IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
___________________
No. 94-11089
DAVID WAYNE STOKER,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WAYNE SCOTT, Director, Texas
Department of Criminal Justice,
Institutional Division,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas
(92-CV-148)
________________________________________________
October 25, 1996
Before GARWOOD, JONES and EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.*
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
Petitioner-appellant David Wayne Stoker (Stoker) appeals the
dismissal of his application for writ of habeas corpus challenging
his Texas capital murder conviction and death sentence. Stoker
contends that the State failed to disclose certain evidence
favorable to Stoker in violation of its obligations under Brady v.
Maryland, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), and that he received ineffective
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
assistance of counsel at trial. We affirm.
Facts and Proceedings Below
On June 23, 1987, Stoker was indicted by a grand jury convened
in Hale County, Texas, and charged with capital murder in the
course of committing and attempting to commit a robbery in
connection with the November 9, 1986, slaying of convenience store
clerk David Mannrique (Mannrique). See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §
19.03(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
The evidence adduced during the course of the October 1987
trial held in Plainview, Texas, so far as is relevant to the
present appeal, was as follows. On November 9, 1986, Gracie
Sanchez (Sanchez) reported for work at the Allsup’s Convenience
Store in Hale Center, Texas, at approximately 5:50 a.m. Upon
arriving, Sanchez noted that several customers were waiting in the
store but were not being assisted with their purchases. Sanchez
entered the store and found that the cash register drawers were
open and all of the bills had been removed. Shortly thereafter,
she noted that the back door to the store was open, and upon
entering the storeroom found Mannrique, the night clerk, lying on
the floor in a pool of blood. Although Mannrique was apparently
still alive at the time that he was discovered, he had only a weak
pulse and attempts by medical personnel to revive him were
unsuccessful. After being transported to the local hospital,
Mannrique was pronounced dead at 7:08 a.m. The medical examiner
2
testified at trial that Mannrique had been shot twice in the back
and once at the top of the head, and that he died as a result of
these wounds. The only evidence found at the scene was three spent
.22 caliber shell casings retrieved from the storeroom floor.
In April 1987, Carey Todd (Todd), an associate of Stoker’s,
approached local law enforcement officers claiming that he believed
that he could obtain possession of the weapon used to kill
Mannrique. Todd testified that he was told that law enforcement
would be interested in seeing the weapon if he could obtain it. On
May 16, Todd obtained a .22 caliber Ruger automatic pistol claiming
to have received it from Stoker to assist Stoker in killing two
people, Ronnie and Deborah Thompson. Todd turned this weapon over
to Texas Department of Public Safety Officer Claudie Hinkle
(Hinkle). At that time, charges were filed against Todd for
unlawfully carrying a weapon, although both Todd and Hinkle
testified that these were sham charges filed to protect Todd. Todd
also assisted law enforcement officers in recovering a fourth .22
caliber shell casing from Stoker’s car on May 18, 1987.1
William Albrecht (Albrecht), an FBI firearms examiner, offered
testimony concerning the findings of his examination of the Ruger
1
During the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, the jury heard
testimony indicating only that the fourth .22 caliber shell casing
had been recovered from Stoker’s car during an inventory search.
At the punishment phase of the trial, testimony was offered to show
that the inventory search was the result of Stoker’s arrest for
selling crystal methamphetamine to Todd during a “controlled buy”
set up by Todd in cooperation with local law enforcement officers.
3
pistol, the shell casings, and a bullet removed from Mannrique’s
body during the autopsy. Albrecht testified that based upon his
microscopic comparison of markings left on the shell casings by the
firing pin, the four shell casings were fired by the Ruger pistol
“to the exclusion of every other firearm.” Albrecht further
testified that he was unable to reach a positive conclusion
regarding whether the bullet recovered from the deceased’s body was
fired by the Ruger pistol due to the rapidly changing microscopic
characteristics of the pistol’s barrel. However, he concluded that
the bullet “was fired from a barrel of a weapon having rifling
characteristics that are consistent with the rifling
characteristics present in” the Ruger.
Peter J. Belcastro (Belcastro), an FBI fingerprint specialist,
testified that two fingerprints on the grips of the pistol when
compared with a fingerprint card bearing Stoker’s prints “were made
by one and the same person and could not have been made by any
other.”
Ronnie Thompson (Thompson), a friend of Stoker’s, testified
that Stoker had told him before the murder was reported in the
media that he had “[k]illed that guy working at Allsup’s,” and that
he had described to Thompson that he had shot him twice in the back
and once in the head. Thompson also testified that he had known
both Todd and Stoker to carry the Ruger pistol in the past.
Deborah Thompson, Ronnie’s estranged wife, testified that Stoker
had also told her “that he had gotten in some debt, and he needed
4
some money, and he killed the man in the Allsup’s store,”
indicating that he had shot the man three times. She also
identified that Ruger pistol as belonging to Stoker. Another
witness, Ronald Dean Hale (Hale), also indicated that he had seen
Stoker in possession of the Ruger pistol, although he was unable to
recall just when.
The defense offered the testimony of Billy Wayne Reed (Reed),
a friend of Stoker’s at whose house Stoker had lived for a time,
who stated he saw the Ruger pistol in Stoker’s possession between
Thanksgiving and Christmas of 1986. Reed additionally testified
that two or three weeks after Stoker’s arrest, Todd had stated in
response to a question from Reed: “‘What have you heard, that I
set him [Stoker] up? I did. I set him up to take a big fall.’”
Reed did not disclose this information to authorities prior to the
week of trial.
Danny Stoker, Stoker’s brother, indicated that he had seen the
Ruger pistol in Stoker’s possession around the Christmas holidays.
He further testified that Stoker had repaired the pistol in the
past for Todd.
Following the presentation of evidence and summation in the
guilt/innocence phase of the trial, the jury found Stoker guilty of
capital murder. During the course of its deliberations, the jury
sent only one written query to the judge requesting that the
evidence submitted during trial be brought to the jury room, and
asking, “is it possible to learn the exact date the empty cartridge
5
was found in David Stoker’s car?” The court sent the evidence to
the jury room, and instructed the jury that it was bound by the
evidence received during trial with respect to the date that the
empty shell casing was discovered in Stoker’s car.
At the punishment phase of the trial, the prosecution
presented testimony by eight law enforcement officials to the
effect that Stoker’s reputation in the community for being a
peaceful, law-abiding citizen was bad. The prosecution
additionally offered the testimony of Dr. James P. Grigson
(Grigson), a forensic psychiatrist, regarding future dangerousness.
Grigson testified based upon a hypothetical tailored to the
prosecution’s version of the facts of the present case. Grigson
opined that an individual such as the one described in the
hypothetical would “most certainly present a continuing threat to
society,” citing the “cold-blooded” nature of the killing and the
apparent lack of remorse. Grigson further offered:
“Well, if you used the scale of, say, like one to ten
with one being the psychopath that is only breaking minor
rules, and as you move up the scale where you have more
serious robbery, rape, assaultive, on up to murder, where
you have complete disregard for another human being’s
life, if you place that at ten, the person you describe
would probably go over the scale, or past the ten mark.”
Grigson then concluded that the type of person described in the
hypothetical would continue the same type of behavior in the future
regardless of his setting. On cross-examination, Grigson
acknowledged that his conclusion was based purely on the
hypothetical facts offered by the prosecution, and that he had
6
never examined Stoker, interviewed others acquainted with him, or
investigated his personal history.
Following Grigson’s testimony, the defense moved for a
continuance in order to secure the appointment of a psychologist or
psychiatrist to testify on Stoker’s behalf. The court denied the
motion for continuance and request for appointment of an expert on
the grounds that it had been advised at the pre-trial hearing that
the defense did not wish to have Stoker examined, and that nothing
had changed since that time to justify the defense’s delay in
lodging this request with the court. The only evidence offered by
the defense during the punishment phase was the testimony of
Stoker’s mother, Jo Ann Stoker. She testified that she had
separated from Stoker’s father when Stoker was sixteen, that Stoker
had quit school to work so that his brothers could continue their
education, and helped to care for his brothers and mother.2
Following its deliberations, the jury returned affirmative
findings to the special issues submitted to them, and Stoker’s
punishment was assessed at death. On direct appeal, Stoker’s
conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals. Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App.
1989), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 371 (1990). The trial court
scheduled Stoker’s execution to be carried out on August 15, 1991.
Stoker, represented by new counsel, filed a Post-Conviction
2
Stoker did not testify at any phase of his trial. Nor did he
testify at any of the subsequent evidentiary hearings in the state
and federal courts.
7
Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus in the state trial court on
May 23, 1991, urging twenty-one points of error. The state filed
no response and the trial court made no findings of fact or
conclusions of law. On August 8, 1991, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals issued an order staying Stoker’s execution and remanding
to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on claims that: (1)
Stoker had received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial; (2)
the prosecution had failed to disclose that Todd had received the
dismissal of an unrelated charge in exchange for his testimony; (3)
the prosecution had failed to disclose that Todd and Deborah
Thompson received cash payments as rewards for their assistance in
the Stoker’s prosecution; and (4) the prosecution had knowingly
used perjured testimony at trial. The trial court was directed to
enter findings and conclusions with respect to these four
allegations and to “also enter any further findings of fact and
conclusions of law which it deems relevant and appropriate to the
disposition of applicant’s remaining seventeen allegations.” The
trial court held evidentiary hearings on December 12, 1991, and
January 27, 1992. On March 6, 1992, the trial court issued its
extensive Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law recommending that
all relief be denied. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals issued
an order on April 20, 1992, denying the Application for Writ of
Habeas Corpus. The court stated: “This Court has reviewed the
record. The findings of fact and conclusions of law entered by the
trial court are supported by the record and upon such basis the
8
relief sought is denied.”
On July 2, 1992, Stoker, represented by his same habeas
counsel, filed the instant Petition for Post-Conviction Writ of
Habeas Corpus and Application for Stay of Execution in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Lubbock
Division. Stoker’s stay request was granted, and an order issued
referring the matter to a magistrate judge. Stoker filed an
amended habeas petition in October 1992. On February 1, 1993, an
evidentiary hearing was set for March 24, 1993, but was postponed
on Stoker’s motion. The evidentiary hearing was eventually held
October 19 and 20, 1993, before the magistrate judge. On July 11,
1994, the magistrate judge filed his report with the district court
recommending that all relief be denied and the petition dismissed
with prejudice. After being granted extensions, Stoker filed
objections to the magistrate judge’s report on September 23, 1994.
On October 19, 1994, the district court entered an order reciting
that it had considered Stoker’s objections and, on de novo review
of the record, approved and adopted the magistrate judge’s
findings, conclusions, and recommendation. The court denied all
relief and dismissed the petition with prejudice. A motion to
alter or amend the judgment was subsequently denied. The district
court issued a certificate of probable cause on December 5, 1994.
Discussion
I. Brady Issues
It is a basic and well-established proposition that the
9
prosecution’s suppression of evidence favorable to the accused
violates the Due Process Clause if it is material to either guilt
or punishment. Brady, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. The prosecution’s
constitutional duty not to suppress embraces both exculpatory and
impeachment evidence. United States v. Bagley, 105 S.Ct. 3375,
3380 (1985). The promise of a reward, a more favorable
disposition of pending criminal charges, or other inducements in
order to secure the testimony of a witness goes to that witness’s
credibility, and therefore triggers the prosecution’s duty to
disclose under Brady. See Giglio v. United States, 92 S.Ct. 763
(1972)(promise of nonprosecution); Kopycinski v. Scott, 64 F.3d
223 (5th Cir. 1995)(payment of $1000 Crimestoppers reward); Black
v. Collins, 962 F.2d 394 (5th Cir.)(reduced plea agreement), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 2983 (1992).
Of course, a new trial is required only if the evidence is
material. As the Supreme Court recently explained, “[t]he question
is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have
received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its
absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting
in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles v. Whitley, 115 S.Ct.
1555, 1566 (1995). For this purpose, the cumulative effect of all
Brady violations is to be evaluated. Kyles at 1569.
Stoker asserts that the prosecution failed to comply with its
obligations under Brady by failing to disclose (1) the dismissal
of pending drug possession charges against Todd in a neighboring
10
county in exchange for his testimony; and (2) the payment of a
$1000 Crimestoppers reward to Todd and Deborah Thompson.
A. Dismissal of Pending Drug Charges Against Todd
At the pretrial hearing of August 31, 1987, the state district
court specifically instructed the district attorney to provide
defense counsel with the criminal records of any prospective
witnesses including convictions for felonies or crimes involving
moral turpitude as well as any charges pending against such
witnesses at that time. The prosecution submitted to the defense
a criminal history report on Todd prepared by the Texas Department
of Public Safety dated December 10, 1986. The most recent entry on
this criminal history report was a November 23, 1986, arrest by the
Amarillo, Texas, Police Department for unlawfully carrying a
weapon. However, Stoker submitted to the state habeas court the
incident report prepared by the arresting officer which reflected
that Todd had not only been arrested for unlawfully carrying a
weapon, but also for possession of amphetamines and marihuana
discovered during an inventory search of Todd’s vehicle. Stoker
also introduced a copy of the Potter County, Texas, criminal
complaint dated November 24, 1986, charging Todd with possession of
a controlled substance. This charge did not appear on the criminal
history report submitted to the defense. Stoker additionally
submitted the Potter County district attorney’s announcement of
February 27, 1987, that he was ready to proceed to trial in Todd’s
case, a letter from Todd’s attorney Thomas Paige Brittain
11
(Brittain) to the Potter County court indicating that he
represented Todd, and a motion filed on August 31, 1987, by Potter
County assistant district attorney Ebelardo Lopez (Lopez)
requesting that the charge be dismissed because “[t]he State is
unable to connect beyond a reasonable doubt the controlled
substance to this Defendant.”
Stoker maintains that the prosecution failed to disclose that
the drug charge then pending against Todd in Potter County was
dismissed in exchange for Todd’s testimony against Stoker. The
state habeas court entered the following findings of fact in this
respect:
“36. Applicant’s fifteenth claim, in which he
alleges that the State failed to reveal that
Carey Todd had been granted a dismissal of a
felony drug charge in Potter County in
exchange for his assistance in the case, was
the subject of a postconviction evidentiary
hearing. Based on the evidentiary hearing
testimony, this court finds that the record
does not support applicant’s contention that
the Potter County drug charge against Carey
Todd was dismissed in exchange for his
testimony against applicant.
37. In response to applicant’s fifteenth
allegation, Ebelardo Lopez, Potter County
assistant district attorney in 1987, testified
at the evidentiary hearing that the
outstanding Potter County drug charge against
Carey Todd was dismissed because there was
insufficient evidence to prosecute. The
dismissal motion shows the case was dismissed
for insufficient evidence and the dismissal
was granted by Naomi Harney on the 31st day of
August, 1987. Randall Sims, first assistant
Potter County district attorney, testified
that his judgment as a prosecutor would have
led him to dismiss the Potter County charge
against Todd because the evidence was
12
insufficient to link Todd to the drugs found.
This court finds the testimony and explanation
by Mr. Lopez and Mr. Sims for the dismissal of
the Potter County drug charge against Carey
Todd to be credible. The court further finds
that Mr. Lopez was aware that Mr. Todd was a
witness in the case against applicant in
Plainview. The applicant and his counsel at
trial were aware of the pending charges as
evidenced by the pretrial hearing of August
31, 1987.”
The magistrate judge found there was ample evidence in the record
to justify these findings, and therefore applied the presumption of
correctness provided for under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Of course, we
are bound to apply the presumption of correctness to such state
findings unless it is established that one of the exceptions to
section 2254(d) applies. Sumner v. Mata, 101 S.Ct. 764 (1981).
Stoker argues that we should not apply the presumption of
correctness to the state habeas court’s findings because they are
not fairly supported by the record.3 See section 2254(d)(8).
Stoker points to the testimony of Thomas Page Brittain (Brittain),
the attorney who represented Todd on the drug charge in Potter
County. Brittain testified that he told Potter County prosecutors
that his client had information about the Hale County crime, and
that he did so in the hope that his client would receive “some kind
of consideration in his treatment . . . in the case in Potter
3
Stoker also contends that the state habeas court’s findings
are not entitled to the presumption of correctness because the
state habeas court applied an erroneous legal standard, thereby
rendering the fact finding procedure inadequate “to afford a full
and fair hearing.” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). Stoker’s claim in this
regard is patently unmeritorious, and is rejected.
13
County.”4 Stoker also emphasizes the notation in Todd’s file in
the Potter County district attorney’s office stating “Dismissed:
this [defendant] helped Terry McEachern (296-5229) D.A. solve a
murder case.” The affidavit of Virginia Lindsay (Lindsay), an
attorney assisting in the investigation of Stoker’s habeas claims,
indicates that former Potter County assistant district attorney
Ebelardo Lopez (Lopez) reviewed Todd’s file in her presence, and
that he held up a message slip indicating that he had received a
call from Terry McEachern on April 20 regarding Carey Todd.5 There
was apparently an additional notation in Lopez’s handwriting
stating, “[c]alled Terry.” Lopez, who was by then a state district
judge, also submitted an affidavit indicating only that the
telephone slip had contained the names Terry McEachern and Carey
Todd. However, the telephone slip itself subsequently disappeared,
and therefore was not produced. Based on this evidence, Stoker
asserts that the Hale County district attorney communicated with
the Potter County district attorney’s office regarding Todd’s
case.6 The state habeas court found that Lopez knew that Todd was
4
However, when asked whether the information influenced the
Potter County district attorney’s decision to dismiss the charge,
Brittain replied: “I don’t know exactly what influenced them, no,
sir. I——I assumed that that was what influenced them, yes.”
5
Terry McEachern was the district attorney for Hale and Swisher
Counties, and was the prosecutor in Stoker’s trial.
6
In his reply brief, Stoker mentions the testimony of his
cousin, Gale Keiser. At the federal evidentiary hearing below,
Keiser testified that she heard Ronnie Thompson state that “[t]he
reason why [Todd] was helping to set [Stoker] up is because they
were going to drop some charges in Amarillo against him.” Keiser’s
14
a witness in the Stoker murder case. Nevertheless, the state
habeas court rejected Stoker’s argument that the drug charge
against Todd was dismissed in exchange for his testimony against
Stoker.
We note that there is additional evidence in the record of the
state habeas hearing that bears on the dismissal of the Potter
County drug charge. Lopez testified that the reason that the
Potter County drug charge was dropped was because the State was
unable to connect the controlled substance to Todd beyond a
reasonable doubt; that he had not dismissed the case at the request
of McEachern; and that McEachern never asked him to do so. Randall
Sims (Sims), an assistant district attorney for Potter County,
testified that he had no knowledge of McEachern’s “intervening in
that case,” and that if there were insufficient evidence to connect
a defendant to the drugs, such a charge would be dismissed by his
office. McEachern additionally testified at the state evidentiary
hearing that he did not discuss with the Potter County district
attorney “the possibility of him dismissing any charge against
Carey Todd in Potter County in return for his testimony in Hale
County,” and that he made no promise to Todd that the charges
against him would be dismissed in exchange for his testimony
against Stoker and knew of no one who did. Todd himself testified
affidavit submitted at the state evidentiary hearing similarly
indicated Ronnie Thompson told her “that Carey Todd told him that
he was setting David up so that Carey could stay out of jail on a
charge in Randall County.”
15
that all he knew about the drug charge was that his “attorney took
care of it,” and answered “no” when asked by McEachern if he was
promised assistance in getting the charge dropped. Todd further
testified he had no knowledge that McEachern knew about the
Amarillo case, and that McEachern never told him or anyone he knew
that he (McEachern) “could assist in getting any charges dropped or
anything like that about any Amarillo cases.” Finally, Brittain,
who represented Todd on the Potter County charge, indicated that he
knew of no involvement by McEachern, or by his staff, or by any
Hale or Swisher County law enforcement officer, in the dismissal,
that he had not talked about the dismissal with McEachern, and that
he had no reason to question the reason for the dismissal given by
Lopez in the motion submitted to the Potter County court.
While there is conflicting evidence in the record, “[t]he
determination whether the record fairly supports a state court
finding requires a high measure of deference.” James v. Whitley,
39 F.3d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1704
(1995). “Mere disagreement with a state court finding does not
entitle a federal court to overturn it.” Id. The state habeas
court specifically credited Lopez’s testimony as to the reason for
the dismissal. See Self v. Collins, 973 F.2d 1198, 1214 (5th Cir.
1992)(“‘§ 2254(d) gives federal habeas courts no license to
redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been
observed by the state trial court, but not by them.’”)(quoting
Marshall v. Lonberger, 103 S.Ct. 843, 851 (1983), cert. denied, 113
16
S.Ct. 1613 (1993). There was substantial testimony of record by
McEachern, Lopez, and Todd as to the absence of any such agreement,
and Brittain also testified that he was aware of no agreement to
this end. The foregoing evidence leads us to conclude that the
state habeas court’s finding that there was no agreement that the
Potter County drug charge would be dismissed in exchange for
Todd’s testimony is fairly and adequately supported by the record,
and is therefore entitled to section 2254's presumption of
correctness. In the absence of any such agreement, Todd’s Brady
claim fails.7
B. Crimestoppers Reward
Stoker also argues that the district court erred in rejecting
his contention that the prosecution failed to disclose the fact
that Todd and Deborah Thompson received a $1,000 reward for their
testimony against Stoker. In this regard, the state habeas court
made the following findings:
“38. Applicant’s sixteenth claim that the State
failed to disclose that witnesses Deborah
Thompson and Carey Todd received cash payments
as rewards for their testimony against him,
was addressed in the postconviction
evidentiary hearing. Based on the record of
that hearing, the court finds no credible
evidence that either Todd or Thompson received
7
We do find, however, that the state habeas court’s finding
that prior to or at trial Stoker and his counsel were aware of the
pending drug charge against Todd is not supported by the record.
Nonetheless, this does not undermine our conclusion that no Brady
violation has been proven. The failure to disclose the pending
drug charge would be material on the facts of the present case only
if it were proven that there was some character of promise of
favorable treatment in exchange for Todd’s testimony.
17
the Crimestoppers reward in exchange for their
testimony against David Stoker.
39. Shortly after the murder, the convenience
store which employed victim, David Mannrique,
posted a $1000 reward for information leading
to the arrest and conviction of the
perpetrator. The offer was placed with Hale
Center Crimestoppers. Claude Burnett,
Crimestoppers Director, testified that after
the conclusion of applicant’s trial, on
October 27, 1987, he received a telephone call
to deposit the Crimestoppers money into the
Hale County Bank. He had no knowledge to whom
the money was paid. Talmadge Todd, Carey
Todd’s father, testified that he wired $1000
to his son in Honey Grove, Texas, where Carey
moved after the trial because he feared for
his life. Carey Todd testified that after the
trial, on November 11, 1987, he received $1000
in Crimestopper’s money, and $300 from the
Swisher County Police Department to help him
move to Honey Grove. He and Debbie Thompson
split the $1000. Todd never spoke with the
Hale Center Police Department concerning the
case. He further testified that District
Attorney Terry McEachern never offered him
anything, and that he had no knowledge that he
would be paid a Crimestopper’s reward until
the trial was over. Riley Rogers testified
that Terry McEachern and the (Hale and Swisher
County) district attorney’s office has
‘nothing to do’ with Crimestoppers or the
Crime Line. Riley Rogers is the county
attorney’s investigator for Swisher County,
Texas.
40. This court specifically finds that neither the
district attorney’s office for Hale and
Swisher counties nor Terry McEachern, district
attorney for those counties, were in any way
involved with Crime Line, Crimestoppers, or
otherwise had anything to do with awarding the
reward received by Deborah Thompson and Carey
Todd after the conclusion of Stoker’s trial
for information they provided leading to the
arrest and conviction of applicant David
Stoker. No request was made for the reward
until after the trial. The reward was for
evidence leading to conviction. No promise
18
was made to Carey Todd or Deborah Thompson
that they would receive a reward for their
testimony.” (Internal record citations
omitted).
Stoker maintains that these findings are not fairly supported
by the record, and therefore are not entitled to a presumption of
correctness. Stoker first argues that there is evidence that Todd
and Deborah Thompson told several other witnesses that they had
been promised money in exchange for their cooperation in the case.
Todd cites the trial testimony of Wayne Reed in which he indicated
that Deborah Thompson had told him that Todd had been offered money
in exchange for the Ruger pistol. Of course, this provides no
evidentiary support for the existence of any promise to pay Todd or
Deborah Thompson for their testimony at trial. Stoker also cites
the affidavit of Virginia Lindsay submitted at the state habeas
hearing about her November 6, 1991, interview with Todd regarding
the Crimestoppers reward. Lindsay states in this affidavit that
Todd “said Terry McEachern had offered him and Debbie Thompson
$1,000 for their testimony. He also said that when they got the
money, they split it fifty-fifty, and that they were told about the
money before they testified.8
8
Stoker also cites the testimony of his cousin, Gale Keiser, at
the federal evidentiary hearing. In response to a question
regarding whether Ronnie Thompson had told her that Todd was being
paid for his testimony, Keiser replied: “He said that it was a
setup, that they were setting David up and that Kerry (sic) was
being paid.” Keiser offered a similar statement in her affidavit
at the state evidentiary hearing stating “Ronnie said [Todd and
Deborah Thompson] were getting money, and both expected to get a
reward for what they were doing.”
19
Stoker additionally emphasizes the reluctance of the
prosecution witnesses to discuss the circumstances surrounding the
payment of the reward money and their sometimes contradictory
statements.9 Indeed, the magistrate judge below observed that
“[i]t certainly appears there were prosecution witnesses at the
State Evidentiary Hearing who were, to put it generously, reluctant
to discuss the circumstances surrounding the payment of the Crime
Stoppers reward.” Nonetheless, the magistrate judge properly
concluded that “whatever suspicion might be engendered by the
stubborn recalcitrance of certain witnesses to testify accurately
and fully about the procedures and post trial events involving the
Crime Stoppers payment is not evidence that payment was made in the
9
Richard Cordell (Cordell), the chief of police for Hale Center
in 1986 and 1987, testified that at the time of the Mannrique
murder Hale Center did not have its own Crimestoppers program, that
Crimestoppers was run through the Plainview, Hale County Crime
Line, and that it was not administered by the Hale Center Police
Department.
Riley Rogers (Rogers), who had worked as an investigator for
the Hale and Swisher County District Attorney, testified initially
at the state habeas hearing that he had no involvement with
Crimestoppers and that he knew of no rewards paid in connection
with the Mannrique case. However, Stoker’s counsel subpoenaed a
bank draft issued by the First National Bank of Hale Center,
payable to Crime Line, and bearing Rogers’ signature. At the
continuation of the state evidentiary hearing on January 27, 1992,
Rogers agreed with the prosecutor that it was possible that he had
received the $1000 and transferred it to Talmadge Todd after the
trial. However, he also then testified that he had no knowledge of
any monies being promised to Carey Todd in exchange for testimony.
Claude Burnett (Burnett), a local businessman, testified at
the state evidentiary hearing that he had helped organize the Hale
Center Crime Line, that a reward had been offered in connection
with the Mannrique case, and that he believed that he had discussed
payment of the reward with Cordell as chief of police, although he
expressed some uncertainty on this point.
20
fashion as alleged by Stoker.”
Todd acknowledged at the state evidentiary hearing that he had
received $1000 from Crimestoppers and that he had split the reward
money with Deborah Thompson. In response to questioning, Todd
indicated that neither McEachern nor any law enforcement personnel
had promised to give him money in exchange for his testimony.
Although Todd initially stated he did not know when he became aware
of the Crimestoppers reward money, he later testified in response
to an inquiry from the court that he did not know he would be paid
a reward until after the trial. McEachern also testified that as
a general matter “[w]e don’t pay county taxpayer’s (sic) monies,
you know, to people to get up on the stand to testify,” and that he
did not even learn of the payment of the Crimestoppers reward until
shortly before the state evidentiary hearing.
We find fair and adequate support in the record for the state
habeas court’s findings, and therefore must accord them the
presumption of correctness that they are due. Clearly the state
habeas court’s finding that there was no promised payment of a
reward in exchange for testimony rests upon its assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses before it, and we are not empowered to
second-guess such determinations. See Self, 973 F.2d at 1214
(“‘When . . . a trial court fails to render express findings on
credibility but makes a ruling that depends upon an implicit
determination that credits one witness’s testimony as being
truthful, or implicitly discredits another’s, such determinations
21
are entitled to the same presumption of correctness that they would
have been accorded had they been made explicitly”)(quoting Lavernia
v. Lynaugh, 845 F.2d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 1988)). Therefore,
Stoker’s second Brady claim must also fail.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In reviewing a habeas petitioner’s claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel, the state habeas court’s findings of
historic fact are entitled to a presumption of correctness under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d), but the deficient performance and prejudice
components of the Strickland standard are mixed questions of law
and fact which must be reviewed de novo. Amos v. Scott, 61 F.3d
333, 348 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 557 (1995).
In order to obtain habeas relief based upon a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must demonstrate
that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that counsel’s
deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v.
Washington, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). To demonstrate that
counsel’s performance was deficient, the petitioner must show that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. Id. at 2064-65. There exists a “strong
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 2065. The prejudice
component of the Strickland standard will be satisfied only if
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
22
unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.” Id. at 2068. “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome.”
Id. As the Strickland standard is conjunctive, a court may dispose
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon the
petitioner’s failure to satisfy either prong of the test. Amos, 61
F.3d at 348.
A. Failure to Introduce Evidence That Car in
Which Fourth Shell Casing Found Purchased
Several Months After the Murder
Stoker argues that his trial counsel provided constitutionally
ineffective assistance because he failed to introduce evidence that
the car from which the fourth empty shell casing was retrieved on
May 18, 1987, had been purchased in April 1987, some six months
after the murder. Ron Felty (Felty), Stoker’s trial counsel,
acknowledged at the state evidentiary hearing that he was aware
that Stoker had not then owned the car “all that long,” and that
Felty had failed to introduce this evidence at trial (there was no
trial evidence whatever as to even approximately how long prior to
May 18, 1987, Stoker had had the car). Stoker urges that this
piece of evidence was crucial to his defense based on the fact that
the jury’s note to the trial court specifically inquired as to the
exact date that the shell casing was found in Stoker’s car.
The magistrate judge rejected this claim, reasoning:
“There was no evidence of a credible nature indicating
the shell casings found in the automobile were fired from
the murder weapon at the moment of the murder. It was
23
simply evidence there were shell casings in the Stoker
vehicle indicating that Stoker or someone associated with
him had fired the weapon, and the shell casings had
dropped in the car. It was not crucial evidence. It was
simply another circumstance of Stoker’s possession of the
weapon. Even if the car had only been purchased a day
before Stoker was arrested, it still would be admissible
and relevant evidence having the same impact. This is
really a frivolous claim.”
We are inclined to agree. Even assuming arguendo that the failure
to introduce this evidence constituted deficient performance,
Stoker simply cannot establish any “reasonable probability” that
but for Felty’s failure to introduce evidence that the car had only
recently been purchased the outcome would have been different. As
the magistrate judge properly observed, this was simply another
piece of evidence connecting Stoker to the murder weapon. And, it
was essentially undisputed that Stoker had been in possession of
the gun at least on several occasions after the murder and several
months before April 1987, including November and December 1986. We
conclude that Stoker fails to establish prejudice under Strickland.
B. Failure to Present Additional Mitigating
Evidence
Stoker additionally contends that he received constitutionally
ineffective assistance at trial because Felty failed to adequately
investigate and present evidence in mitigation at the punishment
phase of the trial. In particular, Stoker cites the testimony of
his cousin, Gale Keiser, regarding Stoker’s caring relationship
with his younger siblings and his mother, his aid to his
grandmother after she suffered a stroke, and his advice and comfort
24
to Keiser when she encountered marital difficulties. Stoker also
points to the affidavits of former employers and co-workers to the
effect that Stoker was a good worker and did not use drugs or
alcohol on the job. This evidence is cumulative of the testimony
presented by his mother during the punishment phase of the trial.
In light of the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,”
Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, we cannot say that Felty’s failure
to offer this evidence satisfies the deficient performance prong of
Strickland. Nor is the requisite prejudice shown. There is no
reasonable probability of a different result had these witnesses
been called.10
10
With respect to Stoker’s claim that he received ineffective
assistance due to Felty’s failure to conduct a reasonable
sentencing investigation, the state habeas court specifically found
as follows:
“29. This court finds that counsel Ron Felty
conducted a reasonable investigation. He
interviewed those members of applicant’s
family who were willing to cooperate with
applicant’s defense, and followed any witness
leads provided by applicant and his family.
Additional information, which applicant now
contends should have been used to undermine
testimony of the state’s witnesses remained
undisclosed for tactical reasons.”
The evidence adequately supports the underlying facts so found, and
we agree that on such findings the investigation was not
constitutionally deficient. Furthermore, as noted above, the
evidence to be thus produced was merely cumulative of the testimony
offered by Stoker’s mother, and Stoker was not prejudiced by the
failure to investigate further. There is no reasonable probability
of a different result had such further investigation been
undertaken.
25
Stoker also urges that Felty should have introduced copies of
his Army records, some of which contained positive evaluations.
However, these records also reflected that Stoker was given an
early discharge, albeit an honorable one, due to an alcohol
problem. Felty, a local practitioner and former district attorney
who had extensive experience before Hale County juries, testified:
“if we showed a continuing use of narcotics, alcohol use as the
reason for being taken out of the military, that would not, you
know, go over with a Hale County jury. A Hale County jury is
tougher than an old billy.” As we have previously observed,
“failure to present mitigating evidence ‘if based on an informed
and reasoned practical judgment, is well within the range of
practical choices not to be second-guessed.’” Wilkerson v. Collins,
950 F.2d 1054, 1065 (5th Cir. 1992)(quoting Mattheson v. King, 751
F.2d 1432, 1441 (5th Cir. 1985)), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 3035
(1993). Again, Stoker fails to overcome the strong presumption
that this tactical decision was reasonable under the circumstances,
and therefore fails to satisfy the deficient performance prong of
Strickland.
Furthermore, Stoker has failed to show that either the
testimony cited above or the mentioned records constitute “evidence
of sufficient quality and force” which “if introduced, would have
more likely than not persuaded the jury that the death penalty was
unwarranted.” Mann v. Scott, 41 F.3d 968, 984 (5th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1977 (1995). Therefore, Stoker also fails
26
to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.
Stoker further asserts that Felty erroneously understood Texas
law to preclude the presentation of any mitigating evidence during
the punishment phase of a capital trial. Stoker relies for this
argument upon Felty’s statement at the state evidentiary hearing
that the “death penalty statute did not provide, basically, for
instruction regarding mitigating evidence for a jury to consider.
And the way I interpret the cases, that type of evidence was not
admissible.” However, this isolated fragment has been removed from
its proper context. When viewed in its full surroundings, this
statement reflects a more limited meaning:
“Q: I had asked you about the evidence of abuse in
the sentencing phase, and you said you thought
it was not admissible under the statute at
that time.
A: Correct.
Q: What did you mean by that?
A: That the death penalty statute did not
provide, basically, for instruction regarding
mitigating evidence for a jury to consider.
And the way I interpret the cases, that type
of evidence was not admissible.”
The phrase “that type of evidence” refers only to evidence of past
acts of abuse committed against Stoker, not to all mitigating
evidence. Indeed, the fact that Felty offered the testimony of
Stoker’s mother in mitigation clearly refutes Stoker’s present
claim that Felty understood Texas law to preclude the presentation
of any mitigating evidence during the punishment phase.11
11
Although Felty was in error as to the admissibility of
evidence of abuse under the Texas capital sentencing scheme at the
27
C. Failure to Procure Mental Health Expert to
Rebut Dr. Grigson’s Testimony
Lastly, Stoker submits that his trial counsel rendered
constitutionally ineffective assistance for failing to procure a
defense mental health expert to rebut the testimony of Dr. Grigson
regarding future dangerousness at the sentencing phase of the
trial.12
Stoker argues that Felty’s failure to rebut Grigson’s
testimony cannot be considered reasonable trial strategy as it was
time, see, e.g., May v. Collins, 904 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir.
1990)(indicating that “[h]ad [defendant] offered evidence of his
abusive childhood and his resultant neurological damage, it is
quite clear under Texas law that evidence would have been
admissible”), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 770 (1991), he was correct
regarding the availability of an instruction as this case was tried
in 1987 before Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S.Ct. 2934 (1989). However,
Stoker does not argue in his brief before this Court that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel due to Felty’s failure
to present evidence of past abuse, and this issue is therefore
waived. Nor does the record show available evidence of abuse such
that had it been introduced there is any reasonable probability of
a different result. Furthermore, Felty testified several times
during the course of these proceedings that neither Stoker nor his
family ever told him of any abuse. Moreover, Felty stated in his
affidavit of August 28, 1991, that he would not have presented such
evidence to the jury as he believed it would have been an
aggravating factor and would have bolstered the State’s case on the
future dangerousness issue. Counsel is not constitutionally
deficient for failing to foresee Penry. See May at 234. Even if
this claim had been properly presented on appeal, we would have
rejected it as failing both prongs of the Strickland test. See,
e.g., Andrews v. Collins, 21 F.3d 612, 623-25 (5th Cir. 1994).
12
There is no dispute between the parties that Felty was made
aware during the pretrial hearing of the State’s intention to call
Grigson as an expert witness at the punishment phase of the trial,
and that Felty elected not to request the appointment of a defense
expert at that time.
28
based upon an erroneous understanding of the law. In support of
this argument, Stoker maintains that Felty misunderstood the Texas
capital sentencing scheme and declined to engage an expert based on
the erroneous belief that information contained in the expert’s
report might open the door to the admission of otherwise
inadmissible evidence of extraneous unadjudicated offenses at the
punishment phase by the prosecution. In fact, Texas permits the
introduction of any relevant evidence during the punishment phase,
including extraneous unadjudicated offenses. See Powell v. State,
898 S.W.2d 821, 830 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct.
524 (1995). However, Stoker’s factual assertion in this respect is
contradicted by Felty’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing
below.13 The district court concluded, and we agree, that Felty
13
At the evidentiary hearing, Felty testified:
“Q: One of the reasons that you decided not to
call a mental health expert was because of
your fear that evidence of these other crimes
would come in, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were you aware of the fact that under the
Sentencing Statute——Pardon me, under the Death
Penalty Statute, that in the sentencing phase
of a capital case, just about anything can
come in?
A: Anything. It’s just an open, it’s an open
ball game.
Q: All right. Almost wide open?
A: Yes.
Q: Were you aware of the fact that had the
prosecution decided, decided to put in this
evidence about these prior cases, they could
have done it anyway?
A: Yes, sir. The same thing about the deal up in
Randall County.
Q: Right.
29
made a strategic decision not to have his client examined by a
court-appointed psychologist or psychiatrist because the examining
expert might uncover evidence with regard to other crimes for which
Stoker was being investigated. While Felty was aware that
extraneous offenses were admissible during the punishment phase, he
made the strategic decision not to have his client examined because
he feared that his own expert might provide the State with
additional information linking his client to those crimes when
subjected to cross-examination.14
A: The quote “suspected homicide” up there.
Q: So this trial strategy not to call a mental
health expert, not calling him wouldn’t have
made any difference, because if the State
wanted to put it in, it would have gone in
anyway?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You didn’t get Mr. Stoker examined because, in
response to the question put by counsel, you
believe that the prosecution would have access
to that information, is that right?
A: They would have subpoenaed him.”
14
At the federal evidentiary hearing, Sam Ogan (Ogan), a
criminal defense attorney offered by Stoker, testified based upon
a hypothetical tailored to the facts of this case regarding the
need for expert psychiatric testimony. The hypothetical asked Ogan
to assume that he was aware his client was suspected of “possible
homicides and drug activities.” Ogan replied: “Well, I would say
that based on the hypothetical, it might be reasonable not to put
a psychologist or a psychiatrist who has examined the client on the
stand, I mean, assuming damaging information in the doctor’s
report. If, generally under the law, if the psychologist or
psychiatrist testifies, then the State would be privy to the report
that he made.” Although Ogan went on to say that he did not
believe it was reasonable not to have the client examined at all,
Stoker complains here of the failure to put on expert testimony to
rebut Grigson, not of the failure to have him examined in the first
place. So Stoker’s own witness in fact validated the
reasonableness of Felty’s strategy. See also Schneider v. Lynaugh,
835 F.2d 570, 576-77 (5th Cir.)(State’s use of testimony by
30
In any event, the expert psychological testimony which Stoker
offered during the course of the habeas proceedings simply fails to
demonstrate prejudice. Dr. Linda Foss (Foss), a clinical
psychologist, found based on her examination that Stoker possessed
psychiatrist appointed to examine defendant for competency at
defendant’s request to rebut other psychiatric evidence offered by
defendant during punishment phase did not violate Fifth Amendment
despite absence of Miranda warning because defendant put mental
state in issue), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 87 (1988); see also Soria
v. State, 1996 WL 514830, at *4-10 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 11,
1996)(defendant constructively places himself on stand when he
presents psychiatric testimony waiving Fifth Amendment privilege,
thereby allowing court to compel examination by State’s expert for
rebuttal).
To be sure, as noted above, after the state closed its
punishment stage evidence on October 27, 1987, defense counsel
unsuccessfully moved for a continuance to secure court funds “for
the defense to have a witness, psychiatric testimony,” and
indicated they had unsuccessfully looked for a psychiatrist “the
last week.” The defense also wanted an expert on parole law.
After the court stated to defense counsel that at the August 31,
1987, pre-trial hearing “you did not want to have your client
examined. You did not want that sort of testimony,” defense
counsel stated:
“the nature and circumstances as well as the evidence
available to the Defense has changed almost daily
throughout this trial. And at certain times, you know,
based on the evidence we have, the Defense would have to
take a certain course in defending Mr. Stoker. As we are
provided new evidence of certain information being known
to Mr. McEachern or new witnesses provided, you know, it
changes the basis of our Defense, too, Judge.”
Defense counsel pointed to nothing specifically new, however. In
substance, it appears that the defense rethought or changed its
approach. But this does not mean that the earlier approach was
outside the “wide range of professionally competent assistance”
recognized in Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, and so many other
cases. As we said in Smith v. Collins, 977 F.2d 951, 960 (5th Cir.
1992), cert denied, 114 S.Ct. 97 (1993), “[h]aving a ‘wide range’
necessarily allows for situations in which each of two opposite
courses of action may properly fall within the ambit of acceptable
professional conduct.”
31
“average intelligence,” and her report indicated that “[i]nadequate
socialization left him with rough manners and habits and
rebellious attitude, but at the same time there’s evidence that he
held himself to a moral code that included . . . honesty,
responsibility, and fair play.” Foss also testified that she found
no evidence of psychotic personality, homicidal or suicidal
tendencies. She finally indicated that a description of a single
incident without an examination and some knowledge of the
individual’s personal history would be inadequate to form an
opinion as to future dangerousness. Dr. Harry Munsinger
(Munsinger), also a clinical psychologist, testified at the federal
evidentiary hearing that Stoker was a passive/aggressive
personality. He further opined, “I think, based on my analysis of
his personality structure, that given certain conditions such as he
is not under the influence of alcohol and he doesn’t have a gun and
he’s not provoked, that the probability is that he will not be
dangerous in the future.” Munsinger also was of the opinion that
it was not possible to predict future dangerousness solely on the
basis of the hypothetical presented to Grigson as it contained a
“hidden predicate” which was that the person possessed a
psychopathic personality disorder. Munsinger also testified that
a psychopathic personality is an “all-or-nothing phenomenon,” and
cannot be quantified on a scale of one to ten as Grigson testified.
In short, the experts offered by Stoker simply fail to rebut
the main thrust of Grigson’s testimony as to future dangerousness.
32
Although Foss testified that a hypothetical of the sort given to
Grigson was an inadequate basis from which to form an opinion
regarding future dangerousness, she offered no such opinion
herself. Munsinger’s assessment was similarly less than
encouraging as he indicated that Stoker would not be dangerous in
the future provided that “he is not under the influence of alcohol
and he doesn’t have a gun and he’s not provoked.” (Emphasis
added). While both experts testified that Grigson based his
opinion on inadequate information, the fact that Grigson had
testified solely on the basis of the hypothetical facts given him,
and had neither interviewed Stoker nor reviewed his personal
history, was placed before the jury. Given the nature of the
expert testimony proffered by Stoker, we are unable to say that
this evidence “if introduced, would have more likely than not
persuaded the jury that the death penalty was unwarranted.” Mann,
41 F.3d at 984. Nothing in this respect (or otherwise) undermines
confidence in the verdict.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court
is hereby
AFFIRMED.
33
Stoker v. Johnson
Combined Opinion