FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION OCT 04 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RYAN SHAWN ERICKSON, No. 11-35315
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. 3:10-cv-05666-BHS
v.
MEMORANDUM *
COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS INC;
et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Benjamin H. Settle, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted September 24, 2013 **
Before: RAWLINSON, N.R. SMITH, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Ryan Shawn Erickson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment
dismissing his action arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. King v. California, 784 F.2d 910,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
912 (9th Cir. 1986). We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand.
The district court properly denied Erickson’s motion to remand because the
district court had federal question jurisdiction over Erickson’s federal claims and
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims that were part of the same case
or controversy. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); id. § 1367(a)
(supplemental jurisdiction); id. § 1441 (removal jurisdiction); Ramirez v. Fox
Television Station, Inc., 998 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard
of review).
The district court properly dismissed Erickson’s claims under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) because Erickson failed to
allege specific facts showing a pattern of racketeering activity. See Sanford v.
MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 557-58 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing elements of
a RICO claim and particularity requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)).
The district court properly dismissed Erickson’s claims under the Real
Estate Settlement and Procedures Act (“RESPA”) and the Truth in Lending Act
(“TILA”) as time-barred because Erickson filed his action more than three years
after the alleged violations. See 12 U.S.C. § 2614 (prescribing at most a three-year
statute of limitations for violations of RESPA); 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (an action for
damages under TILA must be brought within one year of the alleged violation); see
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also King, 784 F.2d at 915 (holding that “the limitations period in Section 1640(e)
runs from the date of consummation of the transaction”).
However, after the district court dismissed Erickson’s wrongful foreclosure
claim, the Washington Supreme Court decided Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage
Group, Inc., 285 P.3d 34, 47 (Wash. 2012) (en banc), which held that, under
Washington’s Deed of Trust Act, Mortgage Electronic Registration System Inc.
cannot be a “beneficiary” of a deed of trust if it never held the promissory note or
other debt instrument secured by the deed of trust. Because the district court did
not have the benefit of Bain when it issued its order of dismissal, we remand to
allow the court to reconsider Erickson’s wrongful foreclosure claim.
Erickson’s contentions regarding “fraud upon the court” and judicial bias are
unpersuasive.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Erickson’s requests for judicial notice are treated as citations of
supplemental authorities under Fed. R. App. P. 28(j). To the extent that Erickson’s
filings seek to supplement the record with documents that were not presented to the
district court, the requests are denied.
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Each party shall bear its own costs on appeal.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
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