FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 2, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 13-6170
(D.C. No. 5:13-CR-00035-C-1)
MELISSA R. LOMAN, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before TYMKOVICH, GORSUCH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Melissa R. Loman was charged with nineteen counts of using a minor to
produce child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). The government
agreed to dismiss eighteen of the nineteen counts in exchange for Ms. Loman
pleading guilty to one count, and waiving her right to appeal or collaterally challenge
her guilty plea, sentence, and any other aspect of her conviction. Ms. Loman entered
*
This panel has determined that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The
case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment
is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
into the plea agreement with the government and pleaded guilty. She was sentenced
to 360 months’ imprisonment, which was within the advisory guideline sentencing
range.1 In spite of the appellate waiver in her plea agreement, Ms. Loman filed a
notice of appeal. The government has moved to enforce the appeal waiver pursuant
to United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam).
When reviewing a motion to enforce, we consider “(1) whether the disputed
appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived [her] appellate rights; and (3) whether
enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1325.
Ms. Loman concedes that her appeal is within the scope of the waiver, that her
waiver was knowing and voluntary, and that enforcing the waiver would not result in
a miscarriage of justice. She argues, however, that the district court did not explicitly
accept the plea agreement, and failed to comply with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(4). She
contends that these deficiencies defeat the government’s motion to enforce the appeal
waiver.
A district court must accept a plea agreement before it becomes binding. See
United States v. Novosel, 481 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 2007). But the court does
1
Ms. Loman’s guideline range was 360 months to life imprisonment, but it was
reduced to 360 months because that was the statutory maximum. The guideline range
included enhancements for multiple victims; a victim being under the age of 12;
commission of a sexual act or sexual contact upon a victim; distribution of the
material; and having a special relationship with the victims (Ms. Loman is the mother
of the three victims).
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not need to expressly accept the agreement if its actions demonstrate constructive
acceptance of the plea agreement. See United States v. Leyva-Matos, 618 F.3d 1213,
1216 n.1 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Smith, 500 F.3d 1206, 1213 n.3
(10th Cir. 2007). The government concedes that the district court never explicitly
stated that it accepted the plea agreement, but the government asserts that the court
constructively accepted the agreement. We agree.
In Smith, we noted that “the District Court did not expressly state on the record
that it was ‘accepting’ or ‘rejecting’ the plea agreement.” 500 F.3d at 1213 n.3. But
we explained that “[t]he court did . . . operate within the terms of the plea agreement,
questioning Ms. Smith with respect to its terms during the Rule 11 colloquy and
dismissing, as provided in the plea agreement, the five other counts set forth in the
superseding indictment.” Id. We therefore concluded that “these actions amount to
constructive acceptance of the plea agreement.” Id.
The circumstances are similar here. At the change-of-plea hearing, the district
court noted that the “plea is being entered pursuant to a plea agreement,” Mot. to
Enforce, Att. 2 at 12, and that the plea agreement “ha[d] been reduced to writing,” id.
at 13. The court then directed the government to summarize the substantive portions
of the agreement. That summary included the government’s promise to dismiss
Counts 1 through 6 and 8 through 19 of the indictment, and to not prosecute
Ms. Loman for other child-pornography-related crimes occurring between April 19,
2011 to February 1, 2013. After the summary, the district court stated, “Ms. Loman,
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this appears to be a simple quid pro quo. You agree to plead guilty to Count 7, the
government agrees to dismiss the remaining counts.” Id. at 15. The district court
also asked if the written plea agreement contained all of the agreements between the
parties and counsel for Ms. Loman replied, “Yes.” Id. at 16. And, on questioning by
the district court, Ms. Loman agreed that the written plea agreement contained all of
the agreements and promises that had been made to her. The court emphasized to
Ms. Loman that only the promises contained in the written plea agreement were
enforceable. At the end of the hearing, the district court accepted Ms. Loman’s
guilty plea.
Consistent with the plea agreement, the minutes from the change-of-plea
hearing reflect that Ms. Loman pleaded guilty to Count 7 of the indictment, and that
Counts 1-6 and 8-19 would be dismissed at sentencing. At sentencing, the district
court announced its sentence and referenced the plea agreement, stating, “I advise
you that under the plea agreement you have waived your right of appeal except in
certain very limited circumstances.” Mot. to Enforce, Att. 3 at 27. The district court
then implemented the terms of the plea agreement by entering a judgment that
memorialized Ms. Loman’s plea to Count 7 and dismissed the remaining counts.
Although the district court did not expressly state on the record that it was accepting
or rejecting the plea agreement, its actions demonstrate that it was operating within
the terms of the plea agreement and amount to constructive acceptance of the
agreement.
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As for the alleged Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(4) error, that rule states “[i]f the
court accepts the plea agreement, it must inform the defendant that to the extent the
plea agreement is of the type specified in Rule 11(c)(1)(A) [,where the government
will not bring, or will move to dismiss, other charges,] . . . the agreed disposition will
be included in the judgment.” We agree with the government’s contention that
Ms. Loman was “constructively and effectively notified [by the court’s conduct] that
the agreed disposition, i.e., dismissal of the remaining counts, would be included in
the judgment, thus satisfying Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(4).” Reply to Mot. to Enforce
at 5.
We acknowledge that it would have been preferable for the district court to
explicitly state that it was accepting the plea agreement and to give the Rule 11(c)(4)
notification. But the district court’s actions in this case demonstrate that it did accept
the plea agreement. Most importantly, the district court operated within the terms of
the plea agreement, and gave Ms. Loman the benefit of her bargain, by dismissing
eighteen of the nineteen counts for which she was charged. Ms. Loman concedes that
she has no valid arguments to challenge the appeal waiver contained in the plea
agreement. Accordingly, we grant the government’s motion and dismiss this appeal.
Entered for the Court
Per Curiam
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