UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4119
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
EDGAR ALFRED ROSS, III,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (6:11-cr-02202-HMH-1)
Submitted: September 24, 2013 Decided: September 26, 2013
Before NIEMEYER and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James B. Loggins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Elizabeth Jean Howard, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Edgar Alfred Ross, III, pleaded guilty, pursuant to a
written plea agreement, to being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)
(2006), and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D) (2006). The
district court sentenced Ross to concurrent terms of seventy-
eight months’ and sixty months’ imprisonment, respectively.
Ross’s counsel has submitted a brief in accordance with Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether Ross’s
sentence is reasonable. Ross was advised of his right to file a
pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so. We affirm.
Because Ross did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, we review the Rule 11 hearing for
plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th
Cir. 2002). To prevail under this standard, Ross must establish
that an error occurred, was plain, and affected his substantial
rights. United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337, 342-43 (4th
Cir. 2009). Our review of the record establishes that the
district court substantially complied with Rule 11’s
requirements, ensuring that Ross’s plea was knowing and
voluntary.
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Ross’s counsel questions whether the district court
erred in imposing a total sentence of seventy-eight months’
imprisonment. We review Ross’s sentence under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007). This review requires consideration of both the
procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence. Id.;
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010). After
determining whether the district court correctly calculated the
advisory Guidelines range, we must decide whether the court
considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) sentencing factors,
analyzed the arguments presented by the parties, and
sufficiently explained the selected sentence. Lynn, 592 F.3d at
575-76; United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir.
2009).
Once we have determined that the sentence is free of
procedural error, we consider the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the totality of the
circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. If the sentence is within
the appropriate Guidelines range, we apply a presumption on
appeal that the sentence is reasonable. United States v.
Mendoza-Mendoza, 597 F.3d 212, 217 (4th Cir. 2010). Such a
presumption is rebutted only if the defendant demonstrates “that
the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a)
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factors.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379
(4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because the district court correctly calculated and
considered as advisory the applicable Guidelines range and
adequately explained its sentencing determination, we conclude
that Ross’s sentence was procedurally reasonable. Furthermore,
our review of the record leads us to conclude that Ross has not
overcome the presumption of reasonableness applicable to his
within-Guidelines sentence. Accordingly, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Ross.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Ross’s convictions and sentence.
This court requires that counsel inform Ross, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Ross requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Ross.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
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before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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