Coleman v. St. Thomas Hospital

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
MAY 26, 2010 Session

MARY COLEMAN, ET AL. v. ST. THOMAS HOSPITAL

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County
No. 04C-2183 Hamilton Gayden, Judge

No. M2009-02526-COA-R10-CV - Filed August 4, 2010

Plaintiffs filed suit against their employer, alleging common law negligence and negligent
infliction of emotional distress due to their exposure to carbon monoxide in the workplace.
The employer filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiffs’ tort claims
were barred by Tennessee’s workers’ compensation law. The trial court denied the
employer’s motion for summary judgment, concluding that Plaintiffs’ injuries did not “arise
out of” their employment. The employer’s application for an extraordinary appeal was
granted. We reverse and remand for entry of an order granting summary judgment to the
employer.

Tenn. R. App. P. 10; Extraordinary Appeal; Judgment of the Circuit Court
Reversed and Remanded

A LAN E. H IGHERS, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which D AVID R. F ARMER,
J., and H OLLY M. K IRBY, J., joined.

Mary Martin Schaffner, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, St. Thomas Hospital

John P. Williams, T. Chad White, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Mary Coleman,
Chloe Nguyen and Cassandra Dixon
 OPINION

I. F ACTS & P ROCEDURAL H ISTORY

Mary Coleman, Chloe Nguyen, and Cassandra Dixon (“Plaintiffs”) were employed
by St. Thomas Hospital and worked at the St. Thomas Hospital Employees Credit Union on
a daily basis. The credit union’s offices were located on the first floor of a building owned
and operated by St. Thomas Hospital. In the spring and summer of 2003, Plaintiffs allegedly
began to experience a wide range of symptoms including fatigue, headaches, dizziness,
nausea, vomiting, seizure, and loss of consciousness. In August of 2003, it was discovered
that the gas-powered hot water heater in the basement of the building had become improperly
vented and was producing carbon monoxide that was entering the credit union. The level of
carbon monoxide present in the credit union was at times of such high concentrations that
exposure to the gas was extremely hazardous and potentially lethal.

Plaintiffs subsequently filed a complaint in the circuit court of Davidson County
against their employer, St. Thomas Hospital, alleging common law negligence and negligent
infliction of emotional distress and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. St.
Thomas Hospital filed an answer in which it asserted that Plaintiffs’ exclusive remedy
against it was pursuant to Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Law. St. Thomas Hospital
also filed a motion for summary judgment, again contending that Plaintiffs’ tort claims were
barred due to the exclusive remedy provided by the Workers’ Compensation Law. Plaintiffs
filed a response, arguing that their claims should be governed by premises liability law.
Plaintiffs conceded that they were full-time employees of St. Thomas Hospital, and that St.
Thomas Hospital was an employer subject to the Workers’ Compensation Law.1 However,
Plaintiffs contended that their injuries did not “arise out of” their employment, so that they
were not limited to the remedies provided by the Workers’ Compensation Law.

The trial court denied St. Thomas Hospital’s motion for summary judgment,
concluding that Plaintiffs’ injuries did not arise out of their employment. St. Thomas
Hospital sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court denied. St.
Thomas Hospital then filed an application for an extraordinary appeal, which was granted
by the Middle Section of this Court.

1
St. Thomas Hospital and St. Thomas Hospital Employees Credit Union are actually separate legal
entities. St. Thomas Hospital had leased these employees to the Credit Union, but the contract provided that
they would remain employees of St. Thomas Hospital at all times.

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 II. I SSUE P RESENTED

On appeal, St. Thomas Hospital contends that Plaintiffs’ tort claims are barred by the
Workers’ Compensation Law because their injuries arose out of their employment, and as a
result, the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. For the following
reasons, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

III. S TANDARD OF R EVIEW

A motion for summary judgment should be granted only “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. “The party seeking the summary
judgment has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine disputes of material fact exist and
that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Green v. Green, 293 S.W.3d 493, 513
(Tenn. 2009) (citing Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry., 271 S.W.3d 76, 83 (Tenn. 2008); Amos v.
Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 259 S.W.3d 705, 710 (Tenn. 2008)). “If
reasonable minds could justifiably reach different conclusions based on the evidence at hand,
then a genuine question of fact exists.” Id. at 514 (citing Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 84; Louis
Dreyfus Corp. v. Austin Co., 868 S.W.2d 649, 656 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993)). “If, on the other
hand, the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence would permit a
reasonable person to reach only one conclusion, then no material factual dispute exists, and
the question can be disposed of as a matter of law.” Id. (citing Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d
692, 695 (Tenn. 2002); Seavers v. Methodist Med. Ctr. of Oak Ridge, 9 S.W.3d 86, 91 (Tenn.
1999)).

The resolution of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law, which we review
de novo with no presumption of correctness. Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 84. However, “we are
required to review the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and to
draw all reasonable inferences favoring the nonmoving party.” Id. (citing Staples v. CBL &
Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000)). Summary judgment is appropriate “when the
undisputed facts, as well as the inferences reasonably drawn from the undisputed facts,
support only one conclusion – that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Green, 293 S.W.3d at 513 (citing Griffis v. Davidson County Metro. Gov't, 164
S.W.3d 267, 283-84 (Tenn. 2005); Pero's Steak & Spaghetti House v. Lee, 90 S.W.3d 614,
620 (Tenn. 2002)).

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 IV. D ISCUSSION

The primary purpose of Tennessee’s Workers’ Compensation Law is “to afford
workers compensation for job-related injuries regardless of fault.” Woods v. Harry B.
Woods Plumbing Co., Inc., 967 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tenn. 1998). The Workers’
Compensation Law is “a legislatively created quid pro quo system where an injured worker
forfeits any potential common law rights for recovery against his or her employer in return
for a system that provides compensation completely independent of any fault on the part of
the employer.” Wait v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Illinois, 240 S.W.3d 220, 224 (Tenn. 2007)
(citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-108(a); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stevenson, 368 S.W.2d 760,
762 (Tenn. 1963)). The Workers’ Compensation Law provides that “[t]he rights and
remedies granted to an employee subject to this chapter, on account of personal injury or
death by accident, . . . shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee . . . at
common law or otherwise, on account of the injury or death.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
108(a).

In order to qualify as a compensable workers’ compensation claim, the employee’s
injury must both “arise out of” and occur “in the course of” employment. Cloyd v. Hartco
Flooring Co., 274 S.W.3d 638, 643 (Tenn. 2008). If the employee’s injury did not “arise out
of” and occur “in the course of” employment, the injury is not compensable, and the
employee does not have the option of accepting the remedies of the Workers’ Compensation
Law. Clawson v. Burrow, 250 S.W.3d 59, 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). If, however, the injury
did “arise out of” and occur “in the course of” employment, the employee must accept the
remedies of the Workers’ Compensation Law to the exclusion of any other right or remedy.
Id.; see also Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-103(a) (providing that every employee subject to the
Workers’ Compensation Law “shall . . . accept compensation for personal injury or death by
accident arising out of and in the course of employment.”).

“[Our Supreme] Court and others over the years have attempted, with little success,
to wring more certainty and specificity from the terse words ‘arising out of and in the course
of employment.’” Bell v. Kelso Oil Co., 597 S.W.2d 731, 733-34 (Tenn. 1980).

The statutory requirements that a compensable injury arise out of and
occur in the course of the employment have been the subject of extensive
litigation in Tennessee and elsewhere. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13)
(2005) (stating that to be eligible for workers’ compensation benefits, an
employee must suffer an “injury by accident arising out of and in the course
of employment”). Our state is by no means unique in having adopted these
two requirements, for nearly all states require that the injury arise out of and
occur in the course of the employment. 1 Larson's Workers' Compensation

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 Law § 3.01 (2004). “Indeed, the bulk of workers’ compensation litigation
[nationwide] centers on these two requirements.” Blankenship v. Am.
Ordnance Sys., 164 S.W.3d 350, 354 (Tenn. 2005). As one commentator has
observed, “ ‘[f]ew groups of statutory words in the history of law have had to
bear the weight of such a mountain of interpretation as has been heaped upon
this slender foundation.’” Id. (quoting 1 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation
Law § 3.01 (2004)).

Anderson v. Westfield Group, 259 S.W.3d 690, 695 (Tenn. 2008). Various judicial “tests”
and “doctrines” have emerged for determining when an injury arises out of and occurs in the
course of employment, such as the “positional doctrine,” the “peculiar hazard doctrine,” the
“foreseeability test,” the “street-risk doctrine,” and others. See Bell, 597 S.W.2d at 734.
However, our Supreme Court has “consistently abstained from adopting any particular
judicial test, doctrine, formula, or label that purports to ‘clearly define the line between
accidents and injuries which arise out of and in the course of employment [and] those which
do not[.]’” Wait, 240 S.W.3d at 225 (quoting Bell, 597 S.W.2d at 734). The Court has
repeatedly rejected “the use of artificial labels,” stating that “classification and labeling is not
the best method of determining whether an injury is compensable.” Hall v. Mason Dixon
Lines, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Tenn. 1987). The Court has found it “difficult, perhaps
impossible to compose a formula” which clearly defines those accidents resulting in
compensable injuries. Id. As such, in Tennessee, “[t]here is no formula which will clearly
define the line between accidents and injuries which arise out of and in the course of
employment and those which do not.” DeBow v. First Inv. Prop., Inc., 623 S.W.2d 273, 275
(Tenn. 1981). Instead, “‘each case must be decided with respect to its own attendant
circumstances and not by resort to some formula.’” Braden v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 833
S.W.2d 496, 499 (Tenn. 1992) (quoting Bell, 597 S.W.2d at 734). As a result, “the standards
employed by [the] Court in deciding whether accidents arise out of employment have led to
diverse results.” Hudson v. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 583 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tenn. 1979).

The requirements that an injury “arise out of” and occur “in the course of”
employment are not synonymous, although both elements exist to ensure a work connection
to the injury for which the employee seeks benefits. Wait, 240 S.W.3d at 225; Hubble v.
Dyer Nursing Home, 188 S.W.3d 525, 533-34 (Tenn. 2006). The “in the course of”
requirement refers to the time, place, and circumstances of the event. Cloyd, 274 S.W.3d at
643. An accidental injury is “in the course of” employment if it occurred while the employee
was performing a duty he or she was employed to do.2 Id. In contrast, the “arising out of”
requirement refers to the injury’s cause or origin. Id.; Wait, 240 S.W.3d at 225. An injury

2
Plaintiffs concede that their injuries occurred “in the course of” their employment because the
exposure occurred while they were working at the credit union.

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arises out of employment when there is a causal connection between the conditions under
which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Trosper v. Armstrong
Wood Prods., Inc., 273 S.W.3d 598, 604 (Tenn. 2008); Foreman v. Automatic Sys., Inc.,
272 S.W.3d 560, 571 (Tenn. 2008); Anderson, 259 S.W.3d at 696. In sum, an injury
generally arises out of and is in the course of employment if it has a rational connection to
the work and occurs while the employee is engaged in the duties of his employment. Cloyd,
274 S.W.3d at 643; Saylor v. Lakeway Trucking, Inc., 181 S.W.3d 314, 318 (Tenn. 2005);
Fritts v. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 163 S.W.3d 673, 677 (Tenn. 2005).

Our Supreme Court has often stated that an injury “must result from a danger or
hazard peculiar to the work or be caused by a risk inherent in the nature of the work” in order
to be compensable. See, e.g., Foreman, 272 S.W.3d at 572; Anderson, 259 S.W.3d at 696;
see also Wait, 240 S.W.3d at 228 (“Generally, for an injury to ‘arise out of’ employment, it
must emanate from a peculiar danger or risk inherent to the nature of the employment.”).
Accordingly, an injury that is purely coincidental, contemporaneous, or collateral with the
employment will not be considered as arising out of the employment. Foreman, 272 S.W.3d
at 572; Anderson, 259 S.W.3d at 696; Wait, 240 S.W.3d at 228. For example, an employee
may not recover for an injury that occurs while simply walking unless there is an employment
hazard, such as a puddle of water or a step, in addition to the injured employee’s ambulation.
Wilhelm v. Krogers, 235 S.W.3d 122, 128-29 (Tenn. 2007). Courts have reasoned that such
an injury would have occurred whether the employee happened to be at work or at another
location. Id. at 128. Likewise, injuries from assaults occurring in the workplace but
originating from inherently private disputes, such as domestic disputes, are not compensable.
Wait, 240 S.W.3d at 227. Compensation has also been denied where an employee choked
on a piece of chewing gum while at work, Jones v. Sonoco Prods., Inc., No. 9, 1992 WL
33269 (Tenn. Feb. 24, 1992), and where an employee injured her knee while using the
restroom at work, Connor v. Chester County Sportswear Co., No. W2001-02114-WC-
R3-CV, 2002 WL 31348662 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Oct. 18, 2002). Because there
was no causal connection between these injuries and the conditions under which the work
was required to be performed, the injuries did not “arise out of” the employment. Jones,
1992 WL 33269, at *3; Connor, 2002 WL 31348662, at *3. Again, “[i]t is not enough that
the injury coincidentally occurred at work; rather, it must in some way be caused by or
related to the working environment or conditions of the employment.” Connor, 2002 WL
31348662, at *3 (citing Miedema v. Dial Corp., 551 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1996)). “The mere
presence of an employee at the place of his employment will not alone result in the injury
being considered as arising out of the employment.” Rogers v. Kroger Co., 832 S.W.2d 538,
541 (Tenn. 1992) (citing Jordan v. United Methodist Urban Ministries, 740 S.W.2d 411, 412
(Tenn. 1987)).

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 We now turn to the facts of the case before us, keeping in mind that the Worker’s
Compensation Act is a remedial statute, which is to be liberally and equitably construed in
furtherance of its purposes and in favor of compensation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116;
Wait, 240 S.W.3d at 224. “The determination of whether an injury arose out of and in the
course of a worker’s employment is a question of fact.” Phillips v. A & H Constr. Co., Inc.,
134 S.W.3d 145, 149 (Tenn. 2004). St. Thomas Hospital cannot use the exclusivity provision
of the Act to secure a judgment as a matter of law unless it can show there was no genuine
dispute of material fact that Plaintiffs’ injuries arose out of and in the course and scope of
their employment. See Clawson, 250 S.W.3d at 63.

As noted above, Plaintiffs concede that their injuries occurred “in the course of” their
employment. However, regarding the “arising out of” requirement, Plaintiffs contend that
“there was no causal connection between the conditions under which the work was required
to be performed and the resulting damage to their health.” The basis of Plaintiffs’ argument
is that “carbon monoxide is not a risk inherent in the workplace of a credit union” and “not
‘a peculiar danger’ to which the employees of a credit union are exposed.”

Although carbon monoxide exposure is not a risk inherent in the workplace in all
credit unions, under the facts of this case, it was a risk or hazard of Plaintiffs’ employment
due to the location of their offices just above the water heater in the basement. This was one
of the “conditions under which the work [was] required to be performed.” See Trosper, 273
S.W.3d at 604. The situation is comparable to the one in Electro-Voice v. O’Dell, Inc., 519
S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tenn. 1975), where the Court concluded that at a particular manufacturing
plant, bees were “part of the environment of working on the assembly line and, consequently,
were a risk or hazard of appellee’s employment.” See also Atkins v. Wozniak Indus., Inc.,
No. W2000-00665-WC-R3-CV, 2001 WL 101799, at *1-2 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel
Feb. 7, 2001) (involving a spider bite at a plant).

Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Electro-Voice and Atkins on the basis that the bees
and spiders were “a known hazard” at each of the respective manufacturing plants, and
Plaintiffs claim that carbon monoxide was not “a risk known to the plaintiffs before their
injuries occurred.” In response to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs submitted the
job descriptions for each of their positions, which listed robbery as a potential risk of their
employment, but not carbon monoxide exposure. Nevertheless, we do not believe that
Plaintiffs’ lack of knowledge of the hazard prevents a finding that their injuries arose out of
their employment. Foreseeability is not the test in workers’ compensation cases. Volz v.
Southerland, 292 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tenn. 1956).

[I]f the injury can be seen to have followed as a natural incident of the work
and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole

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 situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the
employment, then it arises “out of” the employment. It need not have been
foreseen or expected, but after the event it must appear to have had its origin
in a risk connected with the employment and have flowed from that source as
a rational consequence.

Id. (citing Davis v. Wabash Screen Door Co., 204 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. 1947)).

Plaintiffs also argue that their “mere presence . . . in an office which became saturated
with carbon monoxide does not mean that their injuries arose out of their employment.”
They further argue that an injury which is “purely coincidental or contemporaneous or
collateral with the employment” will not be considered as arising out of employment. We
agree. However, when discussing the “coincidental, contemporaneous, or collateral” cases,
our Supreme Court has cautioned that “it is easy to mistake the rule of these cases by
extending their dicta beyond the confines of their facts.” Hall v. Auburntown Indus., Inc.,
684 S.W.2d 614, 616 (Tenn. 1985). The Court further explained that “there is no
requirement of a special risk in a case like this one, where it is obvious that nothing
extraneous to the employment caused the injury.” Id. at 617.

Although Plaintiffs’ arguments, at first glance, appeared persuasive, we have carefully
considered each of them and find them without merit. As noted by Justice Burnett in
Jackson v. Clark & Fay, Inc., 270 S.W.2d 389, 395 (Tenn. 1954) (J.Burnett and J.Prewitt,
dissenting):

‘The few and seemingly simple words ‘arising out of and in the course of the
employment’ have been the fruitful (or fruitless) source of a mass of decisions
turning upon nice distinctions and supported by refinements so subtle as to
leave the mind of the reader in a maze of confusion. From their number
counsel can, in most cases, cite what seems to be an authority for resolving in
his favour, on whichever side he may be, the question in dispute.’ Lord
Wrenbury in Herbert v. Foxx & Co., 1916, 1 A.C. 405, 419.
We think that this statement is without a doubt one of the most truthful that can
be found anywhere in the law books. Anyone who makes any search and study
of the decisions will find the statement true without question.

Again, “an injury arises out of the employment ‘when there is apparent to the rational
mind, upon consideration of all the circumstances, a causal connection between the
conditions under which the work [was] required to be performed and the resulting injury.’”
Anderson v. Save-A-Lot, Ltd., 989 S.W.2d 277, 280 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting T.J. Moss Tie

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Co. v. Rollins, 235 S.W.2d 585 (Tenn. 1951) (alteration in original)). The phrase “causal
connection” means “cause in the sense the accident had its origin in the hazards to which the
employment exposed the employee while doing his work.” Phillips, 134 S.W.3d at 150; City
of Lawrenceburg v. Nelson, 407 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tenn. 1966). The relation of the
employment to the injury is the “essential point of inquiry.” Bell, 597 S.W.2d at 734.
Considering all the circumstances in this case, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ injuries have a
rational, causal connection with their employment and the conditions under which their work
was required to be performed. This was not a situation where the work environment was
merely a coincidental setting for an injury that could have occurred elsewhere. The
employment conditions subjected Plaintiffs to the hazard of carbon monoxide. We find this
case analogous to International Yarn Corporation v. Casson, 541 S.W.2d 150, 151 (Tenn.
1976), where an employee was injured when the roof of the building where she worked
collapsed during a rainstorm. The employee argued that such a hazard was not peculiar to
her employment, but the Supreme Court rejected her argument because “[her] presence in a
building that could not withstand the force of ordinary rainfall was a circumstance directly
related to the employment.” Id. As St. Thomas Hospital aptly stated before the trial court,
“The plaintiffs worked in a building in a confined space near a gas-powered device. Whether
they knew of that device or not, their work environment made carbon monoxide a potential
hazard of their employment. Their alleged exposure to carbon monoxide was peculiar to
their work because it was a risk created as a result of the particular physical environment of
their workplace.”

When the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence permit a
reasonable person to reach only one conclusion, then no material factual dispute exists, and
the question can be disposed of as a matter of law. Green, 293 S.W.3d at 513. Here, the
record supports no inference that the injury arose out of anything except the employment.
See Hall, 684 S.W.2d at 617. Thus, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that
Plaintiffs’ injuries arose out of and in the course of their employment, see Clawson, 250
S.W.3d at 63, and the trial court erred in denying the motion for summary judgment filed by
St. Thomas Hospital.

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 V. C ONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, we reverse the decision of the circuit court and
remand for entry of an order granting summary judgment to St. Thomas Hospital. Costs of
this appeal are taxed to the appellees, Mary Coleman, Chloe Nguyen, and Cassandra Dixon,
for which execution may issue if necessary.

_________________________________
ALAN E. HIGHERS, P.J., W.S.

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