Present: All the Justices
DESTINY JOY CRAWFORD, ET AL.
v. Record No. 050236 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
November 4, 2005
TERRY B. HADDOCK, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
Frederick B. Lowe, Judge
In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred
in its judgment that Code § 51.1-510 bars imposition of a
constructive trust upon proceeds from a Virginia Retirement
System group life insurance policy. For the reasons discussed
herein, the judgment of the trial court will be affirmed.
I. Facts and Proceedings Below
This appeal arises from an interpleader action filed by
Minnesota Life Insurance Company ("Minnesota Life") requesting
the trial court to determine the proper distribution of
proceeds of a life insurance policy insuring the life of
Steven Mark Crawford ("Steven"). Steven was insured under a
group life insurance policy issued to the Virginia Retirement
System ("VRS") pursuant to Title 51.1 of the Code of Virginia.
On January 24, 2000, Steven designated his sister, Terry B.
Haddock ("Terry"), as the sole beneficiary of his life
insurance policy. Steven died on January 13, 2003.
In addition to Terry, Minnesota Life named Eloisa O.
Crawford ("Eloisa"), Destiny Joy Crawford ("Destiny"), Scott
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Zachary Crawford ("Scott"), and Micah Zebulon Crawford
("Micah") as defendants in its interpleader action. Eloisa
was Steven’s third wife and his surviving legal spouse at the
time of his death. Destiny is Steven’s daughter from his
second marriage. Scott and Micah are Steven’s sons from his
first marriage.
Minnesota Life paid the life insurance proceeds, plus the
accrued interest, into the trial court and was discharged.
The trial court then ordered each of the defendants to file
written statements as to the nature of their respective
claims. Terry claimed that she was entitled to the benefits
because she was the sole designated beneficiary. Eloisa
responded that, as Steven’s surviving legal spouse, she was
either the sole beneficiary of Steven’s life insurance policy
or entitled to her elective share of Steven’s augmented
estate. Destiny stated that she was entitled to the proceeds
because the separation agreement between Steven and Destiny’s
mother, entered on February 7, 2000, named her as the "primary
irrevocable beneficiary" of Steven’s life insurance policy.1
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Entitled "Life Insurance Policies for the Child,"
Article 3.4 of the separation agreement stated in relevant
part: "[Steven] agrees to maintain in full force and effect,
his existing employer-provided life insurance policy, with a
$15,000 death benefit unless he dies from an employment-
related injury, in which instance the benefit is $250,000, and
to designate [Destiny] as the primary irrevocable beneficiary
thereof."
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Finally, Scott and Micah argued that, pursuant to the
separation agreement between Steven and their mother entered
on April 7, 1992, they were each entitled to $25,000 from the
proceeds of Steven’s life insurance policy.2 With the
exception of Terry, each of the defendants also asked the
trial court to impose a constructive trust upon the life
insurance proceeds.
After the defendants filed their respective answers,
Terry filed a motion for summary judgment. In it she claimed
that there was no material fact in dispute and that Code
§ 51.1-510 exempted Steven’s life insurance proceeds "from
levy, garnishment[,] and other legal process including
imposition of [the] constructive trust" sought by the other
defendants. Therefore, Terry argued that she was entitled to
all of the proceeds because she was the sole designated
beneficiary.
The trial court granted Terry’s motion for summary
judgment, stating that the "anti-alienation, anti-attachment
provisions set forth [in Code § 51.1-510] bars [sic] the
2
Paragraph 17 of the separation agreement stated that
Steven "agrees to purchase and maintain and provide evidence
to the Wife of a life insurance policy payable to each child
in the amount of $25,000.00 upon the death of the Husband.
Husband agrees from time to time to provide the Wife upon her
written request any documentation which may be desired
concerning his maintaining this policy in full force and
effect."
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imposition of [the] constructive trust" sought by Eloisa,
Destiny, Scott, and Micah. The trial court noted that Eloisa
had filed a separate suit asserting her elective share in
Steven’s augmented estate and specifically did not rule
regarding the validity of this claim by Eloisa.
Destiny, Scott, and Micah filed timely appeals,3 which we
subsequently granted in order to consider two assignments of
error: (1) error by the trial court "in denying the
imposition of a constructive trust by declining to apply the
child support exception provided in" Code § 51.1-124.4 to Code
§ 51.1-510; and (2) error by the trial court "in not
distinguishing the enforcement of the life insurance
obligations of the insured to his children from ordinary
commercial debts."
II. Analysis
In the instant case, no material facts are in dispute.
This appeal is a matter of statutory interpretation and is
therefore "a pure question of law subject to de novo review."
Horner v. Dep't of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, &
Substance Abuse Servs., 268 Va. 187, 192, 597 S.E.2d 202, 204
(2004). When interpreting statutes,
3
Eloisa did not note an appeal and, despite being given
notice of the appeals of Destiny, Scott, and Micah, did not
file a brief, make an appearance, or otherwise participate in
this appeal.
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courts must ascertain and give effect to the
legislature's intention, which is to be deduced
from the words used, unless a literal
interpretation would result in a manifest
absurdity. When, as here, the General Assembly
uses words that are clear and unambiguous,
courts may not interpret them in a way that
amounts to a holding that the legislature did
not mean what it actually has expressed. In
other words, courts are bound by the plain
meaning of clear statutory language.
Id. at 192, 597 S.E.2d at 204 (citations omitted). In a
situation where " 'one statute speaks to a subject generally
and another deals with an element of that subject
specifically, the statutes will be harmonized, if possible,
and if they conflict, the more specific statute prevails.'
This is so because 'a specific statute cannot be controlled or
nullified by a statute of general application unless the
legislature clearly intended such a result.' " Gas Mart Corp.
v. Board of Supervisors, 269 Va. 334, 350, 611 S.E.2d 340, 348
(2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Brown, 259 Va. 697, 706, 529
S.E.2d 96, 101 (2000)).
On appeal, Destiny, Scott, and Micah argue that the
exceptions enumerated in Code § 51.1-124.4 apply to all of
Title 51.1, and that these exceptions are not modified by Code
§ 51.1-510. They argue that the trial court failed to
properly harmonize the statutes and incorrectly held that a
constructive trust could not be imposed upon Steven's life
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insurance proceeds. The arguments advanced by Destiny, Scott,
and Micah are incorrect.
Code § 51.1-124.4, part of the "General Provisions"
addressing the Virginia Retirement System ("VRS") in Chapter 1
of Title 51.1, states that an individual's VRS assets "shall
not be subject to execution, attachment, garnishment, or any
other process whatsoever." Code § 51.1-124.4(A). One of
several enumerated exceptions to this general prohibition is
"any court process to enforce a child or child and spousal
support obligation." Code § 51.1-124.4(A). Code § 51.1-510,
which specifically addresses the "Group Insurance Program" of
the VRS in Chapter 5 of Title 51.1, states that "the insurance
provided for in this chapter, including any optional
insurance, and all proceeds therefrom shall be exempt from
levy, garnishment, and other legal process." Code § 51.1-
510(A).
In the instant case, Steven's life insurance was a VRS
group term life insurance policy. As such, the general
provisions of Chapter 1 and the specific provisions of Chapter
5 of Title 51.1 control it, and our analysis. Generally, all
assets of the VRS "shall not be subject to execution,
attachment, garnishment, or any other process whatsoever."
Code § 51.1-124.4(A). One exception to this general rule is
"any court process to enforce a child or child and spousal
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support obligation." Code § 51.1-124.4(A). Thus, at first
glance, it would appear that a constructive trust could be
imposed on the life insurance proceeds in order to enforce
Steven's obligation to provide for Destiny, Scott, and Micah.
However, the specific provisions of Chapter 5 further
qualify the general provisions found in Chapter 1 of Title
51.1. While, generally, an exception exists for a "child or
child and spousal support obligation," the General Assembly
has clearly stated that this exception does not apply in the
specific context of the VRS Group Insurance Program. Code
§ 51.1-510 clearly exempts both a VRS group life insurance
policy and any resulting proceeds "from levy, garnishment, and
other legal process." The constructive trust sought by
Destiny, Scott, and Micah is a type of "other legal process."
Therefore, the trial court correctly held that it was
prohibited as a matter of law from imposing a constructive
trust on Steven's VRS group life insurance proceeds. The
language employed by the General Assembly evidences a clear
intent to protect an individual's assets in the Group
Insurance Program "from levy, garnishment, and other legal
process." While Code § 51.1-124.4 provides exceptions that
apply generally to VRS assets, Code § 51.1-510 speaks directly
to the specific issue in this appeal. Because the specific
controls the general, and there is no indication that the
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General Assembly clearly intended the general to nullify the
specific, see Gas Mart, 269 Va. at 350, 611 S.E.2d at 348, the
exceptions enumerated in Code § 51.1-124.4 do not apply to the
Group Insurance Program because of the plain language of Code
§ 51.1-510. Furthermore, the exemption found in Code § 51.1-
510 is without exception and it was unnecessary for the trial
court to distinguish "the enforcement of the life insurance
obligations of the insured to his children from ordinary
commercial debts" in the context of this case.
We will affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
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