IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AT JACKSON FILED
March 26, 2008
FEBRUARY 1997
Cecil Crowson, Jr.
Appellate Court Clerk
STATE OF TENNESSEE, )
) C.C.A. NO. 02C01-9603-CC-00087
Appellee, )
) HENRY COUNTY
VS. )
) HON. JULIAN P. GUINN,
) JUDGE
JAMES EDWARD ARMSTRONG, )
) (Sale of a schedule II controlled
) substance)
Appellant. )
FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:
W. JEFFERY FAGAN CHARLES W. BURSON
Asst. District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter
P.O. Box 663
Camden, Tennessee 38320 ELLEN H. POLLACK
Asst. Attorney General
450 James Robertson Parkway
Nashville, Tennessee 37243-0493
ROBERT G. RADFORD
District Attorney General
VICKI S. SNYDER
Asst. District Attorney General
P.O. Box 686
Huntingdon, Tennessee 38344
OPINION FILED: _______________
AFFIRMED
JOE G. RILEY,
JUDGE
OPINION
Defendant Armstrong appeals as of right from a jury verdict of guilty for the
sale of a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine). Sentenced as a Range I
standard offender, Armstrong received thirty-seven (37) months in the Tennessee
Department of Correction and was fined $2,000. The sole issue for review is
whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Armstrong’s conviction. We affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
I.
On an appeal questioning the sufficiency of evidence, it is not the function of
this court to reweigh or re-evaluate evidence offered at trial. State v. Jones, 901
S.W.2d 393 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1987). The trier of fact resolves issues of credibility, weight and value to
be given evidence. Id. The state is entitled to the strongest legitimate view of the
evidence and all reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom. State v.
Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). The ultimate issue is whether, after
reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); T. R. A. P. 13(e).
A jury verdict, approved by the trial court, accredits the testimony of witnesses
for the state and resolves all conflicts in favor of the state’s theory. State v. Williams,
657 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tenn. 1983); State v. Grace, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn.
1973). Accordingly, a verdict of guilt removes the presumption of innocence and
replaces it with a presumption of guilt requiring the accused to prove that the
evidence is insufficient to support the verdict returned by the trier of fact. State v.
Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982); Grace, 493 S.W.2d at 476.
II.
Armstrong contends the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for
the sale of a schedule II controlled substance. The facts surrounding the arrest and
conviction of Armstrong involve an undercover drug operation utilizing two agents.
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One agent was wired with a tape recorder and transmitter which enabled the
supervising officer to monitor the sale. Armstrong approached the car the agents
were driving and asked them “what [did they] need?” Upon requesting “a forty”,
Armstrong had the informants drive him to a nearby house. Armstrong personally
got out of the car, went inside the house, and returned with another person. The
other person gave what was later determined to be cocaine to Armstrong who in turn
handed it to the agents. Armstrong then received the money and gave it to the other
person.
The two agents and the supervising police officer testified at trial to
Armstrong’s involvement in the drug transaction. The jury rejected Armstrong’s
argument that he was merely an agent for a dealer, and not a seller. Moreover, a
rational trier of fact could easily conclude from the above proof that Armstrong
knowingly sold cocaine. The evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for the
sale of a schedule II controlled substance. This issue is without merit.
Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
___________________
JOE G. RILEY, JUDGE
CONCUR:
_____________________________
JOE B. JONES, PRESIDING JUDGE
_______________________
JOHN H. PEAY, JUDGE
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