NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 13-2409
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NORMAN SHELTON,
Appellant
v.
S. E. THOMAS; U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 13-cv-00404)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon Jr.
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 23, 2013
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR. and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 24, 2013)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Appellant Norman Shelton is a federal prisoner incarcerated in USP Lewisburg; he
has been held in the Special Management Unit (SMU), he alleges, since August 27, 2009.
Proceeding pro se, he filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas corpus petition attacking his
continued confinement in the SMU. Shelton requested release from the SMU, money
damages, and that a criminal indictment be filed against a prison official. The District
Court dismissed Shelton’s petition, holding that his claims were not properly brought in a
§ 2241 petition, and Shelton appealed. We have jurisdiction to review the District
Court’s judgment under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).
The District Court correctly determined that Shelton’s § 2241 petition does not
challenge the basic fact or duration of his imprisonment, which is the “essence of
habeas.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). While it is true that we have
held that § 2241 “confers habeas jurisdiction to hear the petition of a federal prisoner who
is challenging not the validity but the execution of his sentence,” Woodall v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), “to
challenge the execution of his sentence under § 2241, [a petitioner] would need to allege
that BOP’s conduct was somehow inconsistent with a command or recommendation in
the sentencing judgment,” Cardona v. Bledsoe, 681 F.3d 533, 537 (3d Cir. 2012).
Shelton has made no such allegation; instead, he argues that he has been held in the SMU
for longer than federal law permits and in violation of his due process rights. Thus, as in
Cardona, “the District Court correctly dismissed his petition for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.” Id. at 537.1
1
Principles of preclusion also bar Shelton’s action. He previously filed a materially
indistinguishable action in the District Court, which the District Court dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction. He then appealed to this Court, and we affirmed. See C.A. No. 13-1586.
Although res judicata does not inevitably bar a second action when the first action was
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, see Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee v. L’Union
Atlantique S.A. d’Assurances, 723 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1983), a party is precluded
2
We will therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment.
from relitigating “matters actually adjudged” in the first case, Bromwell v. Mich. Mut.
Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 208, 212 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore,
the ruling in Shelton’s first case that his challenge to his placement in the SMU is not
cognizable under § 2241 bars his attempt in this case to bring the same claim under the
same statute.
3