Younger v. State

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
On-Brief December 13, 2005

MICHAEL LYNN YOUNGER v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

A Direct Appeal from the Tennessee Claims Commission
No. 20301084 The Honorable Nancy Miller-Herron, Commissioner

No. W2005-02080-COA-R3-CV - Filed January 27, 2006

Appellant, an inmate who was housed in a prison operated by a private prison operating
company, filed a claim against the State for medical malpractice with the Claims Commission
pursuant to T.C.A. § 9-8-307. The Claims Commission dismissed the claim for lack of jurisdiction
because the treating physicians and staff allegedly responsible for the injuries to Appellant were not
“state employees,” as defined by T.C.A. § 8-42-101(3)(A). We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Tennessee Claims Commission
Affirmed

W. FRANK CRAWFORD , P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ALAN E. HIGHERS,
J. and DAVID R. FARMER , J., joined.

Michael L. Younger, Pro Se

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Arthur Crownover II, Senior Counsel for
Appellee, State of Tennessee

OPINION

Michael Lynn Younger (“Claimant,” or “Appellant”) is an inmate of the Tennessee
Department of Correction (“TDOC”). On July 28, 2003, Mr. Younger filed a “Claim for
Negligence” (the “Complaint”) with the Tennessee Claims Commission (the “Commission”) against
the State of Tennessee (“State,” “Respondent,” or “Appellee”).1 In his Complaint, Mr. Younger

1
Mr. Younger brought his action under T.C.A. §9-8-307(a)(1)(D), which provides for claims arising from
“legal or medical malpractice by a state employee....” See discussion infra.
asserts that he is an inmate housed at the Hardeman County Correctional Facility (“HCCF”).2 Mr.
Younger alleges that, while he was housed at HCCF, Dr. Jesse Cannon and Mr. James Boyett, HCCF
Administrator, were negligent in administering treatment for Mr. Younger’s hepatitis. Specifically,
Mr. Younger asserts that Dr. Cannon and Mr. Boyett were negligent in treating his hepatitis with the
drug, Interferon, without administering a second drug that allegedly made the Interferon drug
effective.3 Mr. Younger also asserts that Dr. Cannon and Mr. Boyett were negligent in changing his
medication. Mr. Younger makes further allegations against the “HCCF clinic” for negligence in
giving him antibiotics for a toe nail infection. According to Mr. Younger, the antibiotics were not
supposed to be administered while he was receiving the Interferon treatment. In his Complaint, Mr.
Younger states that he was transferred to the West Tennessee State Penitentiary (“WTSP”) on
August 29, 2002, and that the “sole reason” for the transfer was “due to the negligence of the medical
staff at HCCF.”4 While at WTSP, Mr. Younger was treated by Dr. Adams. In his deposition, Mr.
Younger states that he does not know whether Dr. Adams is a State employee (but see Affidavit of
Donna White, infra). Mr. Younger states that WTSP was supposed to transfer him to the DeBerry
Special Needs Facility in Nashville (“DSNF”) in September, 2002. Mr. Younger was, in fact
transferred to DSNF in December, 2002, where he was treated by Dr. Ivens. Dr. Ivens canceled Mr.
Younger’s hepatitis treatment because Mr. Younger “did not fit the criteria.” In his deposition, Mr.
Younger admits that Dr. Ivens is not an employee of the State (see also Affidavit of Donna White,
infra).

On August 26, 2003, the State filed its Answer. The State generally denied the material
allegations of the Complaint, and denied that “any state employee acted negligently or caused the
claimant any injury.”

On March 18, 2005, The State filed a “Motion for Summary Judgment,” along with a
Memorandum of Law in support thereof. The Motion states that Mr. Younger’s case should be
dismissed because:

1) The claimant has not alleged any medical malpractice against any
employee of the State of Tennessee; and
2) This action should be dismissed on the ground that the claimant
fails to state a prima facie claim for medical malpractice.

On April 7, 2005, Mr. Younger also filed a motion for summary judgment against the State, along
with a memorandum of law and documentation in support thereof. The State filed a response to Mr.

2
In his deposition, taken on March 10, 2005, Mr. Younger admits that HCCF is run by Corrections Corporation
of America and not by the State of Tennessee.

3
It is undisputed in the record that both Dr. Cannon and Mr. Boyett were employees of Corrections Corporation
of America not the State of Tennessee.

4
In his deposition, taken on March 10, 2005, Mr. Younger admits the W TSP is run by Corrections Corporation
of America not by the State.

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Younger’s motion for summary judgment on April 7, 2005, in which it relied upon the grounds set
forth in its own motion for summary judgment.

On May 9, 2005, Mr. Younger filed a motion requesting funding for an expert witness to
testify on his behalf. The State filed its response to this Motion on May 9, 2005 and asserted that
there is no authority for the Commission to pay expert witness fees for the claimant. By Order of
May 20, 2005, the Commissioner denied Mr. Younger’s request.

On June 3, 2005, Mr. Younger filed a motion to amend his complaint to include individually
named defendants. The State responded on June 6, 2005 and asserted that Mr. Younger’s motion
to amend was untimely and that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to hear actions against
individuals because the Commission’s jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated actions against
the State. On June 16, 2005, Mr. Younger filed the unsworn statement of Dr. Richard Larry
Williams in support of his malpractice claim. On June 22, 2005, the State filed its response to Dr.
Williams’ statement, which response reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

Dr. Williams appears to state that the treatment of the claimant by Dr.
Jesse Cannon was somehow deficient in that certain drugs were
substituted by Dr. Cannon, however, it is important to note that
despite Dr. Williams’ criticism of the claimant’s medical treatment
by Dr. Cannon, that Dr. Williams stated in his last note on the
claimant that his labs “looked good.” Nowhere in this unsworn
statement does Dr. Williams state that there was any deviation from
the accepted standard of medical care by Dr. Cannon or anyone else.

(Emphasis in original).

Contemporaneously with its response, the State filed the Affidavit of Donna White, the
Director of Health Services at the TDOC Central Office in Nashville, Tennessee. Ms. White’s
Affidavit reads, in relevant part, as follows:

2. Dr. Jesse Cannon, a physician previously at Hardeman County
Correctional Center (“HCCF”) in Whiteville, TN, James Boyette,
HCCF Health Administrator, and the HCCF nursing staff were all
employees of Correctional Corporation of America (“CCA”). They
were not employees of the State of Tennessee.

3. Dr. Robert Adams contracts with Correctional Medical Services
(“CMS”) to provide physician services at West Tennessee State
Penitentiary (“WTSP”) in Henning TN. He is not an employee of the
State of Tennessee. The WTSP nursing staff are Community
Services Agency (“CSA”) employees and are not employees of the
State of Tennessee.

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 4. Dr. Keith Iv[e]ns is a physician with Correctional Medical
Services (“CMS”), who previously was assigned to DeBerry Special
Needs Facility (“DSNF”) in Nashville. He is not an employee of the
State of Tennessee.

On August 2, 2005, the Commission issued an “Order of Dismissal,” granting the State’s
motion for summary judgment. The Order reads, in relevant part, as follows:

In support of his claim, Claimant submitted an unsworn
statement by Richard Larry Williams, M.D., who had treated
Claimant and stated that Claimant’s therapy was “compromised
significantly by the irregular availability of his Ribavirin, the use of
Interferon alpha instead of pegylated Interferon; and in short, his
chances for eradication of the virus were reduced significantly.” Dr.
Williams’ memorandum mentioned Dr. Cannon, but did not
specifically address a deviation from the standard of care.

The Claimant specifically alleges that Dr. Cannon and James
Boyett were negligent in his treatment for hepatitis while he was
incarcerated at H.C.C.F. Corrections Corporation of America,
hereinafter referred to as CCA, a private, for profit company, operates
H.C.C.F. Dr. Cannon and James Boyett are employees of CCA and
are not considered state employees.

***

The affidavit of Ms. Donna White, Director of Health
Services for the Tennessee Department of Correction, confirms that
Dr. Cannon and James Boyette are employees of CCA, not the State
of Tennessee.

Ms. White further stated that Dr. Robert Adams contracts with
Correctional Medical Services to provide services at W.T.S.P. and is
not an employee of the State. Similarly, Dr. Keith Ivens, previously
assigned to Deberry Special Needs Facility, is a physician with
Correctional Medical Services and is not an employee of the State.
Even members of the nursing staff at W.T.S.P. are actually
Community Services Agency employees and not employees of the
State.

***

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 The Claimant simply has not alleged medical malpractice by
any State of Tennessee employee. It is well settled that a principal is
not responsible for the negligent acts of the employees of an
independent contractor. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Elm Hill Marina,
839 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). While the letter from
Dr. Williams indicates possible serious problems with the medical
care Claimant has received during his incarceration, his cause of
action, if any is against CCA and/or Correctional Medical Service,
not the State of Tennessee.

Therefore, the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
and the motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

(Citations to record omitted).

Mr. Younger appeals, pro se, and raises one issue for review as stated in his brief:

(1) Tennessee Code Annotated Section 9-8-307(a)(1)(D), which
provides for claims arising from the “medical malpractice by a state
employee; provided, that the state employee has a professional/client
relationship with the claimant.” The Claimant has brought forth
reasoning that the State of Tennessee had a[n] above described
relationship. (2) The named officials were employees of the State as
admitted in the notice of omission submitted by the State.

We restate the issue as follows: Whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion for
summary judgment on the ground that Mr. Younger has not alleged medical negligence against
any employee of the State.

Appeals from the Tennessee Claims Commission are reviewed de novo upon the record
with a presumption of correctness of the findings of fact by the Commission. Sanders v. State,
783 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tenn. Ct. App.1989); Tenn. R. App.P. 13(d). No such presumption
attaches to the Commission’s conclusions of law. Tenn. R. App.P. 13(d)

It is well settled that a motion for summary judgment should be granted when the movant
demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. The party moving for summary
judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See
Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn.1997). On motion for summary judgment, the court
must take the strongest legitimate view of evidence in favor of the nonmoving party, allow all
reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and discard all countervailing evidence. See id. In
Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn.1993), our Supreme Court stated:

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 Once it is shown by the nonmoving party that there is no genuine
issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must them demonstrate,
by affidavits or discovery material, that there is a genuine, material
fact dispute to warrant a trial. In this regard, Rule 56.05 provides that
the nonmoving party cannot simply rely upon his pleadings but must
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of
material fact for trial.

Id. at 210-11 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

Summary judgment is only appropriate when the facts and the legal conclusions drawn
from the facts reasonably permit only one conclusion. See Carvell v. Bottoms, 900 S.W.2d 23,
26 (Tenn .1995). Since only questions of law are involved, there is no presumption of correctness
regarding a trial court's grant or denial of summary judgment. See Bain, 936 S.W.2d at 622.
Therefore, our review of the trial court's denial of summary judgment is de novo on the record
before this Court. See Warren v. Estate of Kirk, 954 S.W.2d 722, 723 (Tenn.1997).

Mr. Younger brought his claim before the Commission under T.C.A. § 9-8-307 (Supp.
2005), which sets out the jurisdiction of the Claims Commission and provides, in relevant part,
as follows:

(a)(1) The commission or each commissioner sitting individually has
exclusive jurisdiction to determine all monetary claims against the
state based on the acts or omissions of "state employees," as defined
in § 8-42-101(3), falling within one (1) or more of the following
categories:

***

(D) Legal or medical malpractice by a state employee; provided, that
the state employee has a professional/client relationship with the
claimant

T.C.A. § 8-42-101(3)(A) (Supp. 2005) defines a “state employee,” in relevant part, as:

"State employee" means any person who is a state official, including
members of the general assembly and legislative officials elected by
the general assembly, or any person who is employed in the service
of and whose compensation is payable by the state, or any person who
is employed by the state whose compensation is paid in whole or in
part from federal funds, but does not include any person employed on
a contractual or percentage basis.

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 In the instant case, the State provides the Affidavit of Donna White. As set out above, this
Affidavit indicates that none of the medical aid rendered to Mr. Younger was administered by an
employee of the State. Rather, each of these individuals was an employee of an independent
contractor. Mr. Younger provides no evidence to contradict Ms. White’s assertions.

This Court has previously held that CCA employees are not state employees. See Martin
v. State, No. No. M1999-01642-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 747640 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 5, 2001). The
Martin Court noted that, under the Private Prison Contract Act of 1986 (as codified at T.C.A. §41-
24-107(b)), the sovereign immunity of the State does not apply to private contractors, such as the
CCA. Martin, at *2. The Martin Court specifically stated that, “[w]here the acts complained of
were not committed by state employees, the State enjoys sovereign immunity.” Consequently, as
the Commission correctly found, the proper defendant for negligence claims arising from the action
of private contractors, or their employees, in operating correctional facilities is the contractor, and
not the State. See also Greer v. Corrections Corp. of America, No. 01A01-9604-CH-00150, 1996
WL 697942 at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 1996) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Order of the Commission granting the State’s
motion for summary judgment. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the Appellant, Michael
Lynn Younger, and his surety.

__________________________________________
W. FRANK CRAWFORD, PRESIDING JUDGE, W.S.

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