FAIRFAX COUNTY REDEVELOPMENT v. Riekse

PRESENT:   Kinser, C.J., Lemons, Goodwyn, Millette, and Mims,
           JJ., and Koontz, S.J. *

FAIRFAX COUNTY REDEVELOPMENT
AND HOUSING AUTHORITY
                                             OPINION BY
v.   Record No. 092486                 JUSTICE WILLIAM C. MIMS
                                            March 4, 2011
JAMES C. RIEKSE, ET AL.

                FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
                         Dennis J. Smith, Judge

     In this appeal, we consider whether the Fairfax County

Redevelopment and Housing Authority (“Fairfax”) may enforce a

right of first refusal to repurchase a parcel of real property

by demanding specific performance by the current owner’s

predecessor in title.

           I.    BACKGROUND AND MATERIAL PROCEEDINGS BELOW

     In 1989, Fairfax granted and conveyed a parcel of real

property to Peter and Christine Tovar as tenants by the

entirety subject to certain conditions.     Among those

conditions, Fairfax reserved a right of first refusal to

repurchase the property (“the ROFR”).     The ROFR provided that

     [i]n the event that Grantee shall die (both of
     them if more than one is named as Grantee), or
     in the event the Grantee shall determine to sell
     this Property at any time within thirty (30)
     years from the date of this Deed, then and in
     either event, the said Grantor, its successors
     or assigns, shall have the option to repurchase

     *
       Justice Koontz presided and participated in the hearing
and decision of this case prior to the effective date of his
retirement on February 1, 2011; Justice Kinser was sworn in as
Chief Justice on February 1, 2011.
        the Property at the original sales price of
        $74,640[, adjusted for inflation].

The deed further provided that the ROFR was to be a “covenant[]

running with the land, the burden of which covenant[ is]

assumed by Grantee as evidenced by Grantees[’] signatures

hereon and by any subsequent successor in title as provided

herein.”

        The Tovars contemporaneously executed two deeds of trust

to secure the indebtedness they incurred to purchase the

parcel.    In 1995, the Tovars satisfied the indebtedness secured

by those two deeds of trust and executed a third deed of trust

to secure an indebtedness of $92,400.    In 1997, the Tovars

separated and Peter Tovar conveyed his entire interest in the

parcel to Christine Tovar.    The indebtedness secured by the

third deed of trust subsequently was defaulted and the

substitute trustees under that deed of trust sold the parcel at

a foreclosure auction to Rajinder and Rajesh Kapani in November

2002.    The Kapanis conveyed the parcel to James Riekse in May

2003.    Riekse executed a deed of trust to secure an

indebtedness of $213,200.

        In September 2007, Fairfax filed a complaint in the

circuit court against the Kapanis, Riekse, and trustees under

Riekse’s deed of trust alleging that the Kapanis had violated

the ROFR as a covenant running with the land and as a condition



                                  2
subsequent. 1     Fairfax asked the court to restore title to the

Kapanis by declaring Riekse’s deed void ab initio, to declare

the parcel unencumbered by Riekse’s deed of trust, and to order

the Kapanis to convey the parcel to Fairfax under the terms of

the ROFR.

        The Kapanis filed a demurrer asserting that the ROFR had

not been triggered because the express language in the Tovars’

deed stated that Fairfax had the option to repurchase the

parcel “[i]n the event that Grantee shall die . . . or in the

event the Grantee shall determine to sell,” and the Tovars had

neither died nor determined to sell the parcel.      Riekse later

joined the Kapanis’ demurrer, asserting that the ROFR was not a

covenant running with the land because it did not “touch and

concern” the land, that the ROFR was enforceable only as a

condition subsequent, and that the 10-year statute of

limitations set forth in Code § 8.01-255.1 had expired.

        The circuit court found that the ROFR did touch and

concern the land and thus was a valid covenant running with the

land.       It also found that it could not determine on demurrer

whether Fairfax’s claims were time-barred because it could not

determine as a matter of law when the ROFR initially had been

breached.      Accordingly, the court overruled the demurrer.

        1
       Additional claims in Fairfax’s complaint were either
abandoned or dismissed on demurrer and are not before us in
this appeal.


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     The case proceeded to a bench trial.       At the conclusion of

Fairfax’s evidence Riekse moved to strike asserting that

Fairfax was not entitled to the relief sought, a declaration

that his deed was void ab initio.      The circuit court ruled that

Riekse’s deed was not void ab initio and consequently Fairfax

was unable as a matter of law to “get the relief it requests

under the Complaint with the case in the posture that it’s in.”

Rather, the court ruled that Fairfax’s remedy was to enforce

the ROFR as a condition subsequent by filing an action of

ejectment to effect a re-entry.       Accordingly, the court granted

Riekse’s motion to strike and dismissed the case.

     Upon Fairfax’s motion for reconsideration, the circuit

court reiterated that Riekse’s deed was not void ab initio and

that it therefore could not order the Kapanis to perform the

ROFR because they no longer held title to the parcel.

Consequently, the court denied the motion.      We awarded Fairfax

this appeal.

                          II. ANALYSIS

     Fairfax assigns error to the circuit court’s holdings that

it could not declare Riekse’s deed void ab initio and that

Fairfax may enforce the ROFR only as a condition subsequent by

filing an action of ejectment.    The challenged rulings arise

from the circuit court’s interpretation of the Tovars’ deed,




                                  4
which we review de novo.     Beeren & Barry Invs., LLC v. AHC,

Inc., 277 Va. 32, 37, 671 S.E.2d 147, 150 (2009).

                  A.   THE VALIDITY OF RIEKSE’S DEED

        Fairfax argues that the ROFR divested the Kapanis of the

power to sell the parcel without first offering it to Fairfax.

Accordingly, the deed conveying the parcel to Riekse is void ab

initio.    However, the cases Fairfax cites do not support this

proposition.

        The primary case upon which Fairfax relies is Bond v.

Crawford, 193 Va. 437, 69 S.E.2d 470 (1952).     There, the

Crawfords contracted to sell a parcel to the Bonds but instead

sold to the Londons.     The Londons had actual knowledge of the

Bonds’ contract prior to their purchase.      Id. at 443, 69 S.E.2d

at 474.    The Bonds asked the circuit court to declare the

Londons’ deed void ab initio and to order the Crawfords to

perform the Bonds’ purchase contract.     This Court determined

that the relief was appropriate, citing Thompson v. Thompson,

171 Va. 361, 198 S.E. 897 (1938).

        In Thompson, the Court ruled that collusion between a

grantor and a grantee to convey property to allow the grantor

to escape performance of a contract rendered the resulting deed

void.     Id. at 370, 198 S.E. at 900.   The Court held that

        [w]here a conveyance is made in order to put it
        out of the power of the grantor to fulfill a
        contract previously entered into with the


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        knowledge or concurrence of the grantee, the
        transaction will be declared null and void, and,
        if the proper parties are before the court, a
        decree will be rendered compelling a conveyance
        to the party rightfully entitled.

Id. at 371, 198 S.E. at 901 (quoting Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law 40

(2nd ed.)).

        Fairfax concedes that Riekse did not collude with the

Kapanis to avoid their performance of the ROFR and that he did

not even have actual knowledge that the ROFR existed.       Rather,

Fairfax contends only that Riekse had constructive knowledge of

the ROFR because it was contained in the Tovars’ deed, which

had been properly recorded.    Consequently, Bond and Thompson

are distinguishable and the extraordinary relief of declaring

an executed deed void ab initio is not appropriate in this

case.

        Fairfax also cites cases where conveyances by trustees

under deeds of trusts were declared void ab initio. 2      They are

distinguishable as well because they are predicated on the

well-settled rule that



        2
       Specifically, Fairfax cites Preston v. Johnson, 105 Va.
238, 53 S.E. 1 (1906), Smith v. Woodward, 122 Va. 356, 94 S.E.
916 (1918), Tabet v. Goodman, 136 Va. 526, 118 S.E. 230 (1923),
Dickerson v. McNulty, 142 Va. 559, 129 S.E. 242 (1925),
Everette v. Woodward, 162 Va. 419, 174 S.E. 864 (1934), Wills
v. Chesapeake Western Ry. Co., 178 Va. 314, 16 S.E.2d 649
(1941), Turk v. Clark, 193 Va. 744, 71 S.E.2d 172 (1952), First
Funding Corp. v. Birge, 220 Va. 326, 257 S.E.2d 861 (1979), and
Business Bank v. Beavers, 247 Va. 413, 442 S.E.2d 644 (1994).


                                  6
     a trustee in a deed of trust can only do with
     the trust property what the deed either in
     express terms or by necessary implication
     authorizes him to do. In other words, the powers
     of the person foreclosing under a mortgage or
     deed of trust are limited and defined by the
     instrument under which he acts, and he has only
     such authority as is thus expressly conferred
     upon him, together with incidental and implied
     powers that are necessarily included therein.
     Accordingly, the trustee or mortgagee must see
     that in all material matters he keeps within his
     powers, and must execute the trust in strict
     compliance therewith.

Schmidt & Wilson, Inc. v. Carneal, 164 Va. 412, 415, 180 S.E.

325, 326 (1935). 3

     That line of cases is inapplicable here because the

Kapanis were not trustees under a deed of trust.    Rather, they

were owners of a fee simple estate, though the fee was

defeasible rather than absolute, and they had all necessary

power to convey the whole estate of which they were themselves

seised at the time of their conveyance.     Consequently, the

circuit court did not err when it refused to declare Riekse’s

deed void ab initio.

                     B.   ENFORCEMENT OF THE ROFR




     3
       Moreover, many of these cases declare the deed following
a trustees’ sale void because the trustee had not advertised
the sale, a requirement imposed by statute. Code § 55-59.1
(requiring notice to owner prior to sale); Former Code § 55-
59(6) (Supp. 1978) (same); Former Code § 5167 (1919); Former
Code § 2442 (1887).


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       Fairfax also argues that the circuit court erred in ruling

that it could only enforce the ROFR as a condition subsequent

by filing an action of ejectment.      We disagree.

       Fairfax cites Landa v. Century 21 Simmons & Co., Inc., 237

Va. 374, 377 S.E.2d 416 (1989), and Commonwealth Transportation

Commissioner v. Windsor Industries, Inc., 272 Va. 64, 630

S.E.2d 514 (2006).   In Landa, an executor, Peterson, was

selling a parcel of land, a portion of which was subject to the

Landas’ right of first refusal.       After learning that the estate

had received an offer from another purchaser, the Landas made

their own offer but Peterson nevertheless contracted to sell to

the other purchaser.   The Landas and the other purchaser both

commenced lawsuits against the various parties and this Court

held that the circuit court was required to order Peterson and

the estate’s realty company to perform under the Landas’ right

of first refusal.    Id. at 380-84, 377 S.E.2d at 419-22.

       In Windsor, the Commonwealth acquired a parcel of land

from 1314 West Main Corporation in 1977 in anticipation of

building a state highway (Route 288).      However, the parcel was

never used and, in 2004, VDOT proposed to sell it by sealed

bid.   Windsor, 1314 West Main Corporation’s successor in

interest, sued to compel the Commonwealth to convey the parcel

to it.   The circuit court determined that Code § 33.1-90(B)

required that any parcel acquired by the Commonwealth in


                                  8
anticipation for use in a highway project be offered to its

prior owner if not so used.     We affirmed, ruling that the

statute created a right of re-entry in the prior owner, and

ordered the Commonwealth to convey the parcel to Windsor.

     Both Landa and Windsor are distinguishable from this case

because the parties against whom specific performance was

sought retained title to the parcel.    Here, Fairfax has sought

specific performance by the Kapanis, who no longer hold title

to the parcel.   Accordingly, the circuit court’s determination

that it could not order the Kapanis to perform because it was

impossible for them to offer the parcel to Fairfax was correct.

Cangiano v. LSH Bldg. Co., 271 Va. 171, 180, 623 S.E.2d 889,

895 (2006); Shepherd v. Colton, 237 Va. 537, 541, 378 S.E.2d

828, 830 (1989); Fishburne v. Ferguson, 85 Va. 321, 328, 7 S.E.

361, 364-65 (1888).

                         III.    CONCLUSION

     For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the

judgment of the circuit court. 4

                                                          Affirmed.




     4
       Because we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court,
we do not reach Riekse’s assignments of cross-error challenging
its decision to overrule the demurrer regarding the validity of
the ROFR as a covenant running with the land.


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