PRESENT: All the Justices
RUSSELL MAURICE JONES
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 090979 JUSTICE LEROY F. MILLETTE, JR.
February 25, 2010
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
In this appeal, we consider whether off-duty law
enforcement officers, privately employed by an apartment complex
to protect its property from trespassers, unlawfully seized a
defendant in violation of the Fourth Amendment, when the
defendant complied with the officers’ request to accompany them
to the rental office to issue a notice barring the defendant
from the property.
BACKGROUND
The material facts are largely undisputed. Deputy Jeffrey
Feighner and Deputy Tom Mannes of the Richmond City Sheriff’s
Office were employed as off-duty private security guards for an
apartment complex, “hired to identify people who come on to the
property, and determine if they are residents and are able to be
on the property.”
Both deputies were wearing dark brown pants and a short
sleeve khaki brown polo shirt with an embroidered Sheriff’s
badge over the left breast. “Richmond Sheriff’s Office” was
written around the badge, and “Sheriff’s Office” appeared across
the back of the shirt. The deputies had their firearms
holstered on their hips.
At approximately 2:15 a.m., the deputies observed a sedan
pull into the apartment complex and park in front of an
apartment building. Russell Maurice Jones got out from the
driver’s side and headed toward the building. Shortly
thereafter, Jones returned to the sedan, opened the trunk and
looked through it for 20 to 30 seconds, then headed back to the
same apartment building. Deputy Feighner had not previously
encountered Jones and approached him “to see the reason for him
being on the property.”
When Deputy Feighner asked Jones for identification, Jones
replied that he did not have identification, but provided Deputy
Feighner with his name, date of birth, and social security
number. When Deputy Feighner asked Jones his reason for being
on the property, Jones “stated that [his] baby daughter was sick
and it was an emergency.” When Deputy Feighner asked Jones what
apartment they were staying in, Jones pointed in the general
direction of the building, but could not provide a building or
apartment number. Deputy Feighner did not testify as to any
objection by Jones when he was asked “if it would be okay to pat
him down [for weapons].” No weapons or anything illegal was
recovered and the deputies did not search the car Jones had been
driving.
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Deputy Feighner testified that he asked Jones to go to the
rental office with them “to bar him from the property, fill out
the paperwork.” When asked whether he ordered Jones to come
with him to fill out the paperwork, Deputy Feighner responded,
“No. He was cooperative.” According to Deputy Feighner, Jones
did not give him any “indication physically” that Jones did not
want to go with him, and Jones “did voluntarily come to the
rental office.” However, Deputy Feighner testified that “if
[Jones] was to try to leave the scene, we would have detained
him.”
At the rental office, while Deputy Mannes began processing
paperwork for the letter barring trespass, Deputy Feighner
contacted the Richmond Sheriff’s jail annex to check if Jones
had any warrants out for his arrest and also to check Jones’
driver’s transcript. Deputy Feighner learned that Jones did not
have any outstanding warrants, but his driver’s license was
revoked. Deputy Feighner testified that the Department of Motor
Vehicles check did not prolong their stay in the rental office
beyond what it would have been for Deputy Mannes to complete the
paperwork barring trespass. After Deputy Feighner learned that
Jones’ driver’s license was revoked, he handcuffed Jones and
placed him under arrest in the rental office. *
*
Deputy Feighner testified that they “took him into custody
at . . . 2:25 in the morning.”
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Jones was indicted for “Driving While an Habitual Offender
– Subsequent Offense,” in violation of Code § 46.2-357(B)(3).
Jones filed a motion to suppress any evidence resulting from
what he contended was an unlawful seizure, conducted without a
warrant and without reasonable articulable suspicion to believe
he had committed a crime.
The circuit court overruled Jones’ motion to suppress,
finding that Jones consented to go to the rental office, as
there was “no evidence of any coercion or overbearing [Jones’]
will in any way. [The deputies] said it took no time at all.
Very limited intrusion time-wise.” The circuit court also found
that “there w[ere] no guns drawn, no force involved, no coercion
in any way. [Jones] cooperated. The officers were engaged in
[a] private off-duty capacity, privately engaged person[s].”
Jones filed a motion for reconsideration. The circuit
court denied Jones’ motion to reconsider and held that
[Jones was] asked to accompany the officers
to the rental office, so that they could proceed
with checking the list of those barred and giv[e]
[him] a notice that [he was] barred from the
premises. That was all the action that they
intended to take. They didn’t just pat him down,
but they asked for permission to do that. . . .
It was ten minutes from the encounter to the
rental office, what they determined at the time,
which was a very brief stop.
The circuit court reiterated its conclusion that Jones was not
seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The circuit court
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also stated that, “[i]n this case, the Court doesn’t reach the
issue of the state action in this ruling.”
Jones entered a conditional guilty plea to the charge of
driving while an habitual offender – subsequent offense,
reserving his right to a review of the circuit court’s denial of
his motion to suppress. Code § 19.2-254. Jones appealed his
conviction to the Court of Appeals, which granted his petition,
heard oral argument, and affirmed his conviction in an
unpublished opinion. Jones v. Commonwealth, Record No. 0968-08-
2 (April 21, 2009). We awarded Jones this appeal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal to this Court, Jones assigns error to the circuit
court’s holding that state action was not involved when off-duty
deputies engaged in police business while wearing their uniforms
and displaying their badges of authority, and to the Court of
Appeals’ failure to address the issue of state action. Jones
also assigns error to the circuit court’s denial of his motion
to suppress, and to the Court of Appeals’ holding that the
encounter between Jones and the deputies was consensual.
Because we affirm the Court of Appeals’ determination that the
encounter was consensual, for purposes of this opinion, we
assume without deciding that there was state action. We
therefore will discuss only those arguments pertaining to
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whether Jones’ encounter with the deputies was consensual or an
illegal seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.
Jones argues that he was not free to leave from the moment
the deputies instructed him that he needed to accompany them to
the rental office to effect his barment from the property.
Jones contends that when the armed, uniformed law enforcement
officers indicated that they were going to bar him, then asked
him to come to the rental office to effectuate his barment, no
reasonable person in Jones’ position would have felt free to
leave. According to Jones, a reasonable person in that
situation would go along with the barment paperwork only because
he felt he had no choice. Therefore, Jones argues that since
the encounter was not consensual and was not supported by
reasonable suspicion, the officers’ seizure of Jones violated
the Fourth Amendment.
The Commonwealth argues that the circuit court’s factual
findings supporting a consensual encounter were not plainly
wrong or unsupported by the evidence. The Commonwealth
maintains that the record demonstrates “no application of force,
no intimidating movement, no overwhelming show of force, no
brandishing of weapons, no blocking of exits, no threat, no
command, not even an authoritative tone of voice.” United
States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 204 (2002). The Commonwealth
asserts that although the deputies were armed and wearing
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clothing identifying them as members of the Sheriff’s
Department, those facts did not transform the consensual
encounter into a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Thus,
according to the Commonwealth, Jones was not seized within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A defendant’s claim that
he or she has been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment
presents a mixed question of law and fact that is reviewed de
novo on appeal. Harris v. Commonwealth, 266 Va. 28, 32, 581
S.E.2d 206, 209 (2003); McCain v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483,
489, 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 (2001); Reittinger v. Commonwealth, 260
Va. 232, 236, 532 S.E.2d 25, 27 (2000).
We give deference to the circuit court’s factual findings
and inferences drawn from those facts, but independently
determine whether the manner in which the evidence was obtained
satisfies the Fourth Amendment. McCain, 261 Va. at 490, 545
S.E.2d at 545; Bolden v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 465, 470, 561
S.E.2d 701, 704 (2002); Bass v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 470, 475,
525 S.E.2d 921, 924 (2000).
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In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress
evidence claiming a violation of a person’s
Fourth Amendment rights, we consider the facts in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
prevailing party at trial. The burden is on the
defendant to show that the trial court committed
reversible error. We are bound by the trial
court’s factual findings unless those findings
are plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence.
. . . [A]n appellate court “should take care both
to review findings of historical fact only for
clear error and to give due weight to inferences
drawn from those facts by resident judges and
local law enforcement officers.”
Malbrough v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 163, 168-69, 655 S.E.2d 1, 3
(2008) (quoting Reittinger, 260 Va. at 236, 532 S.E.2d at 27).
However, we will review the trial court’s application of the law
de novo. Id.
The determination whether an encounter is consensual or is
an illegal seizure in violation of a defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights is not governed by a “litmus test,” and
requires consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the
encounter. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996); Florida
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991); Harris, 266 Va. at 32, 581
S.E.2d at 209. “So long as a reasonable person would feel free
‘to disregard the police and go about his business,’ the
encounter is consensual” and no reasonable suspicion is required
to justify the encounter. Dickerson v. Commonwealth, 266 Va.
14, 17, 581 S.E.2d 195, 197 (2003) (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at
434); Reittinger, 260 Va. at 236, 532 S.E.2d at 27. The
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“reasonable person” test is an objective test and presumes an
innocent person. Malbrough, 275 Va. at 169, 655 S.E.2d at 4.
Law enforcement officers may approach a citizen in public
places and engage in consensual encounters involving questioning
of the citizen, if the citizen is willing to listen, without
violating the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable
seizures. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 200. A consensual encounter is
not transformed into a seizure merely by the presence of police
officers who are in uniform and armed. Id. at 204-05;
Dickerson, 266 Va. at 18, 581 S.E.2d at 197. “The consensual
encounter becomes a seizure ‘[o]nly when the officer, by means
of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen.’ ” Malbrough, 275 Va. at
169, 655 S.E.2d at 4 (quoting Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434).
Courts have previously listed factors that are relevant in
determining whether a seizure has occurred, which include the
number of police officers present, the display of weapons by an
officer, physical contact between an officer and a citizen, an
officer’s language or tone of voice compelling compliance, the
retention of documents requested by an officer, and whether a
citizen was told that he or she was free to leave. Robinette,
519 U.S. at 36; Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504 (1983);
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980); Harris,
266 Va. at 32, 581 S.E.2d at 209. However, “what constitutes a
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restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he [or
she] is not free to ‘leave’ will vary, not only with the
particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting in
which the conduct occurs.” Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S.
567, 573 (1988).
The issue presented to the circuit court by Jones’ motion
to suppress was whether, when the deputies asked Jones to
accompany them to the rental office to effect his barment from
the property, the original consensual encounter became a
seizure, such that a reasonable person, under all the
surrounding circumstances, would not have felt free to disregard
the deputies and continue about his business.
The circuit court, in considering the testimony of the
witnesses appearing at the suppression hearing, assessed all of
the evidence. The circuit court determined whether, under all
of the circumstances, the encounter was transformed from
originally consensual to a seizure because a reasonable person
would believe he was not free to leave. The circuit court
concluded that the consensual encounter was not transformed into
a seizure by the deputies’ request.
In Mendenhall, the United States Supreme Court held that
the Fourth Amendment had not been violated when a woman went
with federal agents to the Drug Enforcement Administration
office since the woman had not been told that she had to go to
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the office, but had been simply asked if she would accompany the
agents, and there had been neither threats nor any show of
force. 446 U.S. at 557-58.
In this case, the deputies did not demand that Jones
accompany them to the rental office. Jones was merely asked if
he would accompany the deputies, and he was cooperative with
their request. There was no evidence that either deputy
brandished his weapon, physically touched Jones, used a tone of
voice, language or body language indicating that Jones was not
free to leave, or that compliance with their request to
accompany them to the rental office was compelled. There was no
evidence of repeated requests by the deputies. Although the
deputies did not affirmatively inform Jones that he was free to
leave, that fact alone is not sufficient to remove the
consensual nature of the encounter. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39-
40; Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555; Harris, 266 Va. at 33, 581
S.E.2d at 210. Additionally, the subjective intent of the
deputies that if Jones refused, they would have compelled him to
accompany them is not relevant for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)(explaining that
“[s]ubjective intentions” of investigating officers “play no
role in ordinary . . . Fourth Amendment analysis”).
The deputies, by asking Jones to accompany them to the
rental office, sought information regarding Jones’ identity and
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his authority to be on the property, consistent with their
purpose of enforcing the no trespassing policy of the apartment
complex. The notification process employed by the deputies was
required by their private employer and did not implicate
restraint of Jones’ liberty or the need to restrain. Dickerson,
266 Va. at 18, 581 S.E.2d at 197.
The circuit court determined that the encounter was “very
brief,” and its purpose was to check the barment list and give
Jones notice that he was barred from the property. The court’s
determination included a finding that no guns were drawn, that
there was no force or coercion in any way, and that Jones
cooperated. The circuit court, after analyzing all the
circumstances, observing the witnesses, and making factual
findings, concluded that the deputies’ actions did not
constitute a seizure. The record amply supports the circuit
court’s factual findings, and the evidence supports the circuit
court’s conclusion that the encounter between Jones and the
deputies was consensual.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Jones has failed to
carry his burden of showing that the circuit court’s findings of
fact were plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence, or that
the trial court committed reversible error. We find no error in
the application of the law by the circuit court or by the Court
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of Appeals. We will affirm the judgment of the Court of
Appeals.
Affirmed.
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