State v. Gann

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
Assigned on Briefs May 15, 2007

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMES WILLIAM GANN, JR.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Coffee County
No. 31,723 L. Craig Johnson, Judge

No. M2006-01230-CCA-R3-CD - Filed October 16, 2007

The defendant, James William Gann, Jr., was convicted of first degree premeditated murder, arson,
and setting fire to personal property. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-202(a)(1), -14-301(a)(1), -14-303(a)
(1997). He received a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for the premeditated murder
conviction. The trial court imposed a sentence of six years for the arson conviction and two years
for the setting fire to personal property conviction to be served consecutively to each other and to
the murder conviction for an effective sentence of life plus eight years. In this appeal, the defendant
asserts (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, (2) that the trial court erred in
the admission of certain evidence, (3) that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct, and (4) that
his sentence is excessive. Upon our review of the record, there is no reversible error and the
judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Judgments of the Circuit Court Affirmed

JAMES CURWOOD WITT , JR., J, delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER
and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., JJ. joined.

B. Campbell Smoot, District Public Defender, and Margaret C. Lamb, Assistant District Public
Defender, for the appellant, James William Gann, Jr.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; Leslie E. Price, Assistant Attorney General;
C. Michael Layne, District Attorney General; and Kenneth J. Shelton, Jr., Assistant District Attorney
General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

OPINION

On December 6, 2000, firefighters responding to a fire at the residence of the victim,
Willard Morris, Jr., discovered the victim’s body under a pile of blankets. The victim had been
stabbed repeatedly, and his clothing had been stuffed with wrapping paper, newspaper, and receipts.
The defendant, who was originally charged with first degree felony murder, first degree premeditated
murder, especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of arson, was convicted of first degree
premeditated murder, arson, and setting fire to personal property.

The victim’s mother, Linda Morris, testified that she last saw the victim alive on the
evening of December 5, 2000. She and her husband visited briefly with the victim, who showed
them a large amount of cash totaling at least $1,100, and left at approximately 9:30 p.m. According
to Ms. Morris, the victim kept money in an encyclopedia and under a loose piece of carpeting in his
house, but when she searched the house after the fire, she did not find any money in either location.

Tullahoma Fire Department Firefighter Jason Morgan responded to the fire at the
victim’s residence and used a digital thermal imaging camera to search for signs of life inside the
structure and found none. According to Mr. Morgan, the house was a “complete wreck” with objects
torn from the wall and thrown onto the floor, the shower curtain torn down, and furniture overturned.
He found a large pile of quilts in the front room of the house. After the fire was under control, Mr.
Morgan began a search for bodies and saw the victim’s fingers protruding from the edge of the pile
of blankets in the den. Mr. Morgan pulled back the blankets and saw that the victim’s shirt was
soaked with blood and that his clothing had been stuffed with paper. Officials from the State Fire
Marshall’s Office concluded that the fire began in the kitchen, where numerous items of clothing,
some still on hangers, had been placed on top of the stove and inside the oven.

Tullahoma Police Department Investigator Jason Ferrell led the investigation into the
victim’s death and seized a poster board and two pieces of toilet paper that contained blood drops
and smears as well as a tuft of “light blondish-brown hair” that was in the victim’s hand. As he was
collecting evidence from the scene, Ferrell received a telephone call from Timmy Brawley, who
stated that he had important information regarding the victim’s death. Ferrell met with Brawley, and
Brawley agreed to wear a wire and meet the defendant at his residence. Ferrell recalled that he
listened to the conversation but admitted that parts of it were distorted. Ferrell specifically recalled
that the defendant told Brawley that his wife had scratched his cheek and poked him in the eye. At
some point, the defendant got into a vehicle with Brawley, and the police stopped the vehicle. The
defendant agreed to come to the police station for questioning and traveled there in Brawley’s car.
Ferrell stated that he continued to listen to the conversation between the defendant and Brawley.
According to Ferrell, the defendant told Brawley, “We are the only alibi that each other’s got.”
Brawley responded, “I’m telling the truth.”

At the police station, the defendant waived his rights in writing and provided a
statement in which he admitted smoking crack cocaine with the victim and Brawley at the victim’s
residence. He stated that he left the victim’s residence at approximately 4:30 a.m. The defendant
also told Ferrell that his blood would not be found at the victim’s residence. The defendant said
nothing about an altercation with the victim or about the presence of others who might have attacked
the victim. He stated that after leaving the victim’s residence he walked to a cab stand, but when he
could not get a cab, he walked to the Favorite Market and called a cab. The cab picked him up and
drove him home. The defendant claimed that he received the scratches on his hands while he was
running from police on a prior occasion. After the defendant gave his statement, Ferrell transported

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him to the hospital where blood was drawn for deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) testing. Ferrell
explained that, because of the delay in receiving test results from the Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation (“TBI”), the defendant was not arrested until he was indicted in January 2002.

Timmy Brawley, who had known the defendant for four or five years at the time of
the victim’s death, testified that on December 5, 2000, he and the defendant drove to two different
locations in an unsuccessful attempt to purchase marijuana before driving to the victim’s house to
purchase cocaine. Brawley and the defendant purchased cocaine and left the victim’s house at
approximately 4:00 p.m. They then went to Brawley’s house and injected the cocaine before
traveling to Nashville in search of more drugs. While in Nashville, the two men purchased Dilauded
and cocaine which they dissolved in water and injected before returning to Brawley’s residence.
There, they injected more cocaine and then traveled to the victim’s residence. The defendant told
Brawley to park next door and wait outside. Brawley waited thirty to forty-five minutes and then
went to the front door. At that point, the defendant came to the door, told Brawley that the victim
had agreed to “front him an eightball of cocaine,” and instructed Brawley to go purchase cigarettes
for the victim. When Brawley returned, the victim and defendant were cooking crack cocaine in the
kitchen of the victim’s residence. Thereafter, the three men “smoked a lot of cocaine.” According
to Brawley, the victim and the defendant argued about money, with the victim refusing to front any
cocaine to the defendant. The victim did, however, offer to allow them to smoke all of the crack
cocaine that he had in the house.

Brawley recalled that when he left the victim’s residence at 3:45 a.m., the victim and
the defendant were in the kitchen with a large amount of cocaine. At that time, the defendant was
wearing baggy pants, a t-shirt, tennis shoes, and a blue flannel jacket that he had borrowed from
Brawley on the previous day. Brawley returned to his residence, showered, drove his wife to work,
and then drove his children to school. As he was driving to work later in the morning, he saw police
at the victim’s residence and observed that the house was on fire. Thereafter, he contacted Ferrell,
who asked him to wear a wire and go to the defendant’s house to retrieve the blue flannel jacket.
Brawley admitted that he did not contact Ferrell until after he learned that the victim was dead.
Brawley claimed that the defendant asked him to tell police that he had left the victim’s residence
with Brawley.

Seventeen-year-old Michael Kyle McKay, who lived across the street from the victim,
testified that at approximately 7:45 a.m. on December 6, 2000, he saw a man carrying a garbage bag
leave the victim’s house and walk down the street. The man looked over his shoulder at the victim’s
house several times but did not appear to be in a hurry. He was approximately five feet, four inches
tall and, because of his slim build and shoulder-length hair, McKay initially believed he was a
woman. McKay recalled that the man was wearing navy blue or faded black sweat pants, a red and
black checked shirt, and a navy blue toboggan. Upon viewing a photographic lineup, McKay
identified the defendant as the man he had seen leaving the victim’s house.

Doctor Feng Li, who performed the autopsy, testified that the victim had a of total
77 stab wounds in addition to a number of blunt force trauma injuries. The victim had 15 stab

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wounds to the head and neck, 16 to the left side of the chest, four to the right chest, six to the
abdomen, one to the right shoulder, one to the left thigh, and 34 to the back. At least one of the stab
wounds penetrated the victim’s heart and seven penetrated the lungs. Doctor Li testified that many
of the wounds were likely inflicted after the victim lost consciousness and some after he had died.
The cause of death was multiple stab wounds. Wounds to the victim’s hands and arms were
classified as defensive wounds. The victim’s urine tested positive for cocaine and marijuana.

Scott Robinson, a driver for Courtesy Cab, testified that he picked the defendant up
at Scot Market at 8:31 a.m. on December 6, 2000. He recalled that the defendant had long hair and
acted completely normal.

Kristen Brazier, the defendant’s girlfriend and mother of his three children, testified
that the defendant left their residence on the evening of December 5, 2000, and returned at
approximately 8:00 a.m. the following morning. Ms. Brazier, who was declared a hostile witness,
admitted giving a statement to police that the defendant “had gashes on his hands, his thumb cut, and
had a gash on his head. His scalp was busted.” She also told police that the defendant claimed that
he received the injuries in a fight in Nashville. The defendant did not appear upset or distraught
when he discussed his injuries. On cross-examination, Ms. Brazier stated that the defendant had the
cut on his head before he left on December 5. She claimed that she gave her statement to police only
because she felt pressured by police.

Special Agent Joseph P. Minor of the TBI performed DNA testing on the items
collected from the scene. According to Agent Minor, the defendant’s blood was found on a piece
of poster board found underneath the victim’s body and a calendar found in the front room of the
victim’s house. Blood on a piece of toilet paper was a mixture from the defendant and the victim.

The defendant, who was 19 years old at the time of the crimes, testified that he was
a heavy drug user during that time and that the victim was his usual supplier of cocaine. He stated
that on December 5, 2000, he left his residence with Brawley in search of drugs. After unsuccessful
attempts to purchase marijuana and cocaine elsewhere, he and Brawley bought cocaine from the
victim. They injected the drugs at Brawley’s house and then traveled to Nashville, where they
purchased Dilaudid using clothing that Brawley had shoplifted. While in Nashville, the defendant
injected both cocaine and Dilaudid. The two men then went to Brawley’s house, where they injected
more drugs before traveling to the victim’s house to purchase more cocaine. While at the victim’s
residence, the defendant and Brawley smoked crack cocaine and agreed to split the purchase of an
eightball. The victim sent Brawley for cigarettes, and he was gone thirty to forty-five minutes. The
defendant contended that after he heard a car pull into the driveway, he went into the bathroom and
vomited. He claimed that as he was cleaning himself up, he heard the sounds of a struggle coming
from the front room of the house. When he came out of the bathroom, he saw Brawley and the
victim fighting and observed Brawley “sticking” the victim. The defendant claimed that he was
knocked unconscious when he tried to intervene in the melee.

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 When he regained consciousness, the defendant was lying on the floor and paper had
been stuffed into his clothing. The defendant stated that he got up, pulled the paper out of his
clothing, and “hit the door wide open.” Although he saw the victim lying on the floor and saw and
smelled smoke, he did not check to see if the victim was alive and did not attempt to offer any
assistance. The defendant stated that he did not provide this information to police because he was
sick and sleepy from ingesting Dilauded just prior to the interview. When asked why he did not get
stabbed, the defendant stated that he heard someone say, “Just let him burn.”

During cross-examination, the defendant said that he ran from the victim’s house to
Scot Market and stated that he did not call the fire department or the police because he felt as though
he was “running for [his] life.” The defendant could not explain how his blood came to be on the
items seized from the victim’s residence or how he had received the numerous scratches to his face
and hands. He admitted lying to police about the origin of his injuries, explaining that he was scared.

Tammy Smith, a third-shift clerk at Scot Market, recalled that around 4:30 a.m., a
white man with “scraggly hair,” dark pants, a white t-shirt, and a blue checked shirt entered the store
and told her he was waiting for a ride home to Shelbyville. The man, who she said “could have
been” the defendant, was wearing work boots and had no injuries on his hands or face. Another
clerk, Katie Ferrell, disagreed with Smith’s description of the man from Shelbyville and described
him as tall with broad shoulders and shoulder length dark hair.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned verdicts of guilty for first degree
premeditated murder, arson, and setting fire to personal property. The jury acquitted the defendant
of especially aggravated robbery and felony murder.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

As his first issue, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his
convictions. When an accused challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court’s
standard of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S. Ct. 2781,
2791-92 (1979); State v. Winters, 137 S.W.3d 641, 654 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003). The rule applies
to findings of guilt based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, or a combination of direct
and circumstantial evidence. Winters, 137 S.W.3d at 654.

In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, this court should neither re-weigh the
evidence nor substitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact. Id. at 655. Questions
concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and value of the evidence, as well as all
factual issues raised by the evidence are resolved by the trier of fact. State v. Cabbage, 571 S.W.2d
832, 835 (Tenn. 1978). Significantly, this court must afford the State of Tennessee the strongest
legitimate view of the evidence contained in the record as well as all reasonable and legitimate
inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. Id.

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 A. Premeditated Murder

Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-202(a)(1) provides that “[f]irst degree
murder is . . . [a] premeditated and intentional killing of another.” T.C.A. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (1997).
“‘[P]remeditation’ is an act done after the exercise of reflection and judgment.” Id. § 39-13-202(d).

Proof of premeditation is inherently circumstantial. The trier of fact cannot speculate
what was in the killer’s mind, so the existence of premeditation must be determined from the
defendant’s conduct in light of the circumstances surrounding the crime. See State v. Johnny Wright,
No. 01C01-9503-CC-00093 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Jan. 5, 1996) (citing LaFave and Scott,
Substantive Criminal Law §7.7 (2nd ed. 1986)). Thus, in evaluating the sufficiency of proof of
premeditation, the appellate court may look to the circumstances surrounding the killing. See, e.g.,
State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997); State v. Coulter, 67 S.W.3d 3, 72 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 2001). Such circumstances may include “the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim;
the particular cruelty of the killing; declarations by the defendant of an intent to kill; evidence of
procurement of a weapon; preparations before the killing for concealment of the crime; and calmness
immediately after the killing.” Bland, 958 S.W.2d at 660.

In this case, the proof established that the victim was last seen alive in the company
of the defendant. Both were under the influence of drugs, and the two men had argued over money
during the evening. The defendant’s blood was found on a poster board underneath the victim’s
lifeless body, on two pieces of toilet paper near the body, and on a calendar only a few feet away.
The defendant was seen leaving the victim’s house on the morning of December 6 just before
firefighters arrived on the scene. The victim was stabbed 77 times, and his clothing was stuffed with
paper. The defendant started a fire in the house in an attempt to conceal the murder. Many of the
wounds were inflicted after the victim lost consciousness, and some were inflicted after the victim
had died. There was no evidence that the victim was armed, and wounds to his hands and forearms
were classified by Doctor Li as defensive wounds. McKay testified that the defendant did not appear
to be in a hurry as he left the victim’s house, and he was walking rather than running down the street.
The defendant called a taxi to take him home, and the driver described the defendant’s mood as
completely normal. The defendant’s girlfriend also described the defendant as calm following the
murder. Under these circumstances, it is our view that the evidence was sufficient to support the
conviction for premeditated first degree murder.

B. Arson

“A person commits [arson] who knowingly damages any structure by means of a fire
. . . [w]ithout the consent of all persons who have a possessory, proprietary or security interest
therein . . . .” T.C.A. § 39-14-301 (1997). “A person commits arson who knowingly damages any
personal property, . . . by means of a fire . . . [w]ithout the consent of all persons who have a
possessory or proprietary interest therein; or . . . [w]ith intent to destroy or damage any such property
for any unlawful purpose.” Id. § 39-14-303.

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 Here, the evidence, in the light most favorable to the State, established that the
defendant ignited a fire at the victim’s house using the stove and oven as the heat source and the
victim’s clothing, towels, and various other items as fuel. The victim’s mother, who owned the
house, testified that she did not give the defendant permission to set fire to the house. The evidence
also established that the defendant set the fire for the purpose of concealing the true nature of the
victim’s death. The victim’s clothing had been stuffed with paper, ostensibly to expedite the burning
of the body. In our view, the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions of arson.

II. Evidentiary Issues

A. Photographs

The defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence two
photographs taken of his shoes on December 6, 2000. The photographs depict reddish-brown stains
on the shoes. The inference suggested by the State, of course, was that the stains were blood. The
defendant asserts that because no tests were conducted to confirm that the stains were indeed blood,
any probative value they might have was outweighed by the danger for unfair prejudice.

The admissibility of photographs is governed by Tennessee Rules of Evidence 401
and 403. See State v. Banks, 564 S.W.2d 947, 951 (Tenn. 1978). Under these rules, the trial court
must determine, first, whether the photograph is relevant. Tenn. R. Evid. 401; Banks, 564 S.W.2d
at 949. Next, the trial court must determine whether the probative value of the photograph is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Tenn. R. Evid. 403; Banks, 564 S.W.2d
at 950-51. The term “unfair prejudice” has been defined as “[a]n undue tendency to suggest decision
on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Banks, 564 S.W.2d
at 951. Photographs offered by the State must be relevant to prove some part of its case and must
not be admitted solely to inflame the jury and prejudice it against the defendant. Id. Whether to
admit the photographs rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed
absent a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion. Banks, 564 S.W.2d at 949; see also State v.
Dickerson, 885 S.W.2d 90, 92 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993); State v. Allen, 692 S.W.2d 651, 654 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1985).

In this case, the State introduced into evidence two photographs taken of the
defendant’s shoes during his December 6 interview with Investigator Jason Ferrell. Although the
photographs depict a number of reddish-brown stains on the shoes, Ferrell admitted that no testing
was performed on the shoes and that he could not say that the stains were blood. In consequence,
the photographs were not particularly probative. Nor were they, however, unfairly prejudicial,
particularly when considered in light of the other evidence at trial. Thus, it is our view that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the photographs.

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 B. Testimony of Investigator Jason Ferrell

The defendant asserts that the State violated the rules of discovery by failing to turn
over an audible tape recording of the December 6 conversation between the defendant and Brawley
and that, inconsequence, the trial court should not have permitted Ferrell to relay portions of that
conversation during his testimony. The State submits that there was no discovery violation and that
the remedy fashioned by the trial court alleviated the effects of any error.

At trial, the defense objected to the testimony on the basis that the tape they had
received from the State was inaudible and that they had not been provided with a transcript of the
conversation. The prosecutor stated that he was unaware that the defense was unable to listen to the
tape, that no transcript had been prepared, and that Ferrell was merely referring to the notes he had
prepared after listening to the tape. The defense agreed that Ferrell could testify as to what he heard
while monitoring the conversation but contended that he should not be allowed to reference either
the tape or his notes. The trial court ruled that the notes could be used to refresh his recollection and
that they would have to be provided to the defense prior to cross-examination. The State agreed to
allow defense counsel access to equipment to listen to the tape. Ferrell testified that he monitored
the conversation between the defendant and Brawley and that, although the sound was somewhat
distorted, he was able to hear the bulk of the conversation. He went on to relay the content of the
conversation.

Rule 16 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:

If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule,
the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection,
grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence
not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under
the circumstances. The court may specify the time, place, and manner
of making the discovery and inspection and may prescribe such terms
and conditions as are just.

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 16(d)(2). Whether a defendant has been prejudiced by the State’s failure to
disclose information is a significant factor in determining an appropriate remedy. State v. Smith, 926
S.W.2d 267, 270 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Exclusion of evidence is a “drastic remedy and should
not be implemented unless there is no other reasonable alternative.” Id. at 270.

In this instance, the record does not support the defendant’s claim. Although the
defendant contends that the State violated the rules of discovery by providing defense counsel with
an inaudible tape, the prosecutor stated, and defense counsel agreed, that the State had not been made
aware of any problem with the tape prior to trial. There was no proof that the State had intentionally
provided a faulty tape. In addition, the record establishes that no transcript of the tape was prepared

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and thus none was disclosed. The trial court provided defense counsel with an opportunity to listen
to the tape and examine Ferrell’s notes prior to cross-examination. This was an appropriate remedy
under the circumstances.

III. Prosecutorial Misconduct

The defendant next contends that the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by
suggesting, during Ferrell’s direct examination, that the defendant vomited during his interview with
Ferrell because he was guilty and by making improper and inflammatory statements during closing
argument. The State claims that the defendant waived these issues.

A. Direct Examination of Jason Ferrell

During Ferrell’s direct examination, the prosecutor prefaced a question regarding the
defendant’s statement to police with the words, “And according to his statement that he made less
than 24 hours after he killed Willard Morris . . . .” Defense counsel objected and the trial court
sustained the objection. No curative instruction was requested. Later, when discussing the fact that
the defendant vomited during the interview, the prosecutor stated, “It’s just as likely he got sick
because he knew why he was there as it was the use of drugs.” Again, defense counsel objected and
again, the objection was sustained. The defendant did not request a curative instruction.

Although the defendant complains that the trial court erred by failing to issue a
curative instruction, the record establishes that none was requested. Because the defendant failed
to seek a curative instruction, he has waived our consideration of the issue. See Tenn. R. App. P.
36(a) (“Nothing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible
for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the
harmful effect of an error.”); State v. Jones, 733 S.W.2d 517, 522 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (holding
that “failure to request [a] curative instruction[]” is failure to take action “reasonably available to
prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error”).

B. Closing Argument

The defendant asserts that the prosecutor made numerous improper and inflammatory
statements during closing argument and that, as a result, he is entitled to a new trial. Initially, the
State correctly points out that the defendant did not object during the prosecutor’s closing argument.
As indicated, appellate relief is generally not available when a party has “failed to take whatever
action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of any error.” Tenn. R. App.
P. 36(a); see State v. Killebrew, 760 S.W.2d 228, 235 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) (waiver applies when
the defendant fails to make a contemporaneous objection); see also State v. Jenkins, 733 S.W.2d 528,
532 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987); State v. Rhoden, 739 S.W.2d 6, 11-12, 18 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).

“[W]hether properly assigned or not,” however, this court may consider plain error
upon the record under Rule 52(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Ogle, 666

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S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tenn. 1984). Before an error may be so recognized, however, it “must be ‘plain’ and
it must affect a ‘substantial right’ of the accused.” State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 639 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1994). The word “plain” is synonymous with “clear” or equivalently “obvious.” United
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1777 (1993). “Rule 52(b) leaves the decision
to correct the forfeited error within the sound discretion of the court of appeals, and the court should
not exercise that discretion unless the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public
reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. at 732 (citations omitted).

In State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282-83 (Tenn. 2000), our supreme court adopted
the standard announced by this court in Adkisson. There, we defined “substantial right” as a right
of “fundamental proportions in the indictment process, a right to the proof of every element of the
offense, and is constitutional in nature.” Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 639. Our supreme court also
adopted Adkisson’s five factor test for determining whether an error should be recognized as plain:

“(a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court;
(b) a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached;
(c) a substantial right of the accused must have been adversely
affected;
(d) the accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and
(e) consideration of the error is ‘necessary to do substantial justice.’”

Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 282 (quoting Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 641-42). “[A]ll five factors must be
established by the record before this court will recognize the existence of plain error, and complete
consideration of all the factors is not necessary when it is clear from the record that at least one of
the factors cannot be established.” Id. at 283. The supreme court also observed that “the ‘plain error
must [have been] of such a great magnitude that it probably changed the outcome of the trial.’” Id.
(quoting Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 642) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Our Supreme Court, addressing the virtually identical Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 52, has observed that “[t]he Rule . . . reflects a careful balancing of our need to encourage
all trial participants to seek a fair and accurate trial the first time around against our insistence that
obvious injustice be promptly redressed.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163, 102 S. Ct.
1584, 1592 (1982). The Court also noted “that the power granted [to appellate courts] by Rule 52(b)
is to be used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would
otherwise result.” Id. at 163 n.14. Finally, the Court has held that “the burden of establishing
entitlement to relief for plain error is on the defendant claiming it.” United States v. Dominguez
Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2340 (2004).

As indicated, the defendant complains about the propriety of the prosecutor’s closing
argument. Trial courts have substantial discretionary authority in determining the propriety of final
argument. Although counsel is generally given wide latitude, courts must restrict any improper
argument. Sparks v. State, 563 S.W.2d 564, 569-70 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978). Generally speaking,
closing argument “must be temperate, must be predicated on evidence introduced during the trial of

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the case, and must be pertinent to the issues being tried.” State v. Sutton, 562 S.W.2d 820, 823
(Tenn. 1978). To merit a new trial, however, the argument must be so inflammatory or improper as
to affect the verdict. Harrington v. State, 385 S.W.2d 758, 759 (Tenn. 1965). In Judge v. State, 539
S.W.2d 340 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976), this court articulated the factors to be considered in making
that determination:

(1) The conduct complained of viewed in the context and in light of the facts
and circumstances of the case[;]
(2) [t]he curative measures undertaken by the court and the prosecution[;]
(3) [t]he intent of the prosecutor in making the improper statements[;]
(4) [t]he cumulative effect of the improper conduct and any other errors in the
record [; and]
(5) [t]he relative strength or weakness of the case.

Id. at 344.

Most restrictions during final argument are placed upon the State, based in great
measure upon the role of the prosecutor in the criminal justice system:

[The prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor – indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means
to bring about a just one.

It is fair to say that the average jury, in a greater or less degree,
has confidence that these obligations, which so plainly rest upon the
prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed. Consequently,
improper suggestions, insinuations and, especially, assertions of
personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused
when they should properly carry none. . . .

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S. Ct. 629, 633 (1935); see also Judge, 539 S.W.2d at
344-45. Thus, the State must refrain from argument designed to inflame the jury and should restrict
its commentary to matters in evidence or issues at trial. The prosecutor must not express a personal
belief or opinion, but whether that qualifies as misconduct often depends upon the specific

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terminology used. For example, argument predicated by the words “I think” or “I submit” does not
necessarily indicate an expression of personal opinion. United States v. Stulga, 584 F.2d 142, 147
(6th Cir. 1978). The prosecution is not permitted to reflect unfavorably upon defense counsel or the
trial tactics employed during the course of the trial. See Dupree v. State, 410 S.W.2d 890, 892
(Tenn. 1967); Moore v. State, 17 S.W. 30, 35 (Tenn. 1929); Watkins v. State, 203 S.W. 344, 346
(Tenn. 1918); McCracken v. State, 489 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1972). Although there
may be no commentary on the consequences of an acquittal, the prosecution may point out the
gravity of a particular crime and emphasize the importance of law enforcement. See State v. Dakin,
614 S.W.2d 812, 815 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980); Bowling v. State, 458 S.W.2d 639, 641 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1970).

This court has observed that there are five generally recognized areas of prosecutorial
misconduct related to closing argument:

1. It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally
to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may
draw.

2. It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express
his personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any
testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant.

3. The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to
inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury.

4. The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would
divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by
injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused
under the controlling law, or by making predictions of the
consequences of the jury’s verdict.

5. It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to
intentionally refer to or argue facts outside the record unless the facts
are matters of common public knowledge.

State v. Goltz, 111 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2003) (citations omitted).

In this case, the prosecutor essentially began his closing argument on a sour note by
comparing the defendant to a member of the “Manson family” and insisting that the crime he had
committed was more heinous than theirs. The prosecutor made numerous, improper references to
what he termed the defendant’s “homicidal rage.” In addition, he made the following highly
inappropriate comments about the defendant:

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 [H]ere is a man that should never, ever be permitted to walk among
free people again. . . .

. . . . He has forfeited his right to live as a human being because he
chooses to live as an animal – to engage in savage animalistic
conduct.

. . . . This is not the defendant that did what he did on December the
6th. He bears no resemblance to him. He is the defense’s washed up
and sanitized version of the truth, of the existence of Jay Gann.

Jay Gann is a homicidal maniac killer . . . .

. . . . He has forfeited everything that is human. He exists sitting here,
but he is not human. He breathes air. He breathes air to which he is
not entitled, but we as a society permit it. He takes up space on this
planet, but provides nothing of tangible benefit.

This man is not subject to rehabilitation. Anyone who in an
infantile homicidal rage stabs someone 77 times is not subject and
should not be permitted to ever walk the streets with free people again
– never, ever . . . .

The prosecutor also addressed the defendant personally:

. . . . [N]ot only are you a murderer, you are a brazen liar . . . . You
are a killer without remorse, and you have no shame. A good father,
a good citizen, a good man, a decent person, doesn’t go into a
homicidal rage like a kid who has been told, “No, you can’t have
candy today.”

. . . . Your entire existence is a lie.

. . . . You used to be a nuisance. Now you are a threat. . . . You blow
my mind. You sit there like a kid that I would have coached in
baseball years ago, but you are a raging homicidal killer.

. . . . You lied. . . . [D]on’t shake your head to me. I won’t play your
game. I won’t condescend to sink to your level.

. . . . The lies that you have told are shameful, and you are shameless.

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In addition to these comments, the prosecutor made the following remarks about the veracity of the
defendant’s testimony and the strategy of the defense:

While [in New York with my daughter] I took her to see a
play. What a waste of money. I should have brought her to work
with me this week. This man’s performance on the witness stand
standing alone . . . justifies his conviction for murder in the first
degree.

. . . . [T]o believe his testimony, ladies and gentlemen, to believe
anything that he told you from this witness stand is to allow yourself
to engage in an academic exercise to go into a realm of reality where
the Easter bunny is real and the tooth fairy is alive and well.

At no time did this defendant while he was on the witness
stand utter what could be considered a coherent thought, a thought
with any basis in reality. What he testified to is an existence, a state
of being that exists only in his homicidal mind – his sick homicidal
mind.

. . . . There is absolutely nothing in their defense but his fairy tale . .
. . [O]nce they decide they are going to put on a defense, they owe it
to you to put on a defense instead of a fairy tale.

Finally, the prosecutor made the following statement, “[T]his man has to be removed from society.
You owe it to yourself, your family, your children, your grandchildren, your neighbor, everybody
else you know, and those unknown to you. You owe them that responsibility. He should never see
the light of day again.”

The prosecutor made only passing references to the evidence presented and focused
nearly the entirety of his argument on the defendant’s character, the brutal nature of the crime, and
the strategy of the defense. The statements referenced above were improper, inflammatory, and
utterly indefensible as they violate nearly every rule established for proper closing argument.
Further, our research reveals that this prosecutor, who is guilty of making similar statements in
previous cases, has been previously admonished by our supreme court and this court to temper his
closing arguments. See State v. Bates, 804 S.W.3d 868, 881 (Tenn. 2001); see also State v. Taniese
Annette Wilson, No. 01C01-9802-CC-00083, slip op. at 6 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, May 14,
1999); State v. Ricky J. Sanders, No. 89-187-III (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Feb. 16, 1990); State
v. William Marvin Swoape, No Number in Original (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Jan. 10, 1985).
Given his familiarity with this issue, we have no choice but conclude that the comments were
intentional. The comments fall so far outside the realm of reasonable, permissible closing argument
that it is difficult for this court to fathom defense counsel’s failure to object. Clearly, had defense
counsel lodged a contemporaneous objection, this court would reverse the convictions and remand

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the case for a new trial. Because the issue is presented to us for plain error review, however, the
question presented is much closer.

Initially, two of the five Adkisson factors are easily met. The record clearly
establishes what occurred in the trial court and a clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached.
As to the remaining factors, the defendant has failed to establish that the issue was not waived for
tactical reasons. See State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 357-58 (Tenn. 2006). First, we are troubled
by the defendant’s concession in his brief that the failure to object “could be considered a tactical
decision.” Second, the prosecutor’s comments were so improper that it is our view that no
reasonable attorney would have failed to object out of simple inadvertence or neglect. Finally, it is
difficult to know, upon a cold reading of the record, what effect the prosecutor’s comments had on
the jury. It is certainly possible that the argument was so outrageous that the prosecutor lost more
credibility than he gained. If that were the case, then the failure to object could have been a
reasonable tactical decision.

We are also not convinced that a substantial right of the accused was adversely
affected or that consideration of the issue is necessary to do substantial justice in this case.
Generally, “relief for error is tied in some way to prejudicial effect, and the standard phrased as ‘error
that affects substantial rights,’ used in Rule 52, has previously been taken to mean error with a
prejudicial effect on the outcome of a judicial proceeding.” Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 81. An
error “may be so plain as to be reviewable . . . , yet the error may be harmless and therefore not
justify a reversal.” United States v. Lopez, 575 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1978); see Adkisson, 899
S.W.2d at 642. The evidence of the defendant’s guilt was more than sufficient. Further, that the
defendant was acquitted of felony murder and especially aggravated robbery suggests that the jury
was able to carefully consider the charges against the defendant and render its verdict based upon
the evidence presented. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that the arguments of counsel
are not evidence, and the jury is presumed to follow the instructions of the trial court. See State v.
Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908, 914 (Tenn. 1994). Under these circumstances, it is our view that the
prosecutor’s remarks, although completely improper, had no effect on the verdict. See Tenn. R. App.
P. 36(b); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(a).

IV. Sentencing

As his final complaint, the defendant challenges the length of his sentences as well
as the imposition of consecutive sentencing. When a defendant challenges the lenght of a sentence,
this court generally conducts a de novo review of the record with a presumption that the
determinations made by the trial court are correct. T.C.A. § 40-35-401(d) (2003). This presumption,
however, is conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial court considered
the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances. State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166,
169 (Tenn. 1991). The burden of showing that the sentence is improper is upon the appellant. Id.
If the review reflects the trial court properly considered all relevant factors and its findings of fact
are adequately supported by the record, this court must affirm the sentence, “even if we would have
preferred a different result.” State v. Fletcher, 805 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). In

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the event the record fails to demonstrate the required consideration by the trial court, appellate
review of the sentence is purely de novo. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169.

In making its sentencing determination in the present case, the trial court, at the
conclusion of the sentencing hearing, was obliged to determine the propriety of sentencing
alternatives by considering (1) the evidence, if any, received at the guilty plea and sentencing
hearings, (2) the presentence report, (3) the principles of sentencing and arguments as to sentencing
alternatives, (4) the nature and characteristics of the criminal conduct involved, (5) evidence and
information offered by the parties on the enhancement and mitigating factors, (6) any statements the
defendant made in his behalf about sentencing, and (7) the potential for rehabilitation or treatment.
T.C.A. §§ 40-35-210(a), (b); -103(5); State v. Holland, 860 S.W.2d 53, 60 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993).

A. Length of Sentences

In arriving at the defendant’s sentences of six years and two years, the maximum
within the range for each offense, the trial court found that the defendant “treated or allowed the
victim to be treated with exceptional cruelty during the commission of the offenses,” that “the
personal injuries . . . inflicted and the amount of damage to the property that was sustained was
particularly great,” and that the defendant had “juvenile convictions that if they were adjudicated as
an adult would have been felonies.” See T.C.A. § 40-35-114(6), (7), (21). The court found no
mitigating factors.

The defendant concedes, and we agree, that the trial court’s sentencing decision is
entitled to a presumption of correctness. Nevertheless, he argues that because the victim’s house was
not a total loss, the trial court erred by concluding that the damage to personal property was great.
In our view, the record supports the conclusions of the trial court. The evidence established that the
defendant set fire to the victim’s house and personal belongings in an effort to conceal the victim’s
murder. The kitchen area of the house, as well as many of the victim’s personal belongings, were
destroyed by the fire. The remainder of the house and the victim’s belongings were damaged by
smoke and water.

B. Consecutive Sentencing

When a defendant is convicted of multiple crimes, the trial court, in its discretion,
may order the sentences to run consecutively if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a
defendant falls into one of seven categories listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115.
They are:

(1) The defendant is a professional criminal who has
knowingly devoted such defendant’s life to criminal
acts as a major source of livelihood; (2) The defendant
is an offender whose record of criminal activity is
extensive; (3) The defendant is a dangerous mentally

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 abnormal person so declared by a competent
psychiatrist who concludes as a result of an
investigation prior to sentencing that the defendant's
criminal conduct has been characterized by a pattern
of repetitive or compulsive behavior with heedless
indifference to consequences; (4) The defendant is a
dangerous offender whose behavior indicates little or
no regard for human life, and no hesitation about
committing a crime in which the risk to human life is
high; (5) The defendant is convicted of two (2) or
more statutory offenses involving sexual abuse of a
minor with consideration of the aggravating
circumstances arising from the relationship between
the defendant and victim or victims, the time span of
defendant’s undetected sexual activity, the nature and
scope of the sexual acts and the extent of the residual,
physical and mental damage to the victim or victims;
(6) The defendant is sentenced for an offense
committed while on probation; or (7) The defendant
is sentenced for criminal contempt.

T.C.A. § 40-35-115(b) (2006). The existence of a single category is sufficient to warrant the
imposition of consecutive sentences, see State v. Adams, 973 S.W.2d 224, 231 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1997), and indeed, “[e]xtensive criminal history alone will support consecutive sentencing,” id. In
State v. Wilkerson, 905 S.W.2d 933 (Tenn. 1995), the supreme court imposed two additional
requirements for consecutive sentencing when the “dangerous offender” category is used; the court
must find consecutive sentences are reasonably related to the severity of the offenses committed and
are necessary to protect the public from further criminal conduct. Id. at 937-39; see State v. Imfeld,
70 S.W.3d 698, 707-08 (Tenn. 2002).

In assessing consecutive sentences, the trial court concluded “based upon [his] adult
record and lengthy juvenile record that [the defendant is] a professional criminal who has knowingly
devoted himself to criminal acts as a major source of livelihood,” that the defendant is “an offender
whose record of criminal activity is extensive,” and that the defendant is “a [d]angerous [o]ffender
whose behavior evidences little or no regard for human life and [who has] no hesitation about
committing a crime when the risk to human life is high.” The court also found that “an extended
sentence is necessary to protect the public against [the defendant’s] future criminal conduct,” and
that “consecutive sentences relate to the severity of the offenses committed in this case.”

The defendant contends this last finding was in error. It is our view, however, that
the record supports the imposition of consecutive sentences. The defendant, only 19 at the time of
the crimes, had more than 15 prior convictions, many of which were juvenile convictions that would
have been classified as felonies if committed by an adult. His criminal history began at age 14, and

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the presentence report established that the defendant’s work history was nearly non-existent.
Although the defendant claimed to have had four different jobs, he could not remember employment
dates or his salary, and none of the employment could be verified. The defendant’s lengthy criminal
history and lack of a work record suggest that criminal activity was his primary source of livelihood.
Further, the circumstances of the crimes indicate the defendant’s willingness to commit a crime
when the risk to human life was high. The crimes in this case were severe and, in our view,
warranted the imposition of consecutive sentencing.

CONCLUSION

In our view, the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions.
Further, the trial court did not err by admitting into evidence photographs of the defendant’s shoes
or by permitting Jason Ferrell to testify as to a conversation between the defendant and Timmy
Brawley. It is also our view that although the prosecutor made several improper and inflammatory
comments during his closing argument, the error did not affect the outcome of the trial and could not,
therefore, be classified as plain. Finally, it is our view that the sentence is not excessive.
Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

___________________________________
JAMES CURWOOD WITT, JR., JUDGE

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