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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-11728
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:11-cv-01043-CEH-GJK
TAYLOR DAVID NEEFE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(September 27, 2013)
Before DUBINA, HULL and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Taylor Neefe appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming
the administrative law judge’s (“ALJ”) denial of Neefe’s application for
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Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1383. On appeal,
Neefe argues that the ALJ failed to include any consideration of Neefe’s
limitations in concentration, persistence, or pace in his residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) assessment or in the hypothetical question to the vocational expert.
We review the ALJ’s decision to determine whether it is supported by
substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards. Crawford v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). We must affirm a decision that is
supported by substantial evidence even if the evidence preponderates against the
ALJ’s findings. Id. at 1158-59. “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Id. at 1158(quoting Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439
(11th Cir. 1997)). Moreover, we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our
judgment for that of the ALJ. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir.
2005). We will reverse where the ALJ fails to apply the correct law or to provide
us with sufficient reasoning to allow us to determine that the proper legal analysis
has been conducted. Keeton v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064,
1066 (11th Cir. 1994).
An individual claiming Social Security disability benefits must prove that
she is disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999). The Social
Security regulations provide a five-step sequential evaluation process for
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determining if a claimant has proven that she is disabled. Id. A claimant must
show that (1) she is not performing substantial gainful activity; (2) she has a severe
impairment; (3) the impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals an
impairment listed in the regulations; or (4) she cannot return to past work; and, if
the ALJ identifies other work, (5) she cannot perform other work based on her age,
education, and experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d
1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004).
The ALJ may determine whether the claimant has the ability to adjust to
other work in the national economy by (1) applying the Medical Vocational
Guidelines, or (2) using a vocational expert. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239-40. When
the ALJ uses a vocational expert, the ALJ poses hypothetical questions to the
vocational expert to ascertain whether someone with the claimant’s previously-
determined limitations will be able to secure employment in the national economy.
Id. at 1240. “In order for a vocational expert’s testimony to constitute substantial
evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the
claimant’s impairments.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180
(11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir.
2002)).
In Winschel, we followed the example of many other circuits, and rejected
the argument that an ALJ generally accounts for a claimant’s limitations in
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concentration, persistence, and pace by restricting hypothetical questions to simple,
routine tasks or unskilled work. Id. However, we clarified that:
[W]hen medical evidence demonstrates that a claimant can engage in
simple, routine tasks or unskilled work despite limitations in
concentration, persistence, and pace, courts have concluded that
limiting the hypothetical to include only unskilled work sufficiently
accounts for such limitations.
Id. at 1180. In Winschel, we highlighted that the ALJ did not indicate that medical
evidence suggested the plaintiff’s ability to work was unaffected by this limitation,
nor did the ALJ otherwise implicitly account for the limitation in the hypothetical
question. Id. at 1181. So, we concluded that, because the ALJ should have
explicitly included Winschel’s moderate limitation in maintaining concentration,
persistence, and pace in the hypothetical question to the vocational expert, the
vocational expert’s testimony was not substantial evidence that supported the
ALJ’s conclusion. Id.
Unlike Winschel, here the ALJ accounted for Neefe’s limitations in
concentration, persistence, or pace by considering and posing to the vocational
expert that Winschel could perform only simple tasks in a low stress environment
with only limited contact with the public. Since the ALJ determined that the
medical evidence demonstrated that Neefe could engage in simple tasks, despite
moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace, the ALJ sufficiently
accounted for such impairments, implicitly, by limiting the hypothetical that was
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posed to the vocational expert to include only simple tasks or unskilled work. See
Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment
affirming the ALJ’s denial of SSI benefits.
AFFIRMED.
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