Grandison v. Com.

PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Koontz, Kinser, Lemons and Agee,
JJ., and Stephenson, S.J.

TONY DONNELL GRANDISON
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 061296 SENIOR JUSTICE ROSCOE B. STEPHENSON, JR.
June 8, 2007
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

In this appeal, we determine whether a police officer

violated the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable

searches and seizures when the officer removed a folded one-

dollar bill from the defendant's pocket and unfolded it to

reveal drugs.

I

After a bench trial in the Circuit Court of the City of

Petersburg, Tony Donnell Grandison was convicted of possession

of cocaine, in violation of Code § 18.2-250. During the trial,

Grandison moved to suppress the evidence. The trial court

denied the motion, finding that the cocaine had been legally

seized under the "plain view doctrine." Thereafter, the trial

court sentenced Grandison to imprisonment for ten years, with

eight years suspended.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Grandison v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 314, 630 S.E.2d 358

(2006). We awarded Grandison this appeal.
 II

On November 25, 2003, about 4:56 a.m., Officer Matthew P.

Gilstrap of the Petersburg City Police Department was called to

assist another officer in a traffic stop of a vehicle that had

been reported stolen. The vehicle was stopped in a "high crime

area" of downtown Petersburg that was known for drug activity.

Officer Gilstrap approached the passenger side of the

vehicle and directed Grandison, the front seat passenger, to

step out of the vehicle. When Grandison exited the vehicle,

Officer Gilstrap immediately handcuffed Grandison because the

officer was concerned for his own safety considering the time

and circumstances of the detention. Officer Gilstrap then

conducted a pat-down search of Grandison's outer clothing for

weapons.

During the pat-down search, Officer Gilstrap felt a hard

object in the front watch pocket of Grandison's jeans. The

object was a cigarette lighter. When the officer looked down at

the lighter, he observed a piece of drinking straw and a folded

one-dollar bill protruding from the pocket.∗ The dollar bill was

protruding halfway out of the pocket and was folded in what

Officer Gilstrap recognized as an "apothecary fold." The

officer testified that, when he saw the bill's apothecary fold,

∗
The lighter and straw were not produced as evidence at
trial.

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he immediately recognized it as a way of packaging cocaine.

Thereupon, Officer Gilstrap pulled the folded bill out of

Grandison's pocket and opened it. Inside the bill, the officer

discovered a substance that, from a subsequent laboratory

analysis, proved to be cocaine.

Officer Gilstrap was familiar with the packaging and

storage of drugs from his training and experience as a police

officer. Consequently, the trial court qualified him as an

expert in the packaging of drugs. Officer Gilstrap stated that

an apothecary fold is a method commonly used to conceal and

carry contraband. He explained that an apothecary fold results

when a dollar bill "is folded three times lengthwise with the

material, whatever it is that you're trying to hide on the

inside, and then the two ends are folded over toward the

middle."

III

In Harris v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 146, 149, 400 S.E.2d

191, 193 (1991), we said the following:

The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States provides in part that "the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated." This inestimable
right of personal security belongs to all citizens,
whether they are in the comfort of their homes or on
the streets of our cities.

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 The Supreme Court, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968),

recognized that, in certain circumstances, a police officer may

conduct a limited search of a subject who has been detained but

not arrested. When a detention is not an arrest based upon

probable cause, the right of a police officer to search a

subject is limited to a search of the subject's outer clothing

"to discover weapons which might be used to assault [the

officer]." Id. at 30.

An officer who conducts a Terry pat-down search is

justified in removing an item from a subject's pocket if the

officer reasonably believes that the object might be a weapon.

Lansdown v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 204, 213, 308 S.E.2d 106, 112

(1983). Additionally, the removal of an item from a subject's

pocket is also justified if the officer can identify the object

as suspicious under the "plain feel" variation of the plain view

doctrine. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375-76 (1993);

see Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 568, 574, 570 S.E.2d 836,

839 (2002). However, an item may not be retrieved under the

plain view doctrine unless it is "immediately apparent" to the

officer that the item is evidence of a crime. Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971); Murphy, 264 Va. at 574, 570

S.E.2d at 839.

An accused's claim that evidence was seized in violation of

the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution presents

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a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo on

appeal. Murphy, 264 Va. at 573, 570 S.E.2d at 838; see Ornelas

v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 691, 699 (1996). The accused

has the burden of showing that the denial of his suppression

motion, when the evidence is considered in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, is reversible error. McCain v.

Commonwealth, 261 Va. 483, 490, 545 S.E.2d 541, 545 (2001).

IV

We find the facts in the present case to be strikingly

similar to those in Harris. In Harris, a police officer seized

and searched a film canister discovered on a subject's person

during a pat-down search for weapons. 241 Va. at 148, 400

S.E.2d at 192. The officer justified opening the canister based

upon his personal experience on "plain clothes assignments" and

"making arrests," which led him to conclude that the canister

contained drugs. Id. at 154, 400 S.E.2d at 196. In concluding

that the officer did not have probable cause to believe that the

canister contained contraband, we said,

It is true that [the officer] knew from his personal
experience of working "plain clothes assignments" and
"making arrests" that certain people kept their
narcotics and drugs in film canisters and "things of
that nature." However, law-abiding citizens, on a
daily basis, also use film canisters to store film,
which is a legitimate use.

Id.

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 We also find the facts in the present case somewhat

analogous to those in Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 620

S.E.2d 760 (2005). In Brown, the police found a subject who was

sleeping in a car in an alley in a high-crime area. The subject

had a hand-rolled cigarette in his possession. The arresting

officer, based upon his experience with hand-rolled cigarettes,

concluded that the cigarette contained narcotics. Id. at 417,

620 S.E.2d at 761. We held that the officer did not have

probable cause to arrest the subject, stating:

[F]or the last 25 years, [we have] consistently
declined to find that probable cause can be
established solely on the observation of material
which can be used for legitimate purposes, even though
the experience of an officer indicates that such
material is often used for illegitimate purposes. To
support a finding of probable cause, such observations
must be combined with some other circumstance
indicating criminal activity.

Id. at 420-21, 620 S.E.2d at 763.

In the present case, Grandison had legal currency in his

possession when Officer Gilstrap made a Terry pat-down search

for weapons. At that time, all that the officer saw was about

one-half of a folded dollar bill protruding from Grandison's

watch pocket. As with the canister in Harris and the hand-

rolled cigarette in Brown, the folded dollar bill was legal

material with a legitimate purpose, even though Officer

Gilstrap, based on his experience, knew that dollar bills folded

in a similar manner are often used as containers for drugs. No

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other circumstances indicated criminal activity. Consistent

with our holdings in Harris and Brown, we conclude that, in the

present case, Officer Gilstrap did not have probable cause to

retrieve the dollar bill from Grandison's possession.

V

We hold, therefore, that the trial court erred in refusing

to suppress the evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful

seizure and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the

trial court's judgment. Accordingly, we will reverse the

judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to the

Court of Appeals with directions to remand the case to the trial

court for a new trial if the Commonwealth be so advised.

Reversed and remanded.

JUSTICE AGEE, with whom JUSTICE KINSER and JUSTICE LEMONS join,
dissenting.

The majority opinion relies upon two prior decisions of

this Court, Harris v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 146, 400 S.E.2d 191

(1991) and Brown v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 414, 620 S.E.2d 760

(2005), to conclude Officer Gilstrap did not have probable cause

to seize Grandison’s dollar bill containing cocaine because “the

folded dollar bill was legal material with a legitimate

purpose.” Thus, the majority concludes the Court of Appeals

erred in affirming Grandison’s conviction for possession of

cocaine. In my view, neither Harris nor Brown is applicable to

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the case at bar, and the police officer’s search did not violate

the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches

and seizures. Accordingly, I would affirm Grandison’s

conviction.

Neither Harris nor Brown involved the distinctive

circumstance before us: the manipulation of an otherwise

“legitimate” object in such a way as to indicate illegitimate

usage and thus provide probable cause to the arresting officer

who views such a manipulated object in plain view. For purposes

of appeal, it is important to note that there is no issue the

dollar bill was found in plain view and was manipulated into an

“apothecary fold.” Grandison did not assign error to those

findings by the circuit court, and consequently those facts are

the law of the case. Trustees of Asbury United Methodist Church

v. Taylor & Parrish, Inc., 249 Va. 144, 154, 452 S.E.2d 847, 852

(1995) (where appellant “did not object or assign error to [the

circuit court’s] ruling, it . . . become[s] the law of the

case”).

Grandison’s dollar bill shaped in the unique apothecary

fold indicating drug packaging is dissimilar from the ordinary

film canister in Harris or the hand-rolled cigarette in Brown.

Neither the film canister nor the cigarette reflected an

intentional manipulation of an otherwise legitimate object into

an item that a trained police officer could identify as

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contraband on the basis of the manipulation. This is a critical

distinction that renders the majority’s reliance on Brown and

Harris inapplicable, particularly in view of other precedent

more directly on point.

The United States Supreme Court in Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.

730 (1983), upheld a conviction for heroin possession when

police, conducting a routine driver’s license checkpoint stop,

observed the defendant holding an opaque party balloon, knotted

one-half inch from the tip, between the two middle fingers of

his hand. Id. at 733. In upholding the conviction, the Supreme

Court considered testimony of the police officer that “balloons

tied in the manner of the one [in this case] were frequently

used to carry narcotics.” Id. at 743. The Supreme Court ruled

“the distinctive character of the balloon itself spoke volumes

as to its contents – particularly to the trained eye of the

officer.” Id. at 743. The balloon at issue in Texas was an

otherwise legitimate object which any citizen could possess.

However, because of the manipulation for an illegitimate use,

there was sufficient basis to form probable cause.

The Court of Appeals in Arnold v. Commonwealth, 17 Va. App.

313, 437 S.E.2d 235 (1993), similarly considered the

reasonableness of a search by a police officer who viewed the

defendant’s folded plastic shopping bag in plain view in the

back seat of a stopped vehicle. Id. at 315, 437 S.E.2d at 236.

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The officer testified based on his experience in retail security

that the manner in which the shopping bag was folded indicated

the bag had been intentionally lined with foil to prevent anti-

theft devices in stores from detecting tags on clothing. Id.

In affirming the defendant’s conviction for receiving stolen

property, the Court of Appeals concluded:

[a]lthough . . . the shopping bag in this case was of
the sort that law-abiding citizens put to legitimate
use on a daily basis, Officer Craig testified that the
manner in which the bag was folded led him to suspect,
based on his training and experience, that it was
lined with aluminum foil for use as a shoplifting aid.

Id. at 320, 437 S.E.2d at 239.

Arnold relied in part on the Court of Appeals’ earlier

decision in Carson v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 497, 404 S.E.2d

919 (1991), which upheld the conviction of a defendant for

possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and possession

of cocaine with intent to distribute, when the defendant was

observed in a vehicle at a toll booth with a “one-and-a-half to

two inch” cut straw on the seat between his legs. Id. at 498-

99, 404 S.E.2d at 920. The arresting officer knew that cut

straws often corresponded with cocaine usage, and the court

considered how the straw had been intentionally cut and

concluded that “[t]he uniqueness of the straw’s size

distinguishes it from straws one would usually encounter for

legitimate purposes.” Id. at 502, 404 S.E.2d at 922. This

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Court granted an appeal in Carson on several issues, including

the validity of the seizure of the straw, and we affirmed that

court’s ruling on the issue by expressly adopting “the reasons

articulated in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.” Carson v.

Commonwealth, 244 Va. 293, 294, 421 S.E.2d 415, 416 (1992).

Texas, Arnold and Carson all support the premise in a

Fourth Amendment context that an ordinarily lawful or legitimate

object, discovered in plain view during an otherwise lawful

seizure like a Terry stop, can be the basis of probable cause

where the object has been manipulated in a way so as to reflect

an illegitimate purpose. That factual predicate was simply

absent in Harris and Brown, as there was no evidence the

otherwise legitimate objects of a film canister and a cigarette

had been manipulated in any way. Thus, the film canister and

cigarette could not form the basis of probable cause. In

contrast, like the items in Texas, Arnold and Carson,

Grandison’s dollar bill, creased in an apothecary fold and found

in plain view, was a proper basis for probable cause to search

by virtue of the manipulation of an otherwise lawful object for

an illegitimate purpose.

In affirming Grandison’s conviction, the Court of Appeals

effectively synthesized these cases and applied them to the

facts of this case:

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 It is clear that the determinative,
distinguishing factor in each of these cases was the
observed nature of the item seized by the police.
Although often used for illegitimate purposes, the
items seized in Harris and Brown v. Commonwealth – the
film canister and hand-rolled cigarette, respectively
– were “facially innocent vessel[s] of a type employed
by law-abiding citizens, on a daily basis, for
legitimate uses.” [Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.
App. 206, 209, 409 S.E.2d 177, 179 (1991)]. Because
there was nothing in those cases that made it
immediately apparent to the officer that the items
observed in plain view were being used illegitimately,
probable cause did not exist to believe they contained
contraband. Conversely, the items seized and searched
in Carson and Arnold were items legitimately used by
law-abiding citizens on a daily basis that had been
noticeably manipulated in a manner that was consistent
with illegitimate usage. The size of the cut-off
straw in Carson led the officer, based on his
experience and training, to suspect it was used for
snorting cocaine. The shopping bag in Arnold was
folded in a manner that led the officer, based on his
experience, to suspect it had been lined with aluminum
foil for shoplifting purposes. Because the items had
been manipulated in a way that made it immediately
apparent to the officers that they may contain
contraband, the officers had probable cause to seize
and search them.

Here, like the cut-off straw in Carson and the
foil-lined shopping bag in Arnold, the dollar bill
seized and searched by Officer Gilstrap was an item
legitimately used by law-abiding citizens on a daily
basis that had been manipulated in a manner consistent
with illegitimate usage. Qualified as an expert in
drug packaging, Officer Gilstrap indicated at trial
that the distinctive manner in which the dollar bill
he saw protruding from appellant's watch pocket had
been folded led him to immediately suspect, based on
his training and experience, that it contained
contraband. The bill, he explained, was manipulated
into an “apothecary fold,” which involves a series of
systematic folds and is a common method for concealing
and carrying contraband. Thus, the unique manner in
which the bill was manipulated “distinguishes it from
[bills] one would usually encounter for legitimate

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 purposes.” Carson, 12 Va. App. at 502, 404 S.E.2d at
922. Hence, unlike the film canister in Harris and
the hand-rolled cigarette in Brown v. Commonwealth,
the distinctively folded dollar bill Officer Gilstrap
observed protruding from appellant's watch pocket was
not a “facially innocent vessel of a type employed by
law-abiding citizens, on a daily basis, for legitimate
uses.” Ruffin, 13 Va. App. at 209, 409 S.E.2d at 179.

Grandison v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 314, 322-23, 630 S.E.2d

358, 362-63 (2006).

I find the Court of Appeals’ analysis correct and

persuasive. In my view, the circuit court did not err when it

refused to suppress the evidence obtained from the police

officer’s search of Grandison, and the Court of Appeals did not

err when it affirmed Grandison’s conviction. Therefore, I

respectfully dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court

of Appeals.

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