FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 04 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TAYLOR WINSTON WRIGHT, No. 12-16270
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 4:10-cv-00219-CKJ
v.
MEMORANDUM *
DAVID DUNCAN, Warden,
Defendant,
and
JOE T. MERAZ, Food Service
Administrator; et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Cindy K. Jorgenson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 24, 2013 **
Before: RAWLINSON, N.R. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Federal prisoner Taylor Winston Wright appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his action, brought under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging
Eighth Amendment violations in connection with a slip-and-fall incident. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391
F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wright’s claim
against defendant Meraz because Wright failed to raise a genuine dispute of
material fact as to whether Meraz knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his
safety. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (for a deliberate
indifference claim, “the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Wright’s claim
against defendant Ferriol because Wright failed to raise a triable dispute as to
whether Ferriol’s treatment of his injured left knee amounted to deliberate
indifference. See id.; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058 (to prevail on a claim involving
choices between alternative courses of treatment, an inmate must show that the
chosen course of treatment was both medically unacceptable and chosen in
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conscious disregard of an excessive risk to the inmate’s health).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, including summary judgment for defendant Garrett and
Ferriol’s treatment of Wright’s ear injury. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983,
985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
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