UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 96-30012
(Summary Calendar)
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MARY LEE DUDLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee,
versus
JAMES JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant,
GORDON ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Louisiana
(95-CV-1755"R”)
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September 17, 1996
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff Mary Lee Dudley appeals the district court's
dismissal of her civil rights suit, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Defendants Gordon Anderson and James Johnson appeal the
district court's order denying their motion to recover attorney's
fees, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. We affirm.
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
I
Dudley filed a § 1983 suit against Johnson, a Deputy Marshal
at the City Court of Hammond, and Anderson, the 7th Ward Marshal.
Dudley alleged that Johnson had violated her civil rights by using
excessive force in restraining her during an altercation which
erupted in the courtroom. Dudley also alleged that Anderson had
violated her civil rights by refusing to accept charges against
Johnson after the incident. Johnson moved for summary judgment on
grounds of qualified immunity, and Anderson moved for a Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal. In addition, both Defendants sought to recover
attorney's fees pursuant to § 1988(b). The district court granted
both motions, but denied Defendants’ request for attorney's fees.
Dudley and the two Defendants filed timely notices of appeal.1
II
Dudley argues that the district court erred in dismissing her
complaint. On appeal from an order granting a motion for summary
judgment based upon qualified immunity, we review the record de
novo, examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-movant. Pfannstiel v. City of Marion, 918 F.2d 1178, 1183 (5th
Cir. 1990). “Summary judgment is appropriate if the record
discloses ‘that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
1
Although Dudley filed a general notice of appeal, in her brief she
states, "No appeal is taken with respect to the court's order concerning
defendant Anderson." Accordingly, this Court granted Anderson's motion to
dismiss the appeal as it pertained to him.
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law.’” Matagorda County v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir.
1994) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)).
A government official is entitled to summary judgment on
qualified immunity grounds in a § 1983 suit if he can establish as
a matter of law that it was objectively legally reasonable for him
to believe that his actions did not violate a clearly established
legal right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39, 107 S.
Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523 (1987). "If reasonable public
officials could differ on the lawfulness of the defendant's
actions, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity."
Pfannstiel, 918 F.2d at 1183. Therefore, even if a defendant's
actions violate a plaintiff’s Constitutional rights, the defendant
is still entitled to qualified immunity if his actions were
objectively reasonable. Id.
Whether the defendant's actions were objectively reasonable is
essentially a question of law to be determined by the court.
Lampkin v. City of Nacogdoches, 7 F.3d 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, __ U.S __, 114 S. Ct. 1400, 128 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1994).
To defeat a motion for summary judgment on grounds of qualified
immunity, Dudley must have presented summary judgment evidence
sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether defendant's
conduct was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Id.
Having carefully reviewed the record, we find that Dudley has
failed to carry her burden. Dudley presented evidence which
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establishes that an altercation took place in the courthouse, and
that she, while not a participant, was in close proximity to the
altercation when it occurred. Her evidence also establishes that
four police officers were in the process of restraining the two
primary combatants when Deputy Marshal Johnson reentered the
courtroom and proceeded to remove Dudley from the scene of the
altercation. When Dudley refused to hand over a purse she was
holding, Johnson grabbed her by the neck and arm and threw her to
the floor. Even when viewing the summary judgment evidence in the
light most favorable to Dudley, reasonable officials could differ
as to whether force was necessary to neutralize the situation.
Thus, even if Johnson was mistaken about the need to restrain
Dudley, because his conduct was objectively legally reasonable, he
is entitled to qualified immunity. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 644, 107
S. Ct. at 3041. Accordingly, the district court properly granted
his motion for summary judgment.
III
On cross-appeal, Anderson and Johnson contend that the
district court erred in denying their motion for attorney's fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). We review a denial of defendant’s
request for attorney's fees pursuant to § 1988(b) for abuse of
discretion. Vaughner v. Pulito, 804 F.2d 873, 878 (5th Cir. 1986).
A court may award a prevailing defendant his attorney's fees under
§ 1988(b) only if it specifically finds that the plaintiff's suit
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was frivolous, without merit, unfounded, or vexatiously brought.
Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S. Ct.
694, 700, 45 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1978). The Supreme Court has rejected
the notion that merely because a plaintiff does not ultimately
prevail, his claim must have been unfounded or without merit. Id.
This Court has held that to be without merit, a claim must be
"devoid of arguable legal merit or factual support." Jones v.
Texas Tech Univ., 656 F.2d 1137, 1146 (5th Cir. 1981). Having
carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that Dudley's civil
rights claim, while weak, was not without arguable legal merit or
factual support. The record reflects that Dudley was forcibly
restrained by Johnson and that she possibly suffered injury as a
result. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Defendants' request for attorney's
fees.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.
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