IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
APRIL 21, 2004 Session
CHRISTY JOHNSON, ET AL. v. DUNCAN E. RAGSDALE
Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Shelby County
No. CT-006360-01 John R. McCarroll, Judge
No. W2003-01257-COA-R3-CV - Filed July 6, 2004
This case involves the dismissal of Appellant’s legal malpractice claim against Appellee on the basis
that Appellee, after the initial dismissal of Appellant’s medical malpractice claim, failed to file a
lawsuit before the statutory period for refiling expired. The General Sessions Court of Shelby
County entered a judgment for Appellee. Appellant subsequently appealed this decision to the
Circuit Court of Shelby County, which dismissed Appellant’s cause for lack of jurisdiction. We
reverse the circuit court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3; Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed and
Remanded
ALAN E. HIGHERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. FRANK CRAWFORD , P.J., W.S.,
and HOLLY M. KIRBY , J., joined.
David Burlison, Memphis, TN; John J. Allan, St. Louis, MO, for Appellants
David M. Cook, Virginia M. Patterson, Memphis, TN, for Appellee
OPINION
Facts and Procedural History
Christy Dianne Johnson (“Appellant”) gave birth to her daughter, Danielle Breanna Taylor
(“Danielle”), on October 10, 1995. However, on October 26, 1995, Danielle died as a result of
hemorrhagic cerebral infarction, coagulation, and acute hepatic failure. At the time of birth,
Appellant was actively suffering from the herpes simplex virus. Appellant alleges that, had the
medical staff tested her for the herpes simplex virus, they could have performed a Caesarian section
to avoid any complications for Danielle.
Thereafter, Appellant employed the legal services of Duncan E. Ragsdale (“Appellee”) to file
a medical malpractice claim against the hospital and medical staff for the death of her daughter.
Appellee filed suit on behalf of Appellant on October 9, 1996, to avoid the running of the statute of
limitations on Appellant’s claim. Thereafter, the suit was dismissed without prejudice and Appellant
had one year to refile her suit to preserve her medical malpractice claim. Appellant alleges that
Appellee did not advise her of this period of limitation and failed to refile her medical malpractice
claim. After losing her right to recover under a medical malpractice claim, Appellant filed a civil
warrant against Appellee in May 2000 in the Shelby County General Sessions Court to recover under
a theory of legal malpractice. Such civil warrant had a docket number of 798646 Subsequently,
Appellant took a voluntary nonsuit, and judgment was entered on June 20, 2000. Appellant filed a
second civil warrant in June 2001 in the Shelby County General Sessions Court again alleging legal
malpractice against Appellee. This civil warrant had a docket number of 855910. After a hearing,
the general sessions court entered a judgment for Appellee on September 26, 2001. On October 5,
2001, Appellant filed a notice of appeal and appeal bond in the general sessions court, seeking an
appeal to the circuit court. Such notice and bond stated Appellant’s and Appellee’s names as the
parties, stated it was an appeal of an order of the general sessions court entered on September 26,
2001, but listed the docket number of 798646 rather than 855910. Appellee moved to dismiss the
case and, based on this incorrect docket number, the circuit court granted Appellee’s motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Appellant now appeals to this Court and presents the following issue
for our review: whether Appellant perfected her appeal to the circuit court giving the circuit court
jurisdiction despite the fact that she put the wrong docket number on her notice of appeal and appeal
bond. For the following reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Standard of Review
When a trial court sits without a jury, we review its findings of fact de novo, affording such
findings a presumption of correctness. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d). However, a trial court’s conclusions
of law are reviewed de novo and given no presumption of correctness. Northland Ins. Co. v. State,
33 S.W.3d 727, 729 (Tenn. 2000) (citing Nelson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Tenn.
1999)); Union Carbide Corp. v. Huddleston, 854 S.W.2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993) (citing Estate of
Adkins v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 788 S.W.2d 815, 817 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989)).
Law and Analysis
Appellant contends that it was error for the circuit court to dismiss her claim for lack of
jurisdiction on the basis that the wrong docket number was entered on her notice of appeal and
appeal bond. As a preliminary matter, we note that Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108 (2000) states that
“[a]ny party may appeal from an adverse decision of the general sessions court to the circuit court
of the county within a period of ten (10) days on complying with the provisions of this chapter.”
Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-5-108(a). In this case, the judgment of the general sessions court was entered
on September 26, 2001. Appellant filed her notice of appeal and appeal bond on October 5, 2001.
We are mindful that “[t]he time within which any act provided by law is to be done shall be
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computed by excluding the first day and including the last, unless the last day is a Saturday, a
Sunday, or a legal holiday, and then it shall also be excluded.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-102 (2003).
In this case, it is undisputed that Appellant filed her notice of appeal and appeal bond within the ten-
day period.
Next, we note that, in general, a notice of appeal should sufficiently describe or specify the
judgment or order appealed from, but “a mistake in designating the judgment appealed from is not
fatal, so long as the intent to appeal from a specific ruling can fairly be inferred and so long as the
other party is not misled or prejudiced.” 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 335 (1995) (citing
Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54 (1978); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962); Badger
Pharmacal v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 1 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990
F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1993)); see also 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 375 (1993). “Thus, [a notice of
appeal] is sufficient if, although defective, the notice adequately describes or identifies the judgment
or order, and appellee is not misled, in which case the court will disregard mere clerical errors,
surplusage, and other mistakes.” 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 375 (citing City Holding Co. v. Hosch,
124 So. 291 (Ala. 1929); Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Lester, 14 P.2d 297 (Cal. 1932);
Markiavicus v. L.E. Bunnell Transp. Co., 175 A. 914 (Conn. 1934); Price v. Horton, 80 So. 305 (Fla.
1918); Jenkins v. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp., 30 S.E.2d 498 (Ga. Ct. App. 1944); Turner v.
Purdum, 289 P.2d 608 (Idaho 1955); In re Marriage of Betts, 511 N.E.2d 732 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987);
Rusk v. Kokomo Steel & Wire Co., 121 N.E. 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 1918); Citizens First Nat’l Bank of
Storm Lake v. Turin, 431 N.W.2d 185 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988); In re Charles’ Estate, 148 P.2d 765
(Kan. 1944); Bumpus v. Drinkard’s Adm’x, 279 S.W.2d 4 (Ky. 1955); Garrett v. City of Lake
Charles, 499 So. 2d 956 (La. Ct. App. 1986); Allison v. Sverdrup & Parcel & Assocs., Inc., 738
S.W.2d 440 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Burgess v. Lasby, 24 P.2d 147 (Mont. 1933); Johns-Manville, Inc.
of Cal. v. Lander County, 234 P. 518 (Nev. 1925); Becker v. Wells, 78 N.E.2d 609 (N.Y. 1948); Bank
of Pinehurst v. Derby, 2 S.E.2d 875 (N.C. 1939); Moore v. Foreacher, 105 N.E.2d 80 (Ohio Ct. App.
1951); Topolos v. Skotheim, 250 P. 235 (Or. 1928); Davis v. Strauss, 174 S.E. 908 (S.C. 1934);
Morrison v. Connery, 223 N.W. 210 (S.D. 1929); Lipscomb v. McCart, 295 S.W. 245 (Tex. 1927);
Salt Lake City v. Anderson, 148 P.2d 346 (Utah 1944); Sargent v. Selvar, 280 P.2d 683 (Wash.
1955)).
In this case, Appellant filed a notice of appeal which stated that Appellant and Appellee were
the parties to the suit, that the appeal was from the general sessions court’s judgment “entered the
26th day of September, 2001,” that Appellant sought an appeal of the judgment with the Shelby
County Circuit Court, but that the docket number of the case was 798646, which was the docket
number of the general sessions case dismissed in June 2000. Additionally, Appellant’s appeal bond
filed with the notice of appeal named Appellant and Appellee as the parties to the appeal but also
listed 798646 as the docket number. Under these circumstances, we hold that it was error for the
circuit court to dismiss Appellant’s claim for lack of jurisdiction. Though Appellant, in her notice
of appeal and appeal bond, designated a general sessions docket number that was for a judgment
outside of the ten-day period for appeal, she stated in her notice of appeal that she was appealing the
judgment entered on September 26, 2001. Given that the notice indicated the date of the judgment
she was appealing, the incorrect docket number is merely a technical error. Additionally, we note
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that, after our review of the record, it appears that Appellee was not misled or prejudiced as a result
of the incorrect docket number. Appellee not only filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
he also filed motions for summary judgment, arguing there was no genuine issue of material fact as
to whether he committed legal malpractice. In addition, the parties appear to have argued over
whether the medical staff performing Danielle’s birth exercised reasonable care. Such issues were
central to the claim and judgment of Appellant in the case docketed number 855910 and show that
the Appellee was not misled about which judgment was being appealed to the circuit court.
Therefore, we reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of Appellant’s claim for lack of jurisdiction and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we reverse the circuit court and remand for further proceedings.
Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellee, Duncan E. Ragsdale, for which execution may issue if
necessary.
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ALAN E. HIGHERS, JUDGE
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