IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_____________________
No. 96-50033
_____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
MIGUEL OMAR VILLALOZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
(EP-95-CR-137-1)
_________________________________________________________________
October 2, 1996
Before KING and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges, and LAKE*,
District Judge.
PER CURIAM:**
Defendant-appellant Miguel Omar Villaloz appeals the denial
of his motion to suppress a firearm and subsequent statements to
police officers. Villaloz argues that the police officer who
detained and frisked him did so without reasonable suspicion.
*
District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, sitting
by designation.
**
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the
motion. We affirm.
The district court concluded that the initial stop of
Villaloz was an investigative detention within the meaning of
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The district court found that
the facts known to the police officer gave rise to a reasonable
suspicion justifying the stop:
The hunched walk and the unusual placement of
the hands coupled with the officer’s
knowledge that a shooting had just occurred
two blocks away added to the facts that the
Defendant was headed away from that location
to the nearest busy intersection, at a
quicker pace after the officer passed, give
rise to reasonable suspicion which would
warrant a check of the Defendant.
The district court further concluded that the officer’s
observations gave him reasonable suspicion to believe that
Villaloz might be armed and pose a danger to the officer.
In Terry, the Court held that an officer may detain an
individual on the street for a brief investigation if the facts
known to the officer give rise to a reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot or that the person has been involved
in criminal activity. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20-23. Reasonable
suspicion exists when, based on the totality of the
circumstances, “the detaining officers . . . have a
particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Cortez,
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449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). We think that the district court’s
fact findings, which are not clearly erroneous, support the
conclusion that the required minimum level of objective
justification for the officer’s decision to stop Villaloz and to
pat him down was reached. We agree with that conclusion, and
accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court denying
Villaloz’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.
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