Present: All the Justices
SHEROD LAMONT JONES
v. Record No. 071986 OPINION BY JUSTICE CYNTHIA D. KINSER
June 6, 2008
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
At a bench trial in the Circuit Court of the City of
Richmond, Sherod Lamont Jones was convicted of maintaining
or operating a fortified drug house in violation of Code
§ 18.2-258.02. 1 The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed
his conviction in a per curiam order, Jones v.
Commonwealth, Record No. 3179-06-2 (June 6, 2007), and a
three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals denied Jones’
petition for appeal. Jones v. Commonwealth, Record No.
3179-06-2 (September 27, 2007). The issue on appeal to
this Court is whether the evidence was sufficient to
sustain Jones’ conviction.
The evidence at trial established that a search
warrant was obtained for a house in the City of Richmond
1
Jones was also convicted of possession of cocaine
with the intent to distribute, subsequent offense, in
violation of Code § 18.2-248(C), and possession of a
firearm while in possession of cocaine with the intent to
distribute, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.4(C). With
regard to the latter conviction, the conviction order and
sentencing order both incorrectly cite Code § 18.2-
308.2(C). Those convictions are not before us in this
appeal.
that was allegedly being used to distribute controlled
substances. As police officers approached the house to
execute the search warrant, Jones and another individual
moved a stove against the rear door of the house. They
also wedged a “2 x 4” board between the stove and a
stairway in the kitchen area of the house. The police
gained entry by using a breaching ram to open the door.
After doing so, the police observed a screwdriver shoved
into the latch of the demolished door.
Jones argues on appeal, as he did before the circuit
court and the Court of Appeals, that the Commonwealth
failed to prove that the house had been “substantially
altered from its original status” as required by Code
§ 18.2-258.02. Jones contends that, even if the use of the
stove and 2 x 4 board were for the purpose of impeding
lawful entry by a law enforcement officer, the placement of
those items did not substantially alter the house from its
original status. In response, the Commonwealth contends
that the original status of the house did not include a
door that was reinforced with a stove, a 2 x 4 board, and a
latch with a screwdriver inserted into it.
The statute at issue in this appeal, Code § 18.2-
258.02, provides:
2
Any office, store, shop, restaurant, dance hall,
theater, poolroom, clubhouse, storehouse,
warehouse, dwelling house, apartment or building
or structure of any kind which is (i)
substantially altered from its original status by
means of reinforcement with the intent to impede,
deter or delay lawful entry by a law-enforcement
officer into such structure, (ii) being used for
the purpose of manufacturing or distributing
controlled substances or marijuana, and (iii) the
object of a valid search warrant, shall be
considered a fortified drug house. Any person
who maintains or operates a fortified drug house
is guilty of a Class 5 felony.
When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of
evidence on appeal, we review the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party at trial and
consider all inferences fairly deducible from that
evidence. Perez v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 724, 728, 652
S.E.2d 95, 97 (2007); Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296,
299, 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005). We will not reverse the
judgment of the trial court unless it is plainly wrong or
without evidence to support it. Code § 8.01-680; Bolden v.
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 148, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008);
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 204, 590 S.E.2d 520,
535 (2004).
To decide whether the evidence was sufficient to
sustain Jones’ conviction for maintaining or operating a
fortified drug house, it is necessary to interpret the
meaning of the phrase “substantially altered from its
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original status” as set forth in Code § 18.2-258.02.
“Statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law
and is accordingly subject to de novo review by this
Court.” Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 634
S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006). In addition, “penal statutes must
be ‘strictly construed against the State’ and . . . such
statutes ‘cannot be extended by implication or
construction, or be made to embrace cases which are not
within their letter and spirit.’ ” Commonwealth, Dep’t of
Motor Vehicles v. Athey, 261 Va. 385, 388, 542 S.E.2d 764,
766 (2001) (quoting Berry v. City of Chesapeake, 209 Va.
525, 526, 165 S.E.2d 291, 292 (1969)). We determine the
General Assembly’s intent by the words used in a statute,
and when a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the
plain meaning of its language. Commonwealth v. Diaz, 266
Va. 260, 264-65, 585 S.E.2d 552, 554 (2003).
The statute at issue is not ambiguous. However, the
phrase “substantially altered from its original status” is
not defined. Thus, we give that phrase “ ‘its ordinary
meaning, given the context in which it is used.’ ” Sansom
v. Board of Supervisors, 257 Va. 589, 594-95, 514 S.E.2d
345, 349 (1999) (quoting Department of Taxation v. Orange-
Madison Coop. Farm Serv., 220 Va. 655, 658, 261 S.E.2d 532,
533-34 (1980)). “ ‘The context may be examined by
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considering the other language used in the statute.’ ”
Sansom, 257 Va. at 595, 514 S.E.2d at 349 (quoting City of
Virginia Beach v. Board of Supervisors, 246 Va. 233, 236-
37, 435 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1993)).
In the first sentence of Code § 18.2-258.02, the
General Assembly set forth the elements needed to
constitute a “fortified drug house.” Among other things,
it must be one of the specified edifices or a “building or
structure of any kind.” The structure’s original status
must be substantially altered by reinforcing it with the
intent to impede, deter, or delay lawful entry by police
officers.
It is without question that the stove and 2 X 4 board
wedged between the house’s rear door and a stairway, as
well as the screwdriver inserted into the door’s latch,
reinforced the door and impeded lawful entry by the police
officers who were executing a search warrant for the house.
However, those items as they were used in this case did not
substantially alter that structure from its original status
any more so than wedging a chair beneath the door’s handle
would have. 2 Indeed, testimony at trial indicated that the
2
The evidence also showed that several firearms were
found in the house during execution of the search warrant
and that individuals inside the house took shifts
protecting it. While such measures may fortify a house and
5
stove had been pushed in front of the door on numerous
occasions. A house’s original status is not substantially
altered by the temporary movement of personal property
within it.
Thus, we conclude that the evidence, when viewed in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was not
sufficient to sustain Jones’ conviction for maintaining or
operating a fortified drug house. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court does not set forth an all-
encompassing definition of the phrase “substantially
altered from its original status” but, instead, recognizes
that each case will turn upon its own peculiar facts.
For these reasons, we will reverse the judgment of the
Court of Appeals and dismiss the indictment.
Reversed and dismissed.
impede lawful entry by police officers, they also do not
fall within the ambit of Code § 18.2-258.02.
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