Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Kinser, and
Lemons, JJ., and Russell, S.J.
WENDELL W. JOHNSTON, ET AL. OPINION BY
SENIOR JUSTICE CHARLES S. RUSSELL
v. Record No. 050376 January 13, 2006
FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK,
n/k/a WACHOVIA BANK, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GILES COUNTY
Brett L. Geisler, Judge
This appeal presents the question whether a debtor,
presenting a check marked “Acc’t. Paid in full” that was
accepted by the creditor and not refunded, accomplished a
discharge of the debt by an accord and satisfaction. It
involves the application of Code § 8.3A-311 to the facts of
the case.
Facts
The essential facts are undisputed. In 1985, Wendell W.
Johnston and Hallie M. Johnston, husband and wife, purchased
real property in Giles County. They executed a deed of trust
securing a loan in the amount of $32,385.20 with a fixed rate
of 13.75% interest, evidenced by a note payable to Dominion
Bank, National Association, the predecessor of First Union
National Bank, now known as Wachovia Bank (collectively, the
Bank). The note provided for repayment in 180 equal monthly
installments of $428.30. Wendell Johnston was “working . . .
two jobs” and Mrs. Johnston stayed at home to care for an
invalid grandson. She made the monthly payments due on the
Bank’s note, but sometimes the payments were late. The Bank
had given her a coupon book at the outset of the loan that she
relied on to keep track of her payments. Each coupon was
marked with the due date, the amount of the monthly payment
and the amount of a “late charge” that would fall due if the
payment were more than seven days late. She attached the
coupons to each payment she made. When a payment was late,
she added the “late charge” to her payment. She believed that
this kept her account current and that the principal was
declining as shown on the Bank’s amortization schedule.
In 1999, Mrs. Johnston noticed a discrepancy between the
principal balance remaining on the loan as shown on a
statement received from the Bank and the much lower balance
shown by her own records. Because she had made all payments
at the Pearisburg branch of the Bank, she brought the matter
to the attention of Lester Tickle, who was then the manager of
that branch. He requested the Bank’s office in Roanoke to
send the Johnstons a “history of her payments.” When Mrs.
Johnston received such a document from the Bank, it did
nothing to answer her questions. She testified that “there
1
was no explanation for that large amount.”
1
This document, captioned “Transaction History,” was made
an exhibit at trial. It is a computer-generated record only of
2
Unable to understand the basis of the Bank’s claim, Mrs.
Johnston prevailed upon her sister, Laura Jane Cook, who had a
degree in accounting, to go to the Bank and discuss the matter
with Mr. Tickle. He told Mrs. Cook that the discrepancy was
due to “extra interest charges on her late payments, and two
extended payments.”2 Mrs. Cook testified: “There seemed to be
a lot of things that didn’t, I didn’t think matched up . . . .
It was very confusing the way the bank had . . . allotted her
payments.” Mrs. Johnston, who was unable to leave her
disabled grandchild, also asked her husband’s cousin, Marie
Johnston, who had worked at the Bank for 45 years and who knew
Mr. Tickle, to go to the Bank to try to resolve the problem.
Mr. Tickle told her that he would like to help but “it was out
of his hands.”
On April 28, 2000, Mrs. Johnston went to the Pearisburg
branch of the Bank in person and was waited on by Vickie
Lucas, a teller. At that time, the Johnstons had two
outstanding loans due the Bank, the mortgage loan that was the
subject of this dispute and an “equity loan.” Mrs. Johnston
told the teller: “I would like to pay my accounts off in full
payments on the loan received by the Bank from June 25, 1993
through April 28, 2000 and shows no principal balance
remaining on the loan at any time.
2
Mrs. Johnston denied that there were ever any extended
payments.
3
and I would have to pay . . . off the [equity loan] with a
credit card and the other one I would pay by check.” There
were two coupons remaining in her mortgage loan coupon book,
representing the last two payments due. Mrs. Johnston wrote
out a check for $856.60, the sum of the last two payments as
shown on the coupons and wrote the loan number on the check
followed by the notation: “Acc’t. Paid in full.” She laid
the coupon books for both loans on the counter before the
teller and gave the teller her check and her credit card. The
teller checked the account numbers for both loans, checked her
computer for the amount due on the equity loan, called the
credit card company to be sure a payment of the required
amount would be honored, and accepted both the credit card
payment and the check. The Bank never refunded the amount of
the check to the Johnstons. It was deposited to the Bank’s
account and returned to the Johnstons, cancelled.
From April until August 2000, the Bank did nothing to
inform the Johnstons that their mortgage loan had not been
repaid in full. A “Certificate of Satisfaction” was mailed to
them evidencing repayment of the equity loan, but no such
evidence of payment ever arrived with respect to the mortgage
loan. Instead, they received a “paper . . . saying that [we]
owed a large amount of money.” In October 2000 they received
in the mail a “Notice of Intention to Foreclose” from the
4
Bank’s office in Jacksonville, Florida. On December 29, 2000,
a vice-president of the Bank executed an affidavit in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, to the effect that the Johnstons’
original note had been lost or misplaced but that the
principal amount due the Bank on the loan was $5,612.05, plus
$521.15 in interest and $85.64 in late charges, with further
interest accruing at the rate of $2.11 per day from November
20, 2000. In March 2001, a substitute trustee appointed by
the Bank sold the Johnstons’ property at a foreclosure sale at
which the Bank became the successful bidder.3
Proceedings
The Johnstons brought this suit against the Bank seeking
a judicial determination that the mortgage loan had been fully
paid and discharged, and other relief. The circuit court
heard the evidence ore tenus.
Although the note had been lost, the Bank produced a
“Customer Loan and Security Agreement” at trial, which the
Johnstons had signed in 1985, stating that the number of
payments would be 180, that each payment would be $428.30, and
that the payments would be due “monthly beginning June 1,
3
The circuit court’s final decree in this case set aside
the sale and the trustee’s deed to the Bank because of
violations of duties owed by the Bank and by the trustee to
the Johnstons. By order entered this day, we have affirmed
that part of the circuit court’s decree.
5
1985.” The agreement further provided that the principal of
the loan was to be $32,385.20 and “[s]tarting on the date of
this Agreement, simple interest is charged on the unpaid part
of your loan at the yearly rate of 13.75% (the 'Note Rate').
Interest is figured counting the actual number of days in each
month and using a 365-day or 366-day (as applicable) year.”
The Bank also offered in evidence a loan recalculation,
showing receipt of all payments and how they had been applied
to principal, interest and “late payments.” There was no
contention, however, that these calculations had ever been
divulged to the Johnstons.
The circuit court, in a letter opinion, held that Mrs.
Johnston had not acted in good faith in tendering a “paid in
full” check to the Bank’s teller, and that as a result, no
accord and satisfaction had occurred. The court reasoned that
good faith would have required Mrs. Johnston to tender her
check directly to Mr. Tickle, the one person in the Bank she
knew to have knowledge of the dispute concerning the debt, or
to have informed the teller that the amount due was disputed.4
The court also found that the terms of the loan were
unambiguous, that the Bank’s recalculation was correct and
4
The U.C.C. defines "Good Faith" as "honesty in fact and
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing." Code § 8.3A-103(4).
6
that the unpaid balance was due as claimed by the Bank. The
court entered a final decree in accordance with that ruling
and we granted the Johnstons an appeal.
Analysis
In 1992, the General Assembly adopted amendments to the
Uniform Commercial Code that included Code § 8.3A-311, a
provision intended to govern the specific situation presented
by this appeal.5 That section provides:
§ 8.3A-311. Accord and satisfaction by use of
instrument. – (a) If a person against whom a claim
is asserted proves that (i) that person in good
faith tendered an instrument to the claimant as full
satisfaction of the claim, (ii) the amount of the
claim was unliquidated or subject to a bona fide
dispute, and (iii) the claimant obtained payment of
the instrument, the following subsections apply.
(b) Unless subsection (c) applies, the claim is
discharged if the person against whom the claim is
asserted proves that the instrument or an
accompanying written communication contained a
conspicuous statement to the effect that the
instrument was tendered as full satisfaction of the
claim.
5
The circuit court's opinion relied, in part, on Code
§ 11-12, which provides, in pertinent part: "Part performance
of an obligation . . . when expressly accepted by the creditor
in satisfaction and rendered in pursuance of an agreement for
that purpose . . . shall extinguish such obligation . . . ."
We find that section inapplicable to the facts of this case
because it is premised upon an express acceptance of part
payment by the creditor, coupled with an agreement between the
parties that such acceptance will be in full satisfaction of
the obligation. The present case is governed entirely by the
provisions contained in the U.C.C., hereinafter stated, which
apply even in cases where an accord and satisfaction may arise
through inadvertence on the creditor's part.
7
(c) Subject to subsection (d), a claim is not
discharged under subsection (b) if either of the
following applies:
(1) The claimant, if an organization, proves
that (i) within a reasonable time before the tender,
the claimant sent a conspicuous statement to the
person against whom the claim is asserted that
communications concerning disputed debts, including
an instrument tendered as full satisfaction of a
debt, are to be sent to a designated person, office,
or place, and (ii) the instrument or accompanying
communication was not received by that designated
person, office, or place.
(2) The claimant, whether or not an
organization, proves that within ninety days after
payment of the instrument, the claimant tendered
repayment of the amount of the instrument to the
person against whom the claim is asserted. This
paragraph does not apply if the claimant is an
organization that sent a statement complying with
paragraph (1)(i).
(d) A claim is discharged if the person against
whom the claim is asserted proves that within a
reasonable time before collection of the instrument
was initiated, the claimant, or an agent of the
claimant having direct responsibility with respect
to the disputed obligation, knew that the instrument
was tendered in full satisfaction of the claim.
The foregoing section is inapplicable if the debtor is
not acting in good faith when presenting the instrument or if
the claim is liquidated and not subject to a bona fide
dispute. If the requirements of sections (a) and (b) are met,
however, an accord and satisfaction is presumed. Gelles &
Sons Gen. Contr. v. Jeffrey Stack, Inc., 264 Va. 285, 290, 569
S.E.2d 406, 408 (2002).
We find no evidence in the record to support the circuit
court’s finding that Mrs. Johnston was not acting in good
8
faith when she presented her “paid in full” check. She
presented her check to a teller, to whom such payments were
regularly made, clearly informing her that she wished to pay
her loans in full, and laid her payment books before the
teller. Her check was plainly marked "paid in full." We find
no support in the evidence for the circuit court's conclusion
that, in dealing directly with the teller in this manner, she
failed to exercise good faith as defined by Code § 8.3A-
103(4). The circuit court's opinion stated: "[Mrs. Johnston]
tendered her check not to Mr. Tickle, the one person with an
intelligent appreciation of the possible consequences of the
pay off, but to a bank teller, Mrs. Lucas. . . . I find that
the teller did not have all the relevant facts regarding this
dispute. . . ." The circuit court's conclusion that the
teller lacked "the relevant facts" could only have been based
upon conjecture.
Further, the evidence fails to support the circuit
court's finding that Mr. Tickle was the "one person with an
intelligent appreciation" of the situation. Mr. Tickle's
testimony was that he had only one conversation with Mrs.
Johnston, that the facts relating to the balance due on the
loan were not available to him in the local branch, but that
he would ask the Bank's Roanoke office to mail a statement to
her. He said: "That is what I think I remember doing for
9
her." When he was shown at trial the confusing and incomplete
statement the Roanoke office actually sent to the Johnstons at
his request, he said, "I don't know that much about the form.
The only thing we do is request it." Mrs. Johnston firmly
believed that if she made 180 payments of $428.30 and added
the required “late charges” to any late payments, as shown by
the coupons in her payment book, the loan would be paid in
full. She testified to that belief at trial and informed the
Bank of it in her contacts with the branch manager. The
record contains no evidence to support an inference that she
knew better and was dissembling.6
The original note was lost and its precise language could
not be determined. The Bank’s claim was based entirely upon
the surmise that the note was worded in strict accordance with
the “Customer Loan and Security Agreement” that had preceded
the note. Mrs. Johnston may well have been mistaken as a
matter of law, as the circuit court found, but an error of law
is not equivalent to bad faith.7 It follows that the amount
6
In Gelles, the trial court found it significant that the
debtor believed that the amount of the check it tendered in
final payment of a disputed account represented the proper
accounting of the amount due. 264 Va. at 291, 569 S.E.2d at
408. We affirmed the trial court's judgment.
7
See DeChene v. Smallwood, 226 Va. 475, 480, 311 S.E.2d
749, 751 (1984) (police officer acting under a mistaken belief
as to the effect of a law nevertheless acted in good faith).
10
due was subject to a bona fide dispute, not a fraudulent or
frivolous one, even though the Bank might ultimately have
prevailed if it had sought to recover the balance without
accepting a “paid in full” check.
As we observed in Gelles, subsection (c) of the statute
is designed to protect a creditor from inadvertent acceptance
of an accord and satisfaction. It offers the creditor two
alternatives consistent with modern business practices. See
Code § 8.3A-311 cmts. 5-6. First, the creditor, if an
organization, may send a statement to the debtor to the effect
that any communication regarding a disputed debt be sent to a
designated person, office, or place. Code § 8.3A-311(c)(1).
The Bank failed to take advantage of that protection. Second,
the Bank might have avoided the risk of an accord and
satisfaction entirely if it had tendered repayment of the
amount of Mrs. Johnston’s check within 90 days of its payment.
Code § 8.3A-311(c)(2). By retaining her payment beyond 90
days, the Bank failed to avail itself of that protection.
Conclusion
Mrs. Johnston had the initial burden of producing
evidence that she acted in good faith when she presented her
"paid in full" check to the teller. We hold that she carried
that burden, that the burden then shifted to the Bank to go
forward with evidence to rebut her showing of good faith, and
11
that the Bank failed to do so. The evidence also showed that
the amount of the claim was subject to a bona fide dispute,
for the reasons stated above. As a result, the provisions of
subsection (b) of Code § 8.3A-311 took effect and the debt was
discharged. Accordingly, we will reverse that part of the
circuit court's decree that was the subject of this appeal and
enter final judgment here in favor of the Johnstons.
Reversed in part and final judgment.
JUSTICE KEENAN, with whom JUSTICE KOONTZ and JUSTICE LEMONS
join, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the trial
court’s decision is not plainly wrong or without evidentiary
support under the standard of review set forth in Code § 8.01-
680, which governs our consideration of this appeal.
I think that the majority has reached a contrary result
for two reasons. First, in my view, the majority has confused
the requirement of a “good faith” tender in Code § 8.3A-311
with the separate statutory element of a “bona fide dispute.”
Second, I think that the majority has misapplied the burden of
proof in this case.
The statutory elements of a “good faith” tender and a
“bona fide dispute” are separate and distinct. Under the
plain language of the statute, the requirement of a “good
faith” tender addresses the method and manner in which payment
12
is offered in satisfaction of a debt, while the statutory
element of a “bona fide dispute” concerns the amount of the
debt itself. See Webb Bus. Promotions, Inc. v. American Elec.
& Entm’t Corp., 617 N.W.2d 67, 73 (Minn. 2000) (focus of “good
faith” inquiry under UCC is on offer of accord, not on
parties’ underlying contract); accord Ex parte Meztista, 845
So.2d 795, 799 (Ala. 2001). Despite the fact that these
statutory elements are entirely different components of an
accord and satisfaction under the Uniform Commercial Code, the
majority heavily relies on evidence of a “bona fide dispute”
in discarding the trial court’s finding that Mrs. Johnston did
not act in “good faith” when she tendered payment to the Bank.
Further, the majority rejects the trial court’s finding
without engaging in an analysis of the “good faith” tender
requirement under the UCC.
“Good faith” under the UCC is defined in Code § 8.3A-
103(a)(4) as “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing.” The party alleging an
accord and satisfaction under the UCC bears the burden of
proving a “good faith” tender, as well as the other elements
necessary to support the claim. Code § 8.3A-311; McMahon Food
Corp. v. Burger Dairy Co., 103 F.3d 1307, 1313 (7th Cir.
1996); Webb Bus. Promotions, Inc., 617 N.W.2d at 74.
13
A trial court’s finding on the issue of “good faith” is a
finding of fact. McMahon Food Corp., 103 F.3d at 1313. Thus,
that finding may not be disturbed on appeal unless it is
without evidence to support it. Code § 8.01-680.
“The meaning of ‘fair dealing’ will depend upon the facts
in the particular case.” Code § 8.3A-311, cmt. 4. Those
facts include the parties’ prior course of dealings. Sarah H.
Jenkins, 13 Corbin on Contracts § 70.8, at 354-55 (Joseph M.
Perillo, ed., rev. ed. 2003). Moreover, “fair dealing
excludes engaging in opportunistic behavior.” Id. at 356.
In the present case, the trial court found that Mrs.
Johnston had dealt exclusively with the Pearisburg branch
manager, Mr. Tickle, in contesting the amount of her loan
balance. The court further found that Mr. Tickle had “full
knowledge of the dispute,” and was the “one person” whom Mrs.
Johnston knew had “an intelligent appreciation of the possible
consequences of the pay off.” The court additionally found
that despite the many prior dealings with Mr. Tickle by Mrs.
Johnston and others acting at her request, she did not
approach Mr. Tickle with her check or inform the Bank’s
teller, Vickie Lucas, of the longstanding dispute with Mr.
Tickle concerning the loan balance.
Based on these factual findings, the trial court
concluded that the exercise of “good faith” would have
14
“required Mrs. Johnston to inform the teller of the dispute
and her [negotiations] with Lester Tickle or to have tendered
the final payment to Mr. Tickle himself.” I agree, and would
hold that the trial court’s factual findings support its
conclusion that reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing required that Mrs. Johnston tender payment to a person
who was aware of her dispute with the Bank, rather than to a
person who lacked any information or appreciation of that
dispute.
The majority acknowledges Mrs. Johnston’s burden of
proving the statutory requirement of “good faith” but
ultimately misapplies that burden in its review of the
evidence. In doing so, the majority also fails to consider
one component of the “good faith” requirement, namely, whether
Mrs. Johnston met her burden of proving that her conduct was
commercially reasonable.
In its analysis, the majority instead characterizes the
circuit court’s finding that Vicki Lewis had no knowledge of
Mrs. Johnston’s ongoing dispute as conjecture. However, Mrs.
Johnston, not the Bank, bore the evidentiary burden on this
issue. Thus, the majority’s argument that there was an
absence of evidence to support the circuit court’s factual
findings is of no consequence here. The circuit court’s
ultimate conclusion that Mrs. Johnston did not prove she acted
15
in good faith is justified by the complete lack of evidence
that she acted in a commercially reasonable manner.
In addition, the majority’s analysis is devoid of any
explanation why Mrs. Johnston’s actions were commercially
reasonable when she failed to inform Vicki Lewis of her
unresolved dispute with the Bank. In my opinion, the facially
opportunistic nature of her tender, in conjunction with her
failure to prove the commercial reasonableness of her actions,
compels a conclusion that she did not prove that she made a
“good faith” tender.
Mrs. Johnston’s failure to prove that she acted in “good
faith” was fatal to her claim of accord and satisfaction. See
Code § 8.3A-311. Thus, it is irrelevant that the Bank could
have employed remedies provided in subsection (c) of the
statute to protect the Bank from an inadvertent acceptance of
an accord and satisfaction. Once Mrs. Johnston’s claim of
accord and satisfaction failed for lack of proof, there was no
accord and satisfaction that the Bank could have accepted,
inadvertently or otherwise.
Beyond the outcome of the present case, I also am
concerned that the majority’s holding weakens the statutory
requirement of “good faith.” The majority’s relaxed
application of the “good faith” tender requirement appears to
permit a court to base its judgment on subjective and
16
sympathetic considerations, such as a debtor’s “firm belief,”
instead of the objective test of “good faith” defined in Code
§ 8.3A-103(a)(4). Thus, under the majority’s approach, a
debtor may engage in opportunistic behavior in tendering
payment on a debt of a disputed amount, as long as she is not
manifestly dishonest and strongly believes that her position
regarding the underlying dispute is correct.
This type of analytical focus will certainly create
confusion in the resolution of disputes involving both
institutional and individual transactions. As a result,
debtors may be encouraged to try to “short-circuit” their
contractual obligations by asserting a “firm belief” in the
proper amount of their remaining debt and by tendering
“payment in full” to the person least likely to have knowledge
of a particular dispute. Such conduct will have a negative
impact on a very broad spectrum of commercial transactions in
this Commonwealth. Thus, in accordance with the trial court’s
factual findings and Mrs. Johnston’s failure to meet her
burden of proof under Code § 8.3A-311, I would affirm the
trial court’s judgment.
17