UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-6064
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
KENNETH MITCHELL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:03-cr-00351-CCB-4; 1:08-cv-01723-CCB)
Submitted: September 30, 2013 Decided: October 3, 2013
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael Lawlor, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellant. James G. Warwick, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kenneth Mitchell, a federal prisoner, filed a 28
U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2013) motion contending, in relevant
part, that his trial counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective
in failing to fully convey to him his options to plead guilty.
We granted a certificate of appealability on this claim and
remanded his case to the district court for an evidentiary
hearing. United States v. Mitchell, 484 F. App’x 744 (4th Cir.
2012) (No. 11-6711). On remand, the district court found that
counsel had sufficiently informed Mitchell regarding his plea
options, specifically an option to plead guilty without
cooperation with the Government. Mitchell appeals for the
second time.
To succeed on his ineffective assistance claim,
Mitchell must show that: (1) counsel’s failures fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) counsel’s
deficient performance was prejudicial. See Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Supreme Court
recently addressed the standard for showing ineffective
assistance during the plea bargaining stage in Lafler v. Cooper,
132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012), and Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399
(2012). In Lafler, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel applies to the plea bargaining
process, and prejudice occurs when, absent deficient advice, the
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defendant would have accepted a plea that would have resulted in
a less severe conviction, sentence, or both. Lafler, 132 S. Ct.
at 1384-85. In Frye, the Supreme Court held that a component of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the plea bargaining
context is that counsel has a duty to communicate any offers
from the Government to his client. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408.
We review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo and
its findings of fact for clear error. United States v.
Nicholson, 611 F.3d 191, 205 (4th Cir. 2010).
The gravamen of Mitchell’s appeal is that the
district court erred in concluding that his counsel communicated
to Mitchell that, in addition to a plea agreement requiring
cooperation, the Government had also offered a plea agreement
without cooperation. Mitchell contends that, had he been
presented with such an offer, he would have accepted it. After
thoroughly reviewing the record and the transcript of the
evidentiary hearing held on this specific issue, we find no
reversible error in the district court’s conclusion that
Mitchell’s counsel adequately conveyed to Mitchell his plea
options, including the option to accept a plea agreement without
further cooperation, and that counsel’s representation was not
deficient in this regard.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
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legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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