UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4255
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
TERRELL B. HILL, a/k/a Twin,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:11-cr-00362-FDW-DSC-1)
Submitted: September 24, 2013 Decided: September 26, 2013
Before NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Chiege O. Kalu Okwara, LAW OFFICE OF CHIEGE O. KALU OKWARA,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Terrell B. Hill pled guilty, pursuant to a written
plea agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess with
intent to distribute cocaine base (Count 1). He was sentenced
to 240 months of imprisonment. On appeal, counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but raising the
following issues: (1) whether district court had jurisdiction to
accept Hill’s guilty plea and enter judgment against him; (2)
whether Hill’s guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily
entered; and (3) whether the Government breached Hill’s plea
agreement by failing to recommend a sentence in the ten-to
fifteen-year range after filing its motion under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 5K1.1 (2012). 1 For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.
Hill’s jurisdictional argument asks whether the
district court had a factual basis to accept his plea. We
review this issue for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Mitchell, 104 F.3d 649, 652 (4th Cir. 1997). 2 The parties
1
Despite notice Hill did not file a pro se supplemental
brief.
2
A court “may conclude that a factual basis exists from
anything that appears on the record.” United States v. DeFusco,
949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991).
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stipulated to a factual basis for the crime as detailed in the
presentence report. Moreover, the parties stipulated in the
plea agreement to joint recommendations under Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(c)(1)(B) to the amount of drugs foreseeable to Hill, and to a
two-level enhancement for Hill’s possession of a firearm. Thus,
we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s finding
of a factual basis for the plea.
Next, we find that Hill knowingly and voluntarily pled
guilty. Prior to accepting a plea, a trial court must conduct a
plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and
determines that the defendant comprehends, the nature of the
charge to which he is pleading guilty, the maximum possible
penalty he faces, and the rights he is relinquishing by pleading
guilty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b); United States v. DeFusco, 949
F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). Additionally, the district court
must ensure that a defendant’s plea was voluntary and did not
result from force, threats, or promises not contained in the
plea agreement. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2). “In reviewing the
adequacy of compliance with Rule 11, this Court should accord
deference to the trial court’s decision as to how best to
conduct the mandated colloquy with the defendant.” DeFusco, 949
F.2d at 116. Because Hill did not seek to withdraw his guilty
plea in the district court or otherwise preserve any alleged
Rule 11 error by timely objection, our review is only for plain
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error, United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir.
2002), and we find none.
Finally, Hill argues that the Government breached the
plea agreement because it did not recommend a sentence between
ten and fifteen years in its § 5K1.1 motion for a downward
departure. Because Hill did not preserve this issue in the
district court, we review the claim for plain error. United
States v. McQueen, 108 F.3d 64, 65-66 (4th Cir. 1997). Here,
the Government did not agree to recommend a sentence in the ten-
to fifteen-year range in the plea agreement or otherwise. Thus,
this claim fails. Moreover, we note that Hill was the
beneficiary of the Government’s § 5K1.1 motion, which reduced
his sentencing range from 360 months to life to 235-293 months.
Moreover, the record reveals that the court expressly considered
the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) sentencing factors, listened to
the sentencing arguments from the parties, and heard from Hill
himself.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Hill’s conviction and sentence. This court
requires that counsel inform Hill, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Hill requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
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may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Hill.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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