IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
September 8, 2005 Session
PHYLLIS A. YOUNG v. TAYLOR-WHITE, LLC
Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Cocke County
No. 28,021-II Richard R. Vance, Judge
No. E2004-00788-SC-R3-CV - Filed October 20, 2005
We granted review in this workers’ compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in
awarding benefits to an employee injured while attending an employer-sponsored company picnic.
After reviewing the evidence and applicable authority, we conclude that the employee’s injury did
not occur in the course of her employment and therefore is not compensable under the workers’
compensation law. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e); Judgment of the Trial Court Reversed
E. RILEY ANDERSON , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, C.J., and
ADOLPHO A. BIRCH , JR. and JANICE M. HOLDER , JJ., joined.
Daniel R. Goodge, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Taylor-White, LLC.
Terry E. Hurst and Brad L. Davidson, Newport, Tennessee, for the Appellee, Phyllis A. Young.
OPINION
Phyllis A. Young (“Young”) filed a complaint against her employer, Taylor-White, LLC
(“Taylor-White”), alleging that she suffered a compensable injury to her shoulder on September 14,
2002, at a company-sponsored picnic. Taylor-White denied that the injury was compensable because
it did not arise out of and in the course of employment. At trial, the parties agreed that the only issue
before the court was whether Young’s injury of September 14, 2002 was compensable.
Background
The pertinent facts as developed at trial are undisputed. Young went to work for Taylor-White
in 1999 making television sets and was fifty-four years old at the time of trial.
On September 14, 2002, Taylor-White sponsored a company picnic. The picnic was held on
a Saturday, outside of work hours, at a public park off of the company’s premises. Young and other
employees were informed of the picnic by signs on the Taylor-White plant’s bulletin boards and by
word-of-mouth from one of the supervisors.
Young testified that she attended the picnic with her friend, Sarah Bales (“Bales”), also a
Taylor-White employee, and participated in a number of games. These included a hula-hoop contest,
a balloon toss, and a three-legged race. The three-legged races were organized in heats, with the
winners of each heat advancing. Young and Bales had won two races and were competing in a third
when Young stepped on something and fell, injuring her shoulder. After she fell, Jack Lester, a
member of Taylor-White management, came to see what had happened and told Young’s sister-in-law
to take her to the hospital.
Eddie Cooper (“Cooper”) testified that he was a Human Resources Specialist at Taylor-White
and that his duties included helping to organize the annual picnic. Taylor-White hired an
entertainment company called Funville to organize the picnic. A Funville D.J. played music and
organized a number of games at the picnic, including the three-legged race. Prizes were offered to
the winners of some of the games, including a $50.00 prize to be split between the two winners of the
three-legged race. Taylor-White also gave door prizes to attendees. Taylor-White usually spent
between $17,000 and $19,000 on the picnic.
Cooper explained that Taylor-White required employees to sign up for the picnic in advance
so that the company could get an attendance count for purchasing food. Upon arrival at the picnic,
employees had to check in and received an arm band to wear during the picnic. Neither employees
nor management were required to attend the picnic. There were no adverse consequences if an
employee signed up but did not attend the picnic, and no one was paid for attending. Cooper said that
he did not attend the picnic one year and that there were no consequences for his failure to attend.
Young conceded that she was not required to attend the picnic and was not required to
participate in any games at the picnic. She said that the announcer had particularly encouraged her
and Bales to participate, referring to them as “Laverne and Shirley,” and she felt that the announcer
“kept insisting” that she participate in the games. She said, however, that her Taylor-White
supervisors did not require her to participate, and she understood that the picnic was a benefit Taylor-
White provided to show its appreciation to its employees.
Sarah Bales testified that she did not feel that Taylor-White or her supervisor expected her to
attend the picnic or required her to participate in any games. Bales had worked at Taylor-White for
five and a half years and had attended the picnic every year but one. She said that there were not any
consequences for her failure to attend the picnic that year.
Following her shoulder injury, Young was off work for four months. She then returned to
work at Taylor-White, but continued to have difficulty with her shoulder. She began seeing Dr.
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Stephan Ponder, who told her that she “was keeping it aggravated.” Dr. Ponder recommended
surgery, and Young underwent surgery on December 17, 2003.
After hearing the testimony of only three witnesses, Young, Bales, and Cooper, the trial court
held that the injury was compensable. The trial court reasoned that although Taylor-White did not
officially require Young or any other employee to attend the picnic, she was encouraged to participate
in the race both by the verbal inducement of the Funville announcer and by the offer of the $50.00
prize for first place. The trial court noted that Taylor-White paid for the picnic as it had for several
years; that it promoted the picnic; and that the company approved of the games and activities offered
by Funville at the picnic.
Taylor-White appealed. We accepted review before the case was heard or considered by the
Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel.
Analysis
Our standard of review of factual issues in a workers’ compensation case is de novo upon the
record of the trial court, accompanied by a presumption of correctness of the trial court’s factual
findings, unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(2)
(2005); see also Blankenship v. Am. Ordnance Sys., LLS, 164 S.W.3d 350, 353 (Tenn. 2005). Our
standard of review of questions of law is de novo without a presumption of correctness. Perrin v.
Gaylord Entm’t Co., 120 S.W.3d 823, 826 (Tenn. 2003).
To be compensable under the workers’ compensation law, an injury must “aris[e] out of and
in the course of employment.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13) (2005). “In Tennessee, as in most
jurisdictions, the statutory requirements that the injury arise out of and occur in the course of the
employment are not synonymous, although both elements exist to ensure a work connection to the
injury for which the employee seeks benefits.” Blankenship, 164 S.W.3d at 354 (citing Sandlin v.
Gentry, 300 S.W.2d 897, 901 (Tenn. 1957)).
An injury arises out of the employment when “there is a causal connection between the
conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury.” Blankenship,
164 S.W.3d at 354 (citing Fritts v. Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp., 163 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tenn. 2005)). An
injury occurs in the course of employment if “it takes place within the period of the employment, at
a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while the employee is fulfilling work duties or
engaged in doing something incidental thereto.” Blankenship, 164 S.W.3d at 354 (quotation and
citation omitted). The issue in this case is whether Young’s injury occurred during the course of her
employment with Taylor-White.
The requirements that an injury arise out of and occur in the course of employment exist to
ensure that there is a rational relationship between the employment and the activity in which the
employee was engaged when the injury occurred. See, e.g., id. Therefore, the fact that an injury
occurs at an employer-sponsored event, or even on the employer’s premises or during normal work
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hours, is not determinative of whether it occurred during the course of the employment. This is
particularly so when participation in the activity causing the injury is not required by the employer.
For example, in Blankenship, the employee sustained a back injury while performing a voluntary
strength test on the employer’s premises. The employer paid for the test and administered it to
employees who were interested in applying for different jobs within the employer’s plant. We held
that the injury did not occur in the course of the employment because the evidence established that
taking the test was strictly voluntary; there was “no element of compulsion on the employer’s part.”
Id. at 355 (internal quotation omitted); see also Ward v. Mid-South Home Serv., 769 S.W.2d 486,
487-88 (Tenn. 1989) (holding that construction worker’s knee injury did not occur in the course of
employment where it was sustained during an impromptu basketball game during work break at job
site).
We recognize, however, that when an employee acts at the request of his or her employer, the
activity may occur in the course of the employment even though the activity is outside the scope of
the employee’s normal duties or occurs off of the job site. Under some circumstances, the course of
employment extends beyond the normal bounds of work; injuries causally connected to such extended
job circumstances necessarily arise from the employment as well. For example, in McCann v.
Hatchett, 19 S.W.3d 218 (Tenn. 2000), we adopted the rule that traveling employees remain in the
course of their employment throughout the duration of their trip, unless “there is a distinct departure
on a personal errand.” 19 S.W.3d at 221. In McCann, we reversed the grant of summary judgment
to the employer where the employee drowned in a motel pool while on a business trip for the
employer. We held that “[b]ecause an employee who travels on the business of the employer is
considered to be within the course of his or her employment continuously during the trip, reasonable
recreational activities properly undertaken by the employee during the trip are rationally connected
to the work.” Id. at 222.
Put another way, because the employee serves at the pleasure of the employer, when the
employee is engaged in an activity required by or at the direction of the employer, the employer’s
compulsion brings the activity within the course of the employment. The injury arises out of the
employment if the injury is causally related to the activity required by the employer, even if that
activity bears no relationship to the employee’s normal work duties.
The trial court resolved this case by applying a test formulated by Professor Larson addressing
recreational injuries as a particular class of work-related injuries.
The so-called “Larson test” provides that:
Recreational or social activities are within the course of employment
when
(1) they occur on the premises during a lunch or recreational period as
a regular incident of the employment; or
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(2) the employer, by expressly or impliedly requiring participation, or
by making the activity part of the services of the employee, brings the
activity within the orbit of the employment; or
(3) the employer derives substantial direct benefit from the activity
beyond the intangible value of improvement in employee health and
morale that is common to all kinds of recreation and social life.
2 Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 22.01 (2001).
Although never explicitly approved by this Court, two Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panels have applied the Larson test in resolving cases involving recreational injuries. Segars
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 1996 WL 164453, *3 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel 1996) (holding injury
sustained by employee while playing volleyball at company picnic was compensable where employee
testified that his employer told him he expected to see him there and requested three times that he play
volleyball); see also Tucker v. Acme Boot Co., Inc., 856 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp.
Panel 1993) (holding employee’s injury sustained while playing softball on company team was not
compensable).
In light of the principles discussed above, we decline to adopt the Larson test as a rule for
resolving all cases involving recreational injuries. In our view, the voluntary nature of the activity,
rather than the fact that the activity occurs on the employer’s premises or provided a benefit to the
employer, is the touchstone for determining whether the injury occurred during the course of
employment.
The trial court and the parties correctly identified the issue in this case as whether Young’s
participation in the three-legged race at the picnic was voluntary or was impliedly required as part of
her employment. The trial court, relying heavily on Segars, held that Young’s participation was not
voluntary, because she testified that the D.J. encouraged her to participate in the race. The trial court
also reasoned that the $50.00 first prize, to be split between the two winners, was an inducement by
Taylor-White to participate in the race.
Although the D.J. did encourage Young to participate in the race, neither mere encouragement
nor the offer of a nominal cash prize is enough to transform what would otherwise be a voluntary
activity into one within the course of employment. Young testified that she chose to attend the picnic
and chose to participate in the race and that she did not feel compelled to do so. She testified that she
understood that she was not required to participate in the picnic or the race; that attendance at the
picnic and participation in the events was voluntary; and that there would be no employment
consequences for declining to participate. Young’s co-worker and friend, Bales, as well as Human
Resources Specialist Cooper, also testified that attendance at the picnic was voluntary. The
preponderance of the evidence therefore does not support the trial court’s holding that Young’s
participation in the race was involuntary. To the contrary, the preponderance of the evidence shows
that it was voluntary. Therefore, although Young’s injury certainly arose out of her participation in
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the three-legged race, because the race was not within the course of her employment, the injury is not
compensable.
Conclusion
After considering the applicable authority and the arguments of the parties, we reverse the
judgment of the trial court awarding benefits to Young. We hold that the injury to her shoulder did
not occur in the course of her employment with Taylor-White. Costs of the appeal shall be assessed
to the appellee, Phyllis A. Young.
___________________________________
E. RILEY ANDERSON, JUSTICE
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