PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Keenan, Kinser, Lemons and Agee, JJ.,
and Stephenson and Lacy∗, S.JJ.
ARCHITECTURAL STONE, LLC, ET AL.
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 061797 SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.
September 14, 2007
WOLCOTT CENTER, LLC, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
Jerome James, Judge
The sole issue in this appeal is whether a district court's
ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment pursuant to
Code § 8.01-428 is an appealable order under Code § 16.1-106.
I
On October 20, 2005, the General District Court of the City
of Norfolk, in an unlawful detainer action, granted a default
judgment in favor of plaintiffs Wolcott Center, LLC, and Lana
Wolcott (collectively, Wolcott) and against defendants
Architectural Stone, LLC, and Tim Watson (collectively,
Architectural Stone). The judgment included a writ of
possession of the subject property pursuant to Code § 8.01-128
and monetary damages.
On April 5, 2006, Architectural Stone filed in the general
district court a motion to set aside the default judgment under
Code § 8.01-428. On April 14, 2006, the general district court
∗
Justice Lacy participated in the hearing and decision of
this case prior to the effective date of her retirement on
August 16, 2007.
denied the motion to set aside the default judgment.
Thereafter, Architectural Stone filed a timely appeal to the
Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk.
Wolcott moved the circuit court to dismiss the appeal,
arguing that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear
the appeal because the general district court's ruling was not
an appealable order. The circuit court granted Wolcott's motion
to dismiss, finding that it was without jurisdiction because the
general district court's ruling on the motion to set aside the
default judgment did not dispose of the merits of the unlawful
detainer action.
II
The statutory law governing civil appeals to circuit courts
from courts not of record is set forth in Code § 16.1-106, which
states, in relevant part, the following:
From any order entered or judgment rendered in a
court not of record in a civil case in which the
matter in controversy is of greater value than fifty
dollars, exclusive of interest, any attorney's fees
contracted for in the instrument, and costs, . . .
there shall be an appeal of right, if taken within ten
days after such order or judgment, to a court of
record.
We interpreted Code § 16.1-106 in Ragan v. Woodcroft
Village Apartments, 255 Va. 322, 497 S.E.2d 740 (1998), upon
facts similar to those in the present case. In Ragan, a
landlord brought an unlawful detainer action in a general
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district court and obtained a judgment granting him possession
of the subject property. The tenant did not appeal the judgment
to the circuit court. Instead, the tenant filed a motion for a
new trial, which the district court denied. Id. at 324-25, 497
S.E.2d at 741.
The tenant then appealed the denial of the motion for a new
trial to the circuit court. The circuit court assumed, without
deciding, that it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but
denied the motion for a new trial on the merits. Id. at 325,
497 S.E.2d at 741.
On appeal, we said that the phrase, "any order," in Code
§ 16.1-106 granted appellate jurisdiction to the circuit court
only over final orders and that "[a] final order or judgment is
one that disposes of the whole subject of the case and gives all
relief contemplated." Id. at 327, 497 S.E.2d at 743. We held
that the district court's denial of the motion for a new trial
was not a final order or judgment because it did not dispose of
the merits of the unlawful detainer action. Rather, "the final
judgment in the unlawful detainer proceeding was the judgment
awarding [the landlord] possession of the leased premises." Id.
Architectural Stone seeks to distinguish the present case
from Ragan. First, it contends that the phrase, "any order
entered," in Code § 16.1-106 includes the ruling by the general
district court to deny the motion to set aside the default
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judgment. That ruling, according to Architectural Stone, was an
appealable order from that court to the circuit court. This
same claim was made by the tenant in Ragan, and we rejected such
a broad interpretation of the statute. We said that "this
language provides for an appeal only from final orders or
judgments" and that "[a] final order or judgment is one that
disposes of the whole subject of the case and gives all relief
contemplated." Id. at 327, 497 S.E.2d at 743.
Second, Architectural Stone contends that an appeal of a
ruling on a motion to set aside a default judgment under Code
§ 8.01-428 is distinct from an appeal of a ruling on a motion
for a new trial under Code § 16.1-97.1. Code § 8.01-428(A)
provides, in part, the following:
Upon motion of the plaintiff or judgment debtor
and after reasonable notice to the opposite party, his
attorney of record or other agent, the court may set
aside a judgment by default or a decree pro confesso
upon the following grounds: (i) fraud on the court
[or] (ii) a void judgment.
Architectural Stone asserts that the issues of fraud on the
court and void judgments are "independent and distinct from the
underlying issues in the unlawful detainer action." Continuing,
Architectural Stone says that "[i]t is for this reason that a
General District Court's ruling pursuant to a Code § 8.01-428
[m]otion must be considered an appealable [o]rder." We do not
agree. Only final orders and judgments are appealable, and we
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reiterate that a final order in the present case is one that
disposes of the merits of the unlawful detainer action.
III
In the present case, the general district court's denial of
the motion to set aside the default judgment was not an order or
judgment that disposed of the merits of the unlawful detainer
action. Rather, the order that disposed of the merits of the
unlawful detainer action was the default judgment entered on
October 20, 2005, and that judgment was not appealed.
We hold, therefore, that the general district court's
ruling to deny the motion to set aside the default judgment is
not a final, appealable order or judgment. Accordingly, we will
affirm the circuit court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of
Architectural Stone's appeal from the general district court.
Affirmed.
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Architectural Stone, LLC v. Wolcott Center, LLC
Combined Opinion