Estate of Sue Bratton Thompson - Concur

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE September 28, 2011 Session ESTATE OF SUE BRATTON THOMPSON Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Maury County No. P646-08 Jim T. Hamilton, Chancellor No. M2011-00411-COA-R3-CV - Filed March 14, 2012 SEPARATE CONCURRENCE I fully concur in the result reached by the majority in this case. However, I write separately to express a different conclusion regarding the applicability of White v. McBride, 937 S.W.2d 796 (Tenn. 1996), to the instant case. The majority correctly notes that White involved a contingent fee arrangement whereby the husband’s attorney was to be paid one-third of any recovery from the wife’s estate. White, 937 S.W.2d at 797. As the surviving spouse, the husband was entitled to $349,000 from his wife’s estate, and based upon that figure, the attorney sought a $108,291.00 attorney fee. Id. at 799. The trial court found that the fee was “grossly disproportionate to the services [] rendered” and therefore, it found that the attorney could not recover under the contract. Id. However, it awarded the attorney a $12,500 fee based upon quantum meruit. This Court affirmed. On appeal, our Supreme Court examined the issue of “whether the contingency fee contract itself and the [attorney’s] subsequent attempt to enforce that contract contravened DR 2-106,” the predecessor to RPC 1.5. Id. The Court agreed that the attorney fee sought was “clearly excessive,” noting that the estate matter was “not terribly complicated or novel[,]” and therefore, it found the fee contract unenforceable. Id. at 801. However, the Court reversed the lower courts’ judgments awarding an attorney fee on a quantum meruit basis, holding that “an attorney who enters into a fee contract, or attempts to collect a fee, that is clearly excessive under DR 2-106 should not be permitted to take advantage of [quantum meruit].” Id. at 803. In the instant case, the majority apparently concludes that all allegedly excessive attorney fee requests–notwithstanding the absence of any fee contract–must be considered against White the backdrop. It is this conclusion with which I cannot agree. White’s application has clearly been limited to cases involving contingent fee arrangements. See Alexander v. Inman, 974 S.W.2d 689, 693 n.6 (Tenn. 1998) (“[B]ecause we find that the fee is not contingent, the recent case [of] White v. McBride, 937 S.W.2d at 803, is inapplicable to this case.”); see also Taylor v. Woods, 282 S.W.3d 285, 294 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008) (“In support of [Appellant’s] argument [that the attorney’s claim was excessive, justifying the denial of a claim for fees,] [Appellant] relies on White v. McBride, . . . . However, such reliance is misplaced because [White] did not involve a claim against a decedent’s estate for services performed for the decedent but rather a contingency contract with the surviving spouse based on a percentage of the amount of the estate awarded to that spouse by operation of law.”). Compare Hosier v. Crye-Leike Comm., Inc., No. M2008-01182-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 799740, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 17, 2001) (discussing White in a non- contingent-fee case, but ultimately concluding that the fee requested was not “clearly excessive,” and therefore, not expressly considering whether White would also have been inapplicable because a contingent fee arrangement was not involved.). Because the instant case does not involve a contingent fee agreement, I believe the White decision is not implicated, and thus, that the majority’s discussion of whether White precludes the recovery of any fee is unnecessary. However, given the majority’s ultimate conclusion that a reasonable fee is appropriate in this case, I concur in the result reached. ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S.