IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
June 7, 2006 Session
DAVID E. CLARK v. LOWE’S HOME CENTERS, ET AL.
Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Jackson County
No. 00-118-KK-180 James O. Bond, Judge
No. M2004-02972-SC-R3-CV - Filed: August 24, 2006
We granted this appeal to address whether a previous workers’ compensation award can be
reconsidered under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) if the employee sustains
subsequent work-related injuries for which he seeks compensation. Upon review, we hold that
reconsideration of a prior award under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) is not
precluded by a subsequent work-related injury for which the employee seeks compensation.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e); Judgment of the Trial Court is Affirmed
JANICE M. HOLDER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, C.J., and
E. RILEY ANDERSON , ADOLPHO A. BIRCH , JR., and CORNELIA A. CLARK, JJ., joined.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; Juan G.
Villasenor, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellant, State of Tennessee Department of Labor,
Second Injury Fund.
Debbie C. Holliman and Everett G. Holliman, Carthage, Tennessee, for the appellee, David E. Clark.
OPINION
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We granted an appeal in this case to determine whether a previous workers’ compensation
award can be reconsidered under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) if the employee
sustains subsequent work-related injuries for which he seeks compensation. David Clark (“Clark”)
worked for Lowe’s Homes Centers, Inc. (“Lowe’s”) from 1992 until his discharge in 2003. In 1994,
Clark suffered a work-related injury to his right shoulder (“First Injury”). The parties settled the
claim for 17.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. In November 2000, Clark was
attempting to load a refrigerator at work when he suffered another injury to his right shoulder. He
also sustained injuries to his neck and right arm at that time (“Second Injury”). Clark subsequently
filed a complaint against Lowe’s and the Second Injury Fund in the Criminal Court for Jackson
County, Tennessee, seeking permanent disability benefits. Lowe’s and Clark settled the Second
Injury for 46.72% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole, which was within the statutory
limits provided by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241.1 In 2003, Clark suffered another
work-related injury, this time to his right hand, right wrist, right elbow and right arm (“Third
Injury”). Clark was terminated by Lowe’s in that same year.
On September 19, 2003, Clark filed a complaint against Lowe’s and the Second Injury Fund
in the Criminal Court for Jackson County seeking reconsideration of the award of 46.72% for the
Second Injury. The complaint alleged that he was entitled to have the court reconsider the extent of
his vocational disability under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) because Lowe’s
had discharged him. Also on September 19, 2003, Clark filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of
Jackson County seeking compensation for carpal tunnel syndrome arising from the Third Injury.
On November 13, 2004, the Criminal Court for Jackson County enlarged the award of
46.72% for the Second Injury by an additional 214 weeks, giving Clark a total of 400 weeks for the
injuries he sustained in 2000. The award of permanent total benefits was apportioned between the
Second Injury Fund and Lowe’s.2 The Second Injury Fund appealed, arguing that Clark was not
entitled to reconsideration of the award for the Second Injury because he sustained and sought
workers’ compensation benefits for the Third Injury. On August 25, 2005, the Circuit Court of
Jackson County found that Clark was permanently and totally disabled as a result of the Third Injury.
The appeal of the increased award for the Second Injury was heard by the Special Workers’
Compensation Appeal Panel on November 29, 2005. The case was transferred to the full Court for
review prior to a decision by the Panel.
1
At the time of Clark’s Second Injury and settlement, Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(1)
provided in pertinent part that
[f]or injuries arising on or after August 1, 1992, in cases where an injured employee
is eligible to receive any permanent partial disability benefits, pursuant to
§ 50-6-207(3)(A)(i) and (F), and the pre-injury employer returns the employee to
employment at a wage equal to or greater than the wage the employee was receiving
at the time of injury, the maximum permanent partial disability award that the
employee may receive is two and one-half (2 1/2) times the medical impairment
rating determined pursuant to the provisions of the American Medical Association
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (American Medical
Association), the Manual for Orthopedic Surgeons in Evaluating Permanent
Physical Impairment (American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons), or in cases not
covered by either of these, an impairment rating by any appropriate method used
and accepted by the medical community. In making determinations, the court shall
consider all pertinent factors, including lay and expert testimony, employee's age,
education, skills and training, local job opportunities, and capacity to work at types
of employment available in claimant's disabled condition.
2
The trial court apportioned 68.88 weeks of the modified award to the Second Injury Fund. The apportionment
is not at issue in this appeal.
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II. ANALYSIS
The issue in this case involves the applicability of Tennessee Code Annotated section
50-6-241(a)(2) to Clark’s claim for increased benefits for his Second Injury and the effect of the
Third Injury on this claim. Issues of statutory construction, like the issue before us, are solely
questions of law. Bryant v. Genco Stamping & Mfg. Co., 33 S.W.3d 761, 765 (Tenn. 2000).
Questions of law are reviewed de novo without a presumption of correctness of the trial court’s
findings. Leab v. S & H Mining Co., 76 S.W.3d 344, 348 (Tenn. 2002). This Court’s role in
statutory interpretation “‘is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without unduly
restricting or expanding a statute’s coverage beyond its intended scope.’” Houghton v. Aramark
Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002) (quoting Owens v. State, 908 S.W.2d 923, 926
(Tenn. 1995)). Intent is determined “from the natural and ordinary meaning of the statutory language
within the context of the entire statute without any forced or subtle construction that would extend
or limit the statute’s meaning.” State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn. 2000). If the
statute’s language is clear, we must apply its plain meaning without a forced interpretation. Mooney
v. Sneed, 30 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tenn. 2000).
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) permits an injured worker whose workers’
compensation benefits are capped by section 50-6-241(a)(1) to seek an enlargement of the award
when the employee is no longer employed by the pre-injury employer. Section 50-6-241(a)(2)
provides in pertinent part:
[For injuries occurring before July 1, 2004], the courts may reconsider, upon the
filing of a new cause of action, the issue of industrial disability. Such reconsideration
shall examine all pertinent factors, including lay and expert testimony, employee’s
age, education, skills and training, local job opportunities, and capacity to work at
types of employment available in claimant's disabled condition. Such reconsideration
may be made in appropriate cases where the employee is no longer employed by the
pre-injury employer and makes application to the appropriate court within one (1)
year of the employee’s loss of employment . . . .
The plain language of the statute indicates that injured workers who lose their jobs within the
relevant time frame may obtain reconsideration of a workers’ compensation award. Notably, the
language of the statute contains no qualifying language, exceptions, or exclusions. See, e.g., Niziol
v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 8 S.W.3d 622, 624 (Tenn. 1999) (noting that the language of
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) “do[es] not require a plaintiff to prove that the
injury [for which reconsideration is sought] was related to the loss of employment”). Moreover, we
give the Workers’ Compensation Law a remedial, equitable construction in favor of injured workers.
Long v. Mid-Tenn. Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 160 S.W.3d 504, 510 (Tenn. 2005).
In Brewer v. Lincoln Brass Works, Inc., this Court stated that a petition to enlarge a prior
award under Tennessee Code Annotated 50-6-241(a)(2) “is not the appropriate vehicle to use when
a worker sustains additional injuries or additional anatomical impairment.” 991 S.W.2d 226, 229
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(Tenn. 1999). The Second Injury Fund asserts that reconsideration of a prior award is inappropriate
under Brewer whenever an employee has sustained subsequent work-related injuries for which he
seeks benefits. We disagree.
In Brewer, the employee received a workers’ compensation award of 37.5% to the body as
a whole for a back injury. The award was paid in a lump sum. The employee returned to work, but
he later aggravated his back injury, resulting in increased anatomical impairment. The employee
filed a petition for reconsideration pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2)
seeking to enlarge his award. This Court held that section 50-6-241(a)(2) “is not applicable when
there is either a subsequent injury or an aggravation of the original injury which increases a worker’s
anatomical disability.” Brewer, 991 S.W.2d at 227. We further explained that if the worker
“sustains additional impairment, whether caused by a subsequent work-related injury or work-related
aggravation injury or aggravation of the original injury, the worker must file a new claim for
workers’ compensation rather than attempting to enlarge the previous award under § 241(a)(2).” Id.
at 229. Thus, we concluded that the employee’s claim should have been filed as a new and separate
action because he re-injured his back and suffered additional anatomical impairment. The employee
could not recover benefits for a new injury by re-opening a prior award.
Our opinion in Brewer should not be read to preclude a lawsuit seeking reconsideration of
a prior award pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2) simply because the
employee has suffered new work-related injuries and has filed a separate lawsuit seeking
compensation for the new injuries. A worker does not forfeit his right to reconsideration simply
because he is unlucky enough to have a subsequent work-related injury. See, e.g., Hayes v. First
Source Furniture Group, No. W2004-00742-WC-R3-CV, 2005 WL 914380 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp.
Panel April 21, 2005) (affirming an enlarged award and an award for a new injury). Adopting a
contrary rule would be inconsistent with both the principles of statutory construction and the
remedial nature of the Workers’ Compensation Law. For instance, adopting the Second Injury
Fund’s construction of Brewer would bar reconsideration of a back injury merely because the worker
subsequently injured a finger. The unfairness of such a result is untenable and finds no support in
the language of section 50-6-241(a)(2) or, for that matter, common sense. Accordingly, Brewer
stands only for the proposition that an employee may not recover for a new injury by seeking to
enlarge a prior award. Instead, a new lawsuit must be filed.
In the present case, Clark filed a separate suit for the Third Injury alleging new work-related
injuries. Unlike the employee in Brewer, Clark is not attempting to recover for the Third Injury by
seeking a reconsideration of the Second Injury under section 50-6-241(a)(2). Rather, Clark’s lawsuit
for his Third Injury stands on its own. He seeks reconsideration of the award for the Second Injury
based upon his original impairment rating for the Second Injury but without regard to the multiplier
that originally limited his award. Under Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(a)(2), an
employee may seek reconsideration of a prior award when he is no longer employed by his pre-injury
employer. We hold that Clark properly filed his claim for reconsideration of the Second Injury and
that Brewer does not bar Clark’s claim.
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III. CONCLUSION
We hold that reconsideration of a prior award under Tennessee Code Annotated section
50-6-241(a)(2) is not precluded by a subsequent work-related injury for which the employee seeks
compensation. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment and remand this case for proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Costs are taxed to the appellant, the Second Injury Fund.
___________________________________
JANICE M. HOLDER, JUSTICE
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