Ruiz v. Hildreth

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH CIRCUIT

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No. 96-50239

(Summary Calendar)
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JOSE RICARDO RUIZ,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

GRAY HILDRETH, Special Agent, DEA;
HOWARD STAHA, Special Agent, Texas
Police Department,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Texas
(A-94-CA-447)
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September 12, 1996
Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Jose Ricardo Ruiz appeals the dismissal of his civil rights

suit1 as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). He argues that

the district court erred by dismissing his complaint as time-barred

*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
1
Ruiz brought his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, the
district court properly construed his complaint, as to DEA agent Hildreth, as one
made under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29
L. Ed. 2d 619, (1971).
because the two-year statute of limitations should have been

tolled. Ruiz also argues that the district court abused its

discretion by refusing to allow him to amend his complaint to

recharacterize his cause of action as one arising under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1985.

We review dismissals under § 1915(d) for abuse of discretion.

Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994). A case is

frivolous under § 1915(d) if it is barred by the applicable statute

of limitations. Id. The denial of a motion to amend is reviewed

for abuse of discretion. Wimm v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 3 F.3d 137,

139 (5th Cir. 1993).

For purposes of determining the applicable statute of

limitations, civil rights actions brought under §§ 1983 and 1985

are treated as synonymous with state tort claims, and in this case

are subject to a two-year limitations period under § 16.003 of the

Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code.2 Helton v. Clements, 832

F. 2d 332, 334 (5th Cir. 1987). While state law determines the

limitations period, federal law governs when a cause of action

accrues and holds that accrual begins the moment the plaintiff

knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the

complaint. Id. Additionally, when applying the statute of

limitations, federal courts adhere to a state’s tolling provisions.

2
The statute of limitations applicable to Bivens actions is likewise
governed by the law of the forum state. Spina v. Aaron, 821 F.2d 1126, 1128 (5th
Cir. 1987).

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Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543-44, 109 S. Ct. 1988, 2002-03,

104 L. Ed. 2d 582 (1989).

Ruiz’s cause of action accrued on November 19-20, 1991, the

date of his arrest and interrogation. Ruiz was clearly aware of

the facts concerning his allegedly tortious arrest and

interrogation.3 Therefore, the statute of limitations began to run

at that time. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 516

(5th Cir. 1995) (holding that for purposes of a statute of

limitations, “A plaintiff need not realize that a legal cause of

action exists; a plaintiff need only know the facts that would

support a claim.”). Ruiz’s complaint was not filed until February

23, 1995, long after the two-year limitations period had run.

However, Ruiz contends that the limitations period should be tolled

for the period he was incarcerated at the Hays County Jail facility

because he suffered from an “unsound mind” resulting from “physical

and psychological depression due to withdrawal symptoms of drug

addiction. . . and nausea-vomiting due to medication that was being

administered by jail officials for the treatment of tuberculosis.”

Because Ruiz’s alleged disability arose after he was arrested and

interrogated, and thus after his cause of action had accrued, Ruiz

3
We find clear evidence of Ruiz's knowledge of the facts concerning
his arrest and interrogation from his motion entitled “Plaintiffs Opposition to
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss.” In that motion, Ruiz admits that just two days
after his arrest he met with his attorney and “told his attorney that his
constitutional rights had been violated by arresting agents.” Ruiz further avers
that had his attorney not told him that his claims would be unsuccessful, he
would have filed suit at that time. These admissions undermine Ruiz’s claim that
he lacked knowledge of the facts and was “unable to manage his affairs or
understand his legal rights.”

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is not entitled to a tolling of the statute of limitations. See

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.001(d) (stating that “a disability

which arises after a limitations period starts does not suspend the

running of the period”). Additionally, the district court did not

abuse its discretion by denying Ruiz’s motion to amend his

complaint, since § 1985 claims are subject to the same two-year

limitations period as his original Bivens and § 1983 claims.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s

order dismissing Ruiz’s claims and denying Ruiz leave to amend his

complaint.

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