IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-30293
ERIC JONES
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Louisiana
(94-CV-763-G)
October 10, 1996
Before GARWOOD, HIGGINBOTHAM, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
American Airlines hired Eric Jones as a 180-day probationary
fleet service clerk in its New Orleans division. Three other
probationary fleet service clerks joined American at the same time.
Jones is African-American, the other three probationary clerks were
white. Jones’s ultimate supervisor, Jerry Arnold (also an African-
American), fired Jones two weeks before the 180-day period elapsed.
American hired the other three white probationary fleet service
clerks. Since then, American’s New Orleans operation has hired
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
only one other probationary service clerk. That clerk was also
African-American.
Jones sued for discrimination under Title VII. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendant, reasoning that a
Title VII plaintiff must show more than mere pretext of one of an
employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reasons for firing the
plaintiff to establish discrimination and avoid summary judgment.
The plaintiff now claims that our recent Rhodes decision allows him
to overcome summary judgment with the evidence he has presented to
the court. See Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989 (5th
Cir. 1996) (en banc). Because we find that plaintiff has presented
inadequate evidence of discrimination, we affirm.
Jones lacks evidence of differential treatment between himself
and a similarly situated white employee. The non-probationary
employees to whom Jones points were not similarly situated because
they were protected by collective bargaining agreements, they had
different supervisors, and they had different employment records.
Jones was not replaced by a white employee, and indeed was
supervised and terminated by an African-American supervisor.
Moreover, both sides tendered summary judgment evidence of
differences in job performance between Jones and his “classmates”
in the probationary group, particularly relating to fighting and
abusive conduct. At most, Jones has raised a question of fact as
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to whether one of Jerry Arnold’s memoranda accurately reflects a
complaint lodged against him.
An employment discrimination plaintiff may reach the jury, and
“can avoid summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law if the
evidence taken as a whole (1) creates a fact issue as to whether
each of the employer’s stated reasons was what actually motivated
the employer and (2) creates a reasonable inference that
[discrimination] was a determinative factor in the actions of which
plaintiff complains.” Rhodes, 75 F.3d at 994. While we have held
that there are cases where “[a] jury may be able to infer
discriminatory intent . . . from substantial evidence that the
employer’s proffered reasons are false,” we see no such substantial
evidence here. Id. In Rhodes, we found substantial evidence of
discrimination from pretext evidence where the employer claimed at
one time that it fired the plaintiff as a reduction in force then
later claimed poor work performance; the firm did not reduce its
work force; there was substantial evidence that the plaintiff was
an excellent salesman; and there was evidence that the employer had
replaced the plaintiff a few months later by someone outside the
protected class. “By contrast, if the evidence put forth by the
plaintiff to establish the prima facie case and to rebut the
employer’s reasons is not substantial, a jury cannot reasonably
infer discriminatory intent.” Id. Jones lacks such substantial
evidence. Because Jones can not show he was treated differently
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than any other similarly situated white employee, and because he
lacks substantial pretext evidence sufficient from which one might
infer discrimination, he cannot avoid summary judgment under
Rhodes.
AFFIRMED.
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