Collelo v. Geographic Services, Inc.

Present: All the Justices

ANTHONY COLLELO

v. Record No. 101411 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
January 13, 2012 *
GEOGRAPHIC SERVICES, INC.

GEOGRAPHIC SERVICES, INC.

v. Record No. 101421

ANTHONY COLLELO, ET AL.

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
R. Terrence Ney, Judge

In these appeals, we consider whether the Circuit Court of

Fairfax County erred when it: (1) granted the motion to strike

filed by the Boeing Company, Autometric, Inc., and Anthony

Collelo (together, "the defendants") and dismissed the suit by

Geographic Services, Inc. ("GSI") against the defendants,

alleging breach of contract, tortious interference with a

contract, and violations of the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets

Act, Code §§ 59.1-336 through -343 ("the Trade Secrets Act");

and (2) denied the motion for attorneys' fees made by Anthony

Collelo ("Collelo").

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

GSI subcontracts with various United States government

prime contractors, including the Boeing Company ("Boeing"), to

perform what is known as geographic names, or "geonames," work.

*
As amended by Order of the Court dated March 6, 2012.
Specifically, geonames work includes referring to a specific

named feature on a map, and entering information about that

feature into a spreadsheet. The spreadsheet contains up to

thousands of pieces of data including, among other things, the

name of the map feature, the feature's location and type, and

the language used on the map. Once all of the map feature

information is collected and verified, GSI then submits the

spreadsheet to the prime contractor or the United States

government, through the National Geospatial Intelligence

Agency, which then uploads certain geonames information to a

publicly accessible website, commonly referred to as the

Geographic Names Data Base.

GSI's geonames work requires it to generate large

quantities of data that must be as accurate as possible.

Accordingly, GSI has developed a systematic method for

performing geonames work, including identifying and correcting

errors in the data entered into the spreadsheet. GSI calls

this its "Geographic Names Procedure" ("GNP") and has

memorialized its GNP in several documents.

GSI's GNP includes a data entry step known as Research

Librarian ("RL"), a quality control ("QC") step, and a quality

assurance ("QA") step. In the RL step, GSI reviews each named

feature on a map, such as a city or body of water, and enters

the relevant data about that feature into a spreadsheet. When

performing the QC step, a senior geonames employee at GSI
2
reviews each of thousands of pieces of data entered during the

RL step, checking for the types of errors that are most likely

to occur, based on his training and experience. Finally, the

QA step includes running two GSI-developed error-finding

software tools that reduce errors and increase productivity and

efficiency. GSI refers to these two software tools as the "QC

tool" and the "edge-matching tool." The QC tool scans the data

to identify possible errors, and is based upon a set of

"rules," that GSI developed through its years of geonames work.

GSI works on several maps simultaneously in its geonames

work, with each map representing a portion of the total region

or country at issue. Certain map features, such as rivers, for

example, often cross several maps. Accordingly, the edge-

matching tool enables GSI to scan the data across all of the

maps for a given country or region, identify possible errors

related to the features near the edges of the maps, and correct

any errors.

GSI claims that its QC and edge-matching tools enable GSI

to produce highly accurate data much more efficiently than is

possible without such tools. GSI considers its entire GNP a

proprietary, confidential trade secret, and has undertaken

efforts to maintain its secrecy.

In 2006, GSI hired Collelo, who had never done geonames

work before, and trained Collelo to do geonames work, exposing

him to its confidential information and alleged trade secrets.
3
Specifically, Collelo worked with GSI's GNP, including GSI's QC

and edge-matching tools. Upon his employment with GSI, Collelo

and GSI executed an employment contract which contained three

documents (together, the "contract"): (1) an "Employment

Agreement;" (2) a document entitled "Addendum A;" and (3) an

"Employee Confidential Information, Non-Competition, Non-

Disparagement, and Non-Solicitation Agreement" ("Addendum B").

The Employment Agreement specifically incorporated Addendum B

by reference and further stated that "[t]his Agreement and any

Addenda hereto, constitute the entire agreement between

[Collelo and GSI]."

Significantly, for the purposes of this case, Addendum B

included a "non-disclosure provision," prohibiting Collelo from

disclosing GSI's confidential information "to any person or

entity without first obtaining [GSI's] written consent," and a

"non-solicitation provision" prohibiting Collelo from

soliciting, performing, or attempting to perform any

"Conflicting Services for a Customer or . . . contractor of

[GSI's]" for a period of one year after Collelo's employment

with GSI ended.

In early 2008, Collelo resigned from GSI and was hired by

Boeing to work in a non-geonames capacity. During his exit

interview, GSI reminded Collelo of his continuing obligations

under the contract and Addendum B, in particular.

GSI subsequently learned, in June 2008, that Collelo was
4
performing geonames work at Boeing when Collelo came to GSI's

office as part of a Boeing team to work on a future Boeing-GSI

geonames project. GSI advised Boeing that Collelo was in

violation of Addendum B's non-solicitation provision.

Specifically, GSI believed that Collelo was in breach of the

non-solicitation provision because he was performing geonames

work for GSI's customer, Boeing, and because Boeing had

pressured GSI to reduce its rates and hours on a bid for

geonames work under a subcontract with Boeing. The parties

attempted to resolve the matter, but were unable to agree on a

resolution.

Thereafter, GSI learned that Collelo had performed

geonames work at Boeing and that he had created a QC tool for

Boeing to use in its geonames work. Just four months after

Collelo began working at Boeing, Collelo wrote a memo to his

superiors claiming that he had developed a QC tool and an

edge-matching tool, and that he had "dramatically increased

production" and efficiency in geonames work at Boeing, such

that Boeing was now "three weeks ahead of schedule," even

though Boeing had had a significant backlog of geonames work

prior to Collelo's arrival.

GSI filed suit against Boeing, Autometric, Inc.

("Autometric"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Boeing, and

Collelo, alleging that: (1) Collelo breached his contract with

GSI by performing conflicting services for Boeing and by
5
disclosing "GSI's confidential information" to Boeing; (2) GSI

is entitled to recover its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs,

pursuant to section 5.8 of the Employment Agreement, if it

prevailed in its complaint for breach of contract; (3) Collelo

violated the Trade Secrets Act; (4) Boeing and/or Autometric

violated the Trade Secrets Act; and (5) Boeing and/or Autometric

tortiously interfered with GSI's contract with Collelo. GSI

sought: (1) damages in an amount to be determined at trial, but

not less than $10 million; (2) reasonable royalties from the

defendants' improper and unauthorized use of GSI's trade

secrets; (3) an injunction against use or disclosure of GSI's

trade secrets; (4) an injunction requiring Collelo to abide by

the terms of the Employment Agreement; (5) attorneys' fees and

costs; and (6) punitive damages of $350,000.

Two expert witnesses testified at trial for GSI regarding

damages. Specifically, the expert witnesses testified

regarding: (1) the amount that GSI's value had decreased due to

Collelo's and Boeing's actions; (2) GSI's cost to develop its

trade secrets and confidential information; (3) Boeing's unjust

enrichment as a result of its acquisition and use of GSI's

trade secrets and confidential information; and (4) reasonable

royalties for Collelo's disclosure and Boeing's use of GSI's

trade secrets.

At the conclusion of GSI's case in chief, the defendants

filed a motion to strike, arguing that, among other things: (1)
6
GSI offered no evidence that Boeing "directly competes" with GSI

for geonames work and, as a result, Collelo cannot be found in

breach of the non-solicitation provision in the contract; (2)

GSI is not entitled to any damages for its breach of contract

claim because GSI has not presented any evidence or expert

opinion on damages for that claim; (3) GSI cannot recover as

damages both the alleged cost of developing its trade secret and

the lost value to the company as a result of misappropriation

because awarding both measures of damages would amount to a

double recovery; (4) GSI cannot recover damages based on the

loss of the trade secret because GSI admits the value of its

trade secret has not been destroyed and has not been publicly

disclosed outside Boeing; and (5) GSI cannot obtain punitive

damages because there are no allegations sufficient to show

willful or malicious conduct by defendants.

The trial court did not permit the jury to consider the

existence of trade secrets or misappropriation. Instead, the

trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike at the

close of GSI's evidence and dismissed GSI's entire case with

prejudice, reasoning that, "even if Mr. Collelo had taken

something, and [despite the fact that Boeing] was a customer of

GSI, Boeing is not doing and has not been doing the same work

as GSI." While the trial court did conclude that "[t]here has

been no loss of business to GSI," and "[t]here has been no

[showing] that Boeing has made more money because it has used
7
these trade secrets," it did so based on its conclusion that

"[t]here is no way that the jury could find that Boeing has

taken GSI's secret in order to do the work that that secret was

designed for."

Following the trial court's dismissal of GSI's suit,

Collelo filed a motion for attorneys' fees, alleging that he

was entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to section

5.8 of the Employment Agreement. Section 5.8 of the

Employment Agreement stated that, "[i]n the event of a

dispute arising out of the interpretation or enforcement of

this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to

recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs." Collelo also

argued that GSI was estopped from taking inconsistent

positions as to which attorneys' fees provision governs

within this action because it had cited, at all times

relevant, section 5.8 of the Employment Agreement as the

provision governing attorneys' fees.

The trial court ultimately ruled that GSI was not estopped

from arguing that section 10.2 of Addendum B applied because

GSI's earlier position that it was entitled to attorneys' fees

pursuant to section 5.8 of the Employment Agreement "was a

legal position . . . but it was not a factual position which it

now seeks to back away from." The trial court also found that

"only [A]ddendum B is at issue in this case," and that the

subject matter contained in Addendum B was "the subject of this
8
lawsuit and the trial that was had in this matter."

Consequently, the trial court found, as a matter of law, that

the section 10.2 attorneys' fees provision in Addendum B

governed any attorneys' fees dispute in this case.

GSI and Collelo timely filed their notices of appeal and

we granted these appeals on the following assignments of error:

For Geographic Services, Inc. v. Collelo, et al., Record No.

101421:

1. The Circuit Court erred by requiring evidence of
competition between GSI and Boeing to establish
liability or a right to a remedy under the [Trade
Secrets Act].

2. The Circuit Court improperly weighed evidence and
credibility, disregarded GSI's evidence or
otherwise failed to consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to GSI when ruling on
Respondent's Motion to Strike that GSI purportedly
failed to present evidence of competition between
GSI and Boeing.

3. The Circuit Court erred by dismissing all of GSI's
claims against all Respondents because only the
part of the breach of contract claim against
Collelo based on the non-solicitation provision of
his Employment Agreement even arguably required a
showing of competition between GSI and Boeing, and
Respondents had only sought dismissal of that part
of the breach of contract claim against Collelo
and exclusion of certain other evidence.

For Collelo v. Geographic Services, Inc., Record No. 101411:

1. The trial court erred in concluding that, because
GSI was reversing position on a question of law,
not a question of fact, GSI was not estopped from
reversing its position with respect to the
applicability of a two-way fee-shifting provision.
That holding violates this Court's long-standing
9
 doctrine of estoppel by inconsistent legal
positions.

2. The trial court erred in denying attorneys' fees
to Collelo because it (i) construed an addendum to
an employment agreement as a separate contract, in
violation of this Court's precedent and the plain
language of the agreement itself; and (ii) failed
to give full effect to all clauses of the
contract, even where there was no conflict between
provisions, in violation of this Court's
precedent.

II. Analysis

A. Geographic Services, Inc. v. Collelo, et al.,
Record No. 101421

1. Standard of Review

We have clearly articulated the standard of review for

cases of statutory interpretation:

[A]n issue of statutory interpretation is a pure
question of law which we review de novo. When the
language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by
the plain meaning of that language. Furthermore, we
must give effect to the legislature’s intention as
expressed by the language used unless a literal
interpretation of the language would result in a
manifest absurdity. If a statute is subject to more
than one interpretation, we must apply the
interpretation that will carry out the legislative
intent behind the statute.

Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96,

104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007) (citations omitted).

Additionally, we have stated that,

[g]ranting a motion to strike at the end of
plaintiff's case, if done erroneously, can lead to
a substantial waste of judicial resources – a
consequence to be avoided. This is particularly
true in a situation where the motion to strike was
granted on a ground raised by the court sua
sponte.
10
 To guard against the waste that can be
occasioned by granting a motion to strike at the
end of plaintiff's evidence, this Court has
developed rules that govern the way in which a
trial court must view plaintiff's evidence when
considering such a motion.

DHA, Inc. v. Leydig, 231 Va. 138, 139-40, 340 S.E.2d 831, 832

(1986) (citation omitted). Specifically,

[w]hen the sufficiency of a plaintiff's evidence is
challenged by a motion to strike, the trial court
should resolve any reasonable doubt as to the
sufficiency of the evidence in plaintiff's favor
and should grant the motion only when it is
conclusively apparent that plaintiff has proven no
cause of action against defendant, or when it
plainly appears that the trial court would be
compelled to set aside any verdict found for the
plaintiff as being without evidence to support it.

Banks v. Mario Indus. of Virginia, Inc., 274 Va. 438, 454-55,

650 S.E.2d 687, 696 (2007) (quoting Saks Fifth Ave., Inc. v.

James, Ltd., 272 Va. 177, 188, 630 S.E.2d 304, 311 (2006)).

"According to well-settled principles of appellate review, when

the trial court grants a motion to strike the plaintiff’s

evidence, we review the evidence on appeal in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff." Green v. Ingram, 269 Va. 281,

284, 608 S.E.2d 917, 919 (2005) (citing Perdieu v. Blackstone

Family Practice Ctr., Inc., 264 Va. 408, 411, 568 S.E.2d 703,

704 (2002) and Bryan v. Burt, 254 Va. 28, 30-31, 486 S.E.2d

536, 537 (1997)).

Lastly, it should be noted that while GSI complains that

the trial court improperly dismissed all of GSI's claims even

11
though the defendants did not request the relief granted by the

trial court, a trial court may properly grant a motion to

strike on a ground raised by the trial court sua sponte. See

DHA, 231 Va. at 139, 340 S.E.2d at 832 (acknowledging that a

trial court may grant a motion to strike "on a ground raised by

the court sua sponte").

2. GSI's Claims Under the Trade Secrets Act

We have previously recognized that the plain language of

the Trade Secrets Act "reflects the General Assembly's decision

to protect the owner of a trade secret from another's misuse of

that secret. Because the General Assembly has enacted

legislation addressing this subject, the role of the courts is

limited to construing and applying the terms set forth in the

[Trade Secrets] Act." MicroStrategy Inc. v. Li, 268 Va. 249,

263, 601 S.E.2d 580, 588 (2004). Additionally, we have held

that, "[i]n order for a plaintiff to establish that [its

alleged trade secret] has been the subject of a trade secret

violation, two statutory elements must be proved, namely, the

existence of a 'trade secret' and its 'misappropriation' by the

defendant." Id. at 263, 601 S.E.2d at 588 (citing Code § 59.1-

336).

The Trade Secrets Act defines "trade secret" as:

information, including but not limited to, a formula,
pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process, that:

1. Derives independent economic value, actual or
12
 potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use, and

2. Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.

Code § 59.1-336.

The trial court, when addressing the defendants' motion to

strike with regard to GSI's breach of contract claim, found

that,

[t]here has been no evidence offered that there has
been any loss of business by GSI because of
competitive conduct on the part of [Boeing]. There
has been no evidence that Boeing has benefitted
[sic] from using this tool in a manner that would
affect the business of GSI, namely, the substantive
business of its Geonames work.

Similarly, the trial court ruled, when addressing GSI's

claim under the Trade Secrets Act, that:

the reason [for the Trade Secrets Act is] that if you
have a secret you have developed for a particular work
and it is taken by someone else, then [they] will be in
violation of the terms of the [Trade Secrets A]ct, and
. . . the holder of the trade secret[] will be entitled
to damages.

And the damages are now codified. They are set
out in the [Trade Secrets A]ct. And what are they?
The loss to the business of the person who has had
its trade secret taken, the unjust enrichment to the
entity that has been able to do the business of the
person holding the trade secret or some portion of
that, and the reasonable royalties, if there is
nothing else, for the use of that particular . . .
trade secret.

But, again, the reason for the rule is to avoid
a person benefiting by doing the type of work which
this trade secret enables to the detriment of the
creator of the trade secret. And, once again, Boeing
13
 is not doing that work. There simply has been no
evidence whatsoever, not merely that Boeing is not
competing with GSI, but in response to the trade
secret aspect, that Boeing is even doing the same
work as GSI.

. . . .

And, so, it would be far easier for the Court to
send this matter to the jury but what damages will a
jury have to consider? . . . There has been no loss
of business to GSI. There has been no [showing] that
Boeing has made more money because it has used these
trade secrets to do the same kind of work . . . .
There is no way that the jury could find that Boeing
has taken GSI's secret in order to do the work that
that secret was designed for. Boeing is simply not
doing that kind of work.

For these reasons, the motion of the
defendants to strike the plaintiff's evidence is
granted.

(Emphasis added.)

Therefore, it is clear that, contrary to the defendants'

claim, the trial court did not rule that "GSI had utterly

failed to present any evidence of harm or injury caused by the

[d]efendants." Rather, the trial court found that "the reason

for the [Trade Secrets Act] is to avoid a person benefiting by

doing the type of work which this trade secret enables to the

detriment of the creator of the trade secret," and that there

had been "no evidence whatsoever," that Boeing is "competing

with GSI," or "that Boeing is even doing the same work as

GSI." While the trial court did conclude that "[t]here has

been no loss of business to GSI," and "[t]here has been no

[showing] that Boeing has made more money because it has used

14
these trade secrets," it did so based on its conclusion that

"[t]here is no way that the jury could find that Boeing has

taken GSI's secret in order to do the work that that secret

was designed for." (Emphasis added.) We disagree with the

underlying premise of the trial court's ruling.

Significantly, for the purposes of this case, the Trade

Secrets Act defines "misappropriation" by providing two

alternative definitions. Code § 59.1-336. The Trade Secrets

Act first defines "misappropriation" as the "[a]cquisition of a

trade secret of another by a person who knows or has reason to

know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means." Code

§ 59.1-336. The Trade Secrets Act also defines

"misappropriation" as:

2. Disclosure or use of a trade secret of another
without express or implied consent by a person who

a. Used improper means to acquire knowledge
of the trade secret; or

b. At the time of disclosure or use, knew or had
reason to know that his knowledge of the trade
secret was

(1) Derived from or through a person who had
utilized improper means to acquire it;

(2) Acquired under circumstances giving rise
to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit
its use;

(3) Derived from or through a person who
owed a duty to the person seeking relief to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or

(4) Acquired by accident or mistake.

15
Code § 59.1-336.

Accordingly, the Trade Secrets Act does not require that

one who is accused of misappropriating a trade secret use the

allegedly misappropriated trade secret to compete with the

holder of the trade secret. Id.

Once a complainant has established the misappropriation

of a trade secret, the Trade Secrets Act provides that the

"complainant is entitled to recover damages for

misappropriation," including "both the actual loss caused by

misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by

misappropriation that is not taken into account in computing

actual loss." Code § 59.1-338. The Trade Secrets Act also

states that, "[i]f a complainant is unable to prove a greater

amount of damages by other methods of measurement, the damages

caused by misappropriation can be measured exclusively by

imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a

misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or use of a trade

secret." Code § 59.1-338.

The defendants argue on appeal that GSI did not prove its

damages; consequently, the trial court properly granted the

motion to strike. This contention ignores the actual ruling

made by the trial court. The trial court's ruling was based

upon the faulty premise that competition must be shown in order

to have a cause of action based upon the Trade Secrets Act and

that damages must flow from the proof of competition. As a
16
result, the trial court's analysis of the proper showing of

damages was based upon losses as a result of competition.

Illustrative of this premise are the trial court's explanatory

remarks when granting the motion to strike:

Boeing is not doing and has not been doing the same
work as GSI.

. . . .

There has been no evidence offered that there
has been any loss of business by GSI because of
competitive conduct on the part of The Boeing
Corporation.

. . . .

[T]he reason for the rule is to avoid a person
benefiting by doing the type of work which this
trade secret enables to the detriment of the
creator of the trade secret. And, once again,
Boeing is not doing that work. There simply has
been no evidence whatsoever . . . that Boeing is
even doing the same work as GSI.

. . . .

And, so, it would be far easier for the
Court to send this matter to the jury but what
damages will a jury have to consider? What
damages? There has been no loss of business to
GSI. There has been no profitability shown on
the part of Boeing that Boeing has made more
money because it has used these trade secrets to
do the same kind of work or similar work.

. . . There is no way that the jury could find
that Boeing has taken GSI's secret in order to
do the work that that secret was designed for.
Boeing is simply not doing that kind of work.

For these reasons, the motion of the
defendants to strike the plaintiff's evidence
is granted.

Whether GSI presented sufficient evidence of damages under
17
a proper analysis of the Trade Secrets Act was not the subject

of the trial court's granting of the motion to strike. The

trial court's ruling was based upon a faulty premise and the

trial court erred in granting the motion to strike.

Nonetheless, upon consideration of the evidence in the light

most favorable to GSI, we cannot say as a matter of law that

GSI did not present sufficient evidence on the question of

damages to survive a motion to strike.

3. GSI's Breach of Contract and Tortious
Interference with a Contract Claims

We have previously stated that,

[a]s a general rule, damages for breach of
contracts are limited to the pecuniary loss
sustained. Proof of damages is an essential
element of a breach of contract claim, and
failure to prove that element warrants dismissal
of the claim. The plaintiff also has the burden
of proving with reasonable certainty the amount
of damages and the cause from which they
resulted; speculation and conjecture cannot form
the basis of the recovery.

Sunrise Continuing Care, LLC v. Wright, 277 Va. 148, 156, 671

S.E.2d 132, 136 (2009) (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted) (emphasis added). We have also recognized that

the tort of intentional interference with
performance of a contract by a third party is a
permissible cause of action in Virginia. The
elements required for a prima facie showing of
the tort are: (i) the existence of a valid
contractual relationship or business expectancy;
(ii) knowledge of the relationship or expectancy
on the part of the interferor; (iii) intentional
interference inducing or causing a breach or
termination of the relationship or expectancy;
and (iv) resultant damage to the party whose
18
 relationship or expectancy has been disrupted.

Lewis-Gale Med. Ctr., LLC v. Alldredge, 282 Va. 141, 149, 710

S.E.2d 716, 720 (2011) (quoting DurretteBradshaw, P.C. v. MRC

Consulting, L.C., 277 Va. 140, 145, 670 S.E.2d 704, 706 (2009)

(citing Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112, 120, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102

(1985))) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The contract in this case included a non-disclosure

provision, which provided that Collelo would "not disclose

[GSI's] Confidential Information to any person or entity

without first obtaining [GSI's] written consent." The

contract also included a non-solicitation provision, which

stated that Collelo agreed that

for the one (1) year period after the date [his]
employment [with GSI] ends for any reason [he
would] not, as an officer, director, employee,
consultant, owner, partner, or in any other
capacity, either directly or through others . . .
solicit, perform, or attempt to perform any
Conflicting Services for a Customer . . . or
contractor of [GSI's] with whom I had . . .
contact or whose identity I learned as a result
of my employment with [GSI].

GSI alleged in its complaint both that "Collelo's

performance of Conflicting Services for Autometric and/or

Boeing is a breach of the [contract]," and "Collelo's

disclosure of GSI's confidential information to Autometric

and/or Boeing is [a] breach of the [contract]." GSI also

alleged in its complaint that "Autometric and/or Boeing

intentionally interfered with, induced, or caused Collelo to

19
breach his obligations to GSI."

At trial, GSI offered the testimony of two expert

witnesses regarding damages incurred as a result of the

defendants' actions in this case. In addition to testifying for

GSI as an expert on the quantification of damages concerning

unjust enrichment and reasonable royalties, Michele Riley

("Riley") testified as an expert on the quantification of

damages stemming from the disclosure of confidential

information. Significantly, however, Riley stated at trial that

she would not testify regarding any damages related to GSI's

tortious interference with a contract claim. Upon cross-

examination, the following exchange occurred:

[Defendants' Counsel:] I want to talk first about what
you are offering an opinion on and what you are
not. You understand that there are . . .
multiple claims in this case; correct?

[Riley:] I do.

[Defendants' Counsel:] And one of those claims is
what's been called tortious interference
with [a] contract or the interference with a
contract at issue. You understand that's a
claim; right?

[Riley:] I do.

[Defendants' Counsel:] That, ma'am, is not
something you are offering an opinion on;
correct?

[Riley:] My opinions relate to trade secret
misappropriation and misuse of confidential
information.

In addition to her testimony regarding unjust enrichment

20
and reasonable royalties, Riley also testified regarding GSI's

cost to develop its trade secrets and stated that she agreed

with GSI's determination that the cost to develop its trade

secrets was about $3.3 million – the value of which represented

an "actual loss to GSI" because "the value [of GSI's trade

secret has] decreased because of Boeing's use of the trade

secret." Significantly, however, while Riley testified

regarding GSI's cost to develop its trade secrets, Riley did

not testify as to the actual value of GSI's trade secrets or

the actual diminution in value of either GSI's trade secrets or

GSI, itself, as a result of the defendants' actions. Riley's

testimony, as a whole, only supported GSI's claims under the

Trade Secrets Act.

Additionally, Kace G. Clawson ("Clawson") testified for

GSI as an expert in the field of business valuation. Clawson

stated, however, that he would testify solely regarding trade

secret misappropriation. Upon voir dire examination for

qualification as an expert, the following exchange occurred:

[Defendants' Counsel:] Sir, I'm correct that you
are not providing an opinion or calculation
for the contract claim in this case;
correct?

[Clawson:] That's correct.

[Defendants' Counsel:] And you are [also not]
providing an opinion with respect to
tortious interference, are you?

[Clawson:] That's correct.

21
 [Defendants' Counsel:] Sir, you believe you are
providing an opinion solely on the issue of
trade secret misappropriation damages;
correct, sir?

[Clawson:] That's correct.

Accordingly, Clawson's testimony was only offered in support of

GSI's claims under the Trade Secrets Act and, in fact, he only

testified regarding two valuations he conducted concerning GSI.

First, Clawson valued GSI, with its trade secrets and

confidential information intact, at just over $34.1 million.

Second, Clawson valued GSI, when considering the risk of loss to

its projected cash flow as a result of its trade secrets and

confidential information not being intact, at about $29.7

million – resulting in a loss to GSI's overall value of around

44.3 million.

GSI offered the testimony of two expert witnesses

regarding damages incurred by GSI as a result of the

defendants' actions but, significantly, Clawson's

testimony was offered only for GSI's claims under the

Trade Secrets Act, and Riley's testimony was competent

only to establish GSI's claims under the Trade Secrets

Act.

Accordingly, after viewing the evidence on appeal in the

light most favorable to GSI, we hold that the evidence was

insufficient to: (1) prove, with any reasonable certainty, the

amount of damages incurred as a result of Collelo's alleged

22
breach of contract; and (2) prove that GSI incurred damages as a

result of Autometric's and/or Boeing's tortious interference

with a contract. As a result, we hold that the trial court did

not err in striking GSI's breach of contract and tortious

interference with a contract claims.

4. GSI's Claim for Attorneys' Fees in Connection
with Its Breach of Contract Claim

In its complaint, GSI claimed that it was entitled to

recover its attorneys' fees and costs in connection with its

breach of contract claim, pursuant to section 5.8 of the

Employment Agreement. However, because GSI cannot prevail on

its breach of contract claim, we hold that the trial court did

not err in dismissing GSI's claim for attorneys' fees in

connection with its breach of contract claim.

5. Collelo's Claim for Attorneys' Fees in Connection
with the Breach of Contract Claim

Following the trial court's dismissal of GSI's suit,

Collelo filed a motion for attorneys' fees, alleging that he

was entitled to attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to section

5.8 of the Employment Agreement. The trial court ultimately

ruled that "only [A]ddendum B is at issue in this case," and

the subject matter contained in Addendum B was "the subject

of this lawsuit and the trial that was had in this matter."

Consequently, the trial court denied Collelo's motion for

attorneys' fees, finding, as a matter of law, that only the

section 10.2 attorneys' fees provision in Addendum B governed
23
and, under that provision, only GSI could be awarded

attorneys' fees.

The contract in this case was made up of three

documents: (1) the "Employment Agreement;" (2) "Addendum A;"

and (3) "Addendum B," which included the non-solicitation and

non- disclosure provisions. Significantly, the contract

included two different attorneys' fees provisions; one in the

Employment Agreement and one in Addendum B. By the plain

language of the contract, each attorneys' fee provision only

applies to the contract document in which it is found.

Specifically, the Employment Agreement stated: "THIS

EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this "Agreement") is made and entered

into . . . between [GSI and Collelo]." (Emphasis added.)

Section 5.8 of the Employment Agreement stated that, "[i]n the

event of a dispute arising out of the interpretation or

enforcement of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be

entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs."

(Emphasis added.)

Additionally, Addendum B stated that:

I [(Collelo)] hereby enter into this Employee
Confidential Information, Non-Competition, Non-
Disparagement and Non-Solicitation Agreement
(the "Agreement") and agree as follows:

. . . .

10.2 I agree that if [GSI] is successful
in whole or in part in any legal or equitable
action against me under this Agreement, the
Company shall be entitled to payment of all
24
 costs, including reasonable attorney's fees,
from me.

(Emphasis added and in original.)

The trial court denied Collelo's motion for attorneys'

fees and costs, explaining that,

these parties had contract documents that contained two
different fee-shifting provisions for two different
documents which were part of the contract documents,
namely, the [E]mployment [Agreement] and [Addendum B].
This suit was only as to the nonsolicitation or
noncompetition contract [(Addendum B)].

That being the case, the fee provision
which is at issue and which would allow for the
recovery of fees allows for the recovery of fees
only as to GSI if it prevails. It did not
prevail.

The trial court did not err in ruling that the attorneys'

fees provision in the Employment Agreement applies to disputes

arising out of that document and the attorneys' fees provision

in Addendum B applies to disputes arising out of the subject

matter of that document. Further, the trial court did not err

in holding that Collelo could not recover attorneys' fees under

Addendum B.

An examination of GSI's complaint demonstrates that GSI's

breach of contract claim ("Breach of Contract – Collelo") was

based entirely upon the subject matter of Addendum B.

Specifically, GSI alleged that: (1) "Collelo was obligated not

to perform Conflicting Services for any of GSI's current or

potential customers"; (2) Collelo's "performance of

Conflicting Services for GSI's customer, Autometric and/or
25
Boeing [was] a breach of the Employment Agreement"; (3)

"Collelo was obligated to maintain the secrecy of all of GSI's

confidential information"; and (4) "Collelo's disclosure of

GSI's confidential information to Autometric and/or Boeing

[was] a breach of the Employment Agreement." Significantly,

Addendum B's non-solicitation provision prohibited Collelo

from soliciting, performing, or attempting to perform any

"Conflicting Services for a Customer or . . . of [GSI's]" for

a period of one year after Collelo's employment with GSI

ended. Similarly, Addendum B's non-disclosure provision

provided that Collelo would "not disclose [GSI's] Confidential

Information to any person or entity without first obtaining

[GSI's] written consent." Accordingly, a careful review of the

pleadings and the arguments made at trial and on appeal

reveals that the trial court did not err when it concluded

that the subject of the breach of contract claim involved

matters arising out of Addendum B.

Finally, we address Collelo's arguments that the trial

court erred by permitting GSI to argue that Addendum B

attorneys' fee provisions applied when it had previously pled

that section 5.8 of the Employment Agreement applied. First,

Collelo argues that judicial estoppel prohibits this change of

position. We disagree. As we have previously observed, "[t]he

doctrine of judicial estoppel applies where the position taken

is inconsistent relative 'to the same fact or state of facts.' "
26
Lofton Ridge, LLC v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 268 Va. 377, 382,

601 S.E.2d 648, 651 (2004) (quoting Burch v. Grace St. Bldg.

Corp., 168 Va. 329, 340, 191 S.E. 672, 677 (1937)).

Next, Collelo argues that the trial court erred in

permitting GSI to take a legal position inconsistent with its

pleadings in violation of the prohibition against approbation

and reprobation. "The prohibition against approbation and

reprobation forces a litigant to elect a particular position,

and confines a litigant to the position that she first

adopted." Matthews v. Matthews, 277 Va. 522, 528, 675 S.E.2d

157, 160 (2009). The principle stated by Collelo is

certainly correct; however, it does not apply in this case.

GSI's pleadings did assert that section 5.8 of the Employment

Agreement provided for an award of attorneys' fees in the

event that it prevailed on the breach of contract claim.

This position is not inconsistent with its later position

that Collelo was not entitled to attorneys' fees under

Addendum B. The trial court did not err in denying Collelo's

motion for attorneys' fees in relation to GSI's breach of

contract claim.

III.

Conclusion

We hold that the trial court erred when it dismissed

GSI's claims under the Trade Secrets Act. We also hold that

27
the trial court did not err when it dismissed GSI's: (1)

breach of contract claim; (2) tortious interference with a

contract claim; and (3) claim for attorneys' fees in

connection with its breach of contract claim. Finally, we

hold that the trial court did not err when it denied Collelo's

motion for attorneys' fees in relation to GSI's breach of

contract claim.

Accordingly, we will affirm in part and reverse in

part the judgment of the trial court and remand this case

for a new trial on GSI's claims under the Trade Secrets

Act.

Record No. 101411 – Affirmed.
Record No. 101421 – Affirmed in part,
reversed in part,
and remanded.

JUSTICE McCLANAHAN, concurring in part, and dissenting in part.

While I agree with the majority's holdings in this case

in all other respects, I disagree with the majority holding in

part II.A.2. The majority reverses the trial court's

dismissal of Geographic Services Inc.'s (GSI) claims under the

Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act (Trade Secrets Act), Code

§§ 59.1-336 through -343. The trial court, in my opinion,

reached the correct result regarding GSI's Trade Secrets Act

claims when it granted the motion filed by the Boeing Company,

Autometric, Inc. and Anthony Collelo (collectively, the

defendants) to strike GSI's evidence offered in support of

28
those claims. I reach that conclusion because I believe GSI

failed, as a matter of law, to present evidence sufficient to

submit those claims for damages to the jury under any of GSI's

theories for recovery under the Trade Secrets Act.

I.

The Trade Secrets Act provides that the complainant,

upon establishing the misappropriation of a trade secret, is

"entitled to recover damages" to the extent the complainant

can also prove "the actual loss caused by misappropriation,"

or "the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is

not taken into account in computing actual loss." Code

§ 59.1-338(A) (emphasis added). Additionally, as a third

alternative, "[i]f a complainant is unable to prove a greater

amount of damages by other methods of measurement, the

damages caused by misappropriation can be measured

exclusively by imposition of liability for a reasonable

royalty for a misappropriator's unauthorized disclosure or

use of a trade secret." Id. (emphasis added).

To establish a prima facie case under this statutory

scheme during its case-in-chief, GSI had the burden to show

" 'with reasonable certainty the amount of [its] damages and

the cause from which they resulted [i.e., misappropriation

of its trade secret]; speculation and conjecture cannot form

the basis of the recovery.' " Banks v. Mario Indus. of Va.,

Inc., 274 Va. 438, 455, 650 S.E.2d 687, 696 (2007) (quoting
29
Saks Fifth Ave., Inc. v. James, Ltd., 272 Va. 177, 188, 630

S.E.2d 304, 311 (2006)); See Sunrise Continuing Care, LLC v.

Wright, 277 Va. 148, 154, 671 S.E.2d 132, 135 (2009) ("The

plaintiff bears the burden to establish the element of

damages with reasonable certainty." (citation omitted)). In

order to make that showing, GSI was thus required to

demonstrate " 'a causal connection between the defendant[s']

wrongful conduct and the damages asserted.' " Banks, 274

Va. at 455, 650 S.E.2d at 696 (quoting Saks Fifth Ave.,

Inc., 272 Va. at 189, 630 S.E.2d at 311). Furthermore, GSI

had to establish " 'the amount of those [alleged] damages by

using a proper method and factual foundation for calculating

damages.' " Id.

The defendants "test[ed]" the legal sufficiency of

GSI's evidence of damages under the Trade Secrets Act by

filing their motion to strike GSI’s evidence, Supervalu, Inc.

v. Johnson, 276 Va. 356, 369, 666 S.E.2d 335, 342 (2008);

Little v. Cooke, 274 Va. 697, 718, 652 S.E.2d 129, 141

(2007); and the sufficiency of that evidence is squarely

before us on appeal, which, as an issue of law, we review de

novo. Syed v. ZH Techs., Inc., 280 Va. 58, 68, 694 S.E.2d

625, 631 (2010); Banks, 274 Va. at 451, 650 S.E.2d at 694.

See Costner v. Lackey, 223 Va. 377, 382, 290 S.E.2d 818, 820

(1982) ("In considering the motion to strike the plaintiffs'

evidence, the trial court was not sitting as the fact finder
30
but was ruling on a matter of law to determine whether the

[plaintiffs] had made out a prima facie case.").

Just as with GSI's other claims in this case, the

circuit court's granting of the defendants' motion to strike

should be affirmed as to GSI's Trade Secrets Act claims if

" 'it is conclusively apparent that [GSI] has proven no cause

of action against [the] defendant[s] [under the Trade Secrets

Act], or [if] it plainly appears that the trial court would

[have been] compelled to set aside any verdict found for

[GSI] [under the Trade Secrets Act] as being without evidence

to support it.' " Banks, 274 Va. at 455, 650 S.E.2d at 696

(quoting Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 272 Va. at 188, 630 S.E.2d at

311). The majority summarily concludes that GSI presented

sufficient evidence on the elements of damages under the

Trade Secrets Act. I disagree.

II.

At trial, GSI offered the testimony of two expert

witnesses regarding its alleged damages recoverable against

the defendants under the Trade Secrets Act as a result of

their actions in this case. Michele Riley (Riley) testified

for GSI as an expert on the quantification of damages

concerning unjust enrichment, reasonable royalties and

disclosure of confidential information - all in the context

of trade secrets misappropriation. Kace Clawson (Clawson)

testified for GSI as an expert in the field of business
31
valuation.

A. Actual Loss

Regarding actual loss, GSI presented (i) Clawson's

testimony as to two valuations he conducted concerning GSI;

and (ii) Riley's testimony regarding GSI's cost to develop

its alleged trade secret in relation to its geonames

procedure.

(i) Clawson. According to Clawson, he valued GSI, with

its trade secret and confidential information intact, at just

over $34.1 million. Clawson then valued GSI by purportedly

taking into consideration the risk of loss to GSI's projected

cash flow as a result of the disclosure of its trade secret and

confidential information. This variable, Clawson stated,

reduced GSI's value to about $29.7 million – resulting in a

loss to GSI's overall value of around $4.4 million.

This evidence was insufficient, however, to submit the

question of "actual loss" to the jury. Clawson admitted

that his testimony regarding his two valuations of GSI had

nothing to do with GSI's actual loss. Upon voir dire

examination for qualification as an expert, the following

exchange occurred:

[Defendants' counsel:] Sir, if I wanted to
know or the [c]ourt wanted to know or the jury
wanted to know how much money was actually lost by
GSI, out-of-pocket loss, your opinion does not deal
with that issue; true? [Clawson:] That's correct.

[Defendants' counsel:] You are not offering an
32
 opinion that GSI lost one, three, five, or any
amount of millions of dollars because of the
allegations of the misappropriation here in terms
of actual dollars; correct?

[Clawson:] That's correct.

Clawson also admitted that his valuations purportedly

measured GSI's total worth on only one particular date,

February 28, 2008, before Collelo joined Boeing in March 2008;

and that he did not "take into account any real world events,"

and did not consider whether GSI lost or gained any customers

or contracts following Collelo's employment at Boeing.

(ii) Riley. Riley testified that she agreed with GSI's

determination that the cost to develop its trade secret was

about $3.3 million. Riley indicated that this sum

represented an "actual loss to GSI" in that "the value [of

GSI's trade secret had] decreased because of Boeing's use of

the trade secret." Yet, Riley did not testify as to the

actual value of GSI's trade secret or the actual diminution

in value of either GSI's trade secret or GSI, itself, as a

result of the defendants' actions. Moreover, Riley admitted

that there was no evidence of Boeing taking any contracts

away from GSI.

The insufficiency of the testimony of both Clawson and

Riley as evidence of actual loss to GSI allegedly caused by

the defendants is reinforced by the testimony of GSI's

operations manager, Jennifer Lopatin. Lopatin admitted that

33
GSI could not "point to any money, whether it's a million or

half a million, that was actually lost in terms of a contract

or any actual money." In short, she stated, GSI "ha[d not]

actually lost [any] money."

In the context of a trade secret case, I find no legal

authority, nor has GSI cited any, supporting an award of either

(a) the alleged diminished value of a business or (b) the

development costs of a trade secret, as damages for "actual

loss" to the plaintiff, where the plaintiff, as here, remains a

viable business, continues to fully utilize the trade secret

process, and has not, in fact, shown any lost profits as a

result of the misappropriation.

As a result, I would hold that GSI did not use " 'a

proper method and factual foundation for calculating' " actual

loss damages; and that it thus failed to prove " 'with

reasonable certainty' " any actual losses it may have sustained.

Banks, 274 Va. at 455, 650 S.E.2d at 696 (quoting Saks Fifth

Ave., Inc., 272 Va. at 189, 630 S.E.2d at 311). Consequently,

in my view, GSI's proof of damages on this issue was

insufficient to submit to the jury.

B. Unjust Enrichment

To recover on its claim for unjust enrichment under

the Trade Secrets Act, GSI had to prove (1) it conferred a

benefit on Boeing, albeit involuntarily; (2) Boing knew of

the benefit and should reasonably have expected to repay
34
GSI; and (3) Boing accepted or retained the benefit without

paying for its value. See Schmidt v. Household Finance

Corp., 276 Va. 108, 116, 661 S.E.2d 834 (2008) (setting

forth elements of unjust enrichment claim).

In quantifying GSI's unjust enrichment claim, Riley

testified that she multiplied the total amount of revenue

billed by Boeing for geonames work following Collelo's arrival

(approximately $5.8 million) by the profit margin earned by

Boeing on its geonames work as testified to by Boeing's

corporate designee (12 percent). Accordingly, Riley concluded

that Boeing received almost $700,000 in unjust enrichment.

Riley admitted, however, to attributing Boeing's total

geonames revenue following Collelo's arrival at Boeing to the

acquisition of GSI's trade secret, despite the fact that two-

thirds of the contracts Riley relied upon in her calculation

were in place before Collelo worked at Boeing. In so doing,

Riley did not attempt to distinguish between Boeing's just

enrichment, in the form of geonames profits earned on

contracts which were in place before Boeing hired Collelo,

and Boeing's alleged unjust enrichment, in the form of any

earnings received due to the misappropriation of GSI's trade

secret.

Moreover, Riley admitted that her unjust enrichment

calculation did not "try to figure out how much better,

faster or stronger things became" at Boeing, or "how much
35
more efficient" Boeing became following Collelo's arrival.

Rather than providing a factual basis upon which a jury could

discern between Boeing's just and unjust enrichment, Riley

testified that "the jury can decide for itself how to work

the numbers out."

I therefore would hold that GSI did not use " 'a proper

method and factual foundation for calculating' " unjust

enrichment damages; and that GSI thus failed to prove " 'with

reasonable certainty' " the amount Boeing may have been

unjustly enriched due to its misappropriation of GSI's trade

secret. Banks, 274 Va. at 455, 650 S.E.2d at 696 (quoting Saks

Fifth Ave., Inc., 272 Va. at 189, 630 S.E.2d at 311).

Consequently, in my view, GSI's proof of damages on this issue

was also insufficient to submit to the jury.

C. Reasonable Royalty

Finally, regarding a reasonable royalty, Riley testified

that she used the "rule of thumb" commonly used in her

practice called the "25 percent rule." Application of this

rule, Riley stated, would result in GSI receiving 25 percent

of the profit attributable to Boeing's use of GSI's trade

secret as a reasonable royalty. Riley stated this would

amount to almost $175,000. Most significantly, Riley

explained that she derived this sum by multiplying Boeing's

alleged $700,000 unjust enrichment profit margin following

Collelo's arrival by 25 percent.
36
 This means Riley's reasonable royalty calculation was

based entirely upon her flawed unjust enrichment calculation

discussed above. I therefore would hold that GSI did not use "

'a proper method and factual foundation for calculating' " a

reasonable royalty; and that GSI thus failed to prove " 'with

reasonable certainty' " the amount of any reasonable royalty it

may have been entitled to. Id. Consequently, in my opinion,

GSI's proof of damages on this issue was likewise insufficient

to submit to the jury.

III.

After considering the evidence on appeal in the light most

favorable to GSI, I would hold that GSI did not present

evidence sufficient to submit its claims for damages to a jury

under any of GSI's theories of recovery under the Trade Secrets

Act. It plainly appears to me that GSI "'has proven no cause

of action against [the] defendant[s]'" under the Trade Secrets

Act; and that the trial court would have been " 'compelled to

set aside any verdict found for [GSI] as being without evidence

to support it.' " Id. (quoting Saks Fifth Ave., Inc., 272 Va.

at 188, 630 S.E.2d at 311). Thus, despite the trial court's

error in concluding that one who is accused of misappropriating

a trade secret must use the trade secret to compete with the

holder of the trade secret, I would hold that the trial court

properly sustained the defendants' motion to strike in relation

to GSI's claims under the Trade Secrets Act.
37