, 739, 100 P.3d 658, 660-61 (2004). Accordingly, appellants
cannot recover a commission under a breach of contract claim against the
Thompsons, because the exclusive listing agreement and the first EMI
agreement had expired, or against the Carlsons, because substantial
evidence supports the district court's conclusion that they did not sign and
were not parties to any of the agreements with appellants. Id.
Appellants alternatively argue that they should be able to
recover a commission under quantum meruit as the procuring cause of the
sale to EMI. But because appellants claimed an exclusive agency to sell
and the extension form did not meet the requirements of NRS 645.320,
appellants cannot recover from the Thompsons under quantum meruit.
Bangle, 80 Nev. at 336, 393 P.2d at 140-41. Similarly, appellants cannot
recover under quantum meruit from the Carlsons because they did not
have a contract with the Carlsons. Carrigan v. Ryan, 109 Nev. 797, 801,
858 P.2d 29, 32 (1993) (holding that a procuring agent must have a
contract to recover a commission).
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Appellants also argue that Colliers tortiously interfered with
the exclusive listing agreement. Having reviewed the parties' arguments
and appendices, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the
district court's findings and conclusions that Colliers did not tortiously
interfere with appellants' contract. See J.J. Indus., LLC v. Bennett, 119
Nev. 269, 274, 71 P.3d 1264, 1267 (2003).
Appellants have also appealed the district court's award of
attorney fees. Appellants, however, have failed to include in their
appendices any district court briefing regarding attorney fees. In the
absence of those documents, "we have no way to meaningfully review the
district court's order for error, [and must] necessarily presume that the
missing [material] supports the district court's decision." Cuzze v. Univ. &
Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 604, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007).
Accordingly, we
ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED.'
J.
Saitta
'We have considered appellants' other arguments and conclude that
they lack merit. Colliers' request for attorney fees and costs is denied.
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cc: Chief Judge, The Second Judicial District Court
Hon. James A. Brennan, Senior Judge
Stephens Knight & Edwards
Gunderson Law Firm
Brent Thompson
O'Mara Law Firm, P.C.
Jill Thompson
Washoe District Court Clerk
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