PRESENT: All the Justices
RODNEY L. DIXON, JR.
v. Record No. 041952 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN
Record No. 041996 June 9, 2005
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
John C. Morrison, Jr., Judge
In these appeals, we consider the denial of a defendant’s
motion to suppress certain statements he made to the police
before being advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). The central issue we resolve is whether a
suspect detained at the scene of a traffic accident was in
police custody for purposes of the Miranda rule after the
suspect was placed in handcuffs and locked in a police patrol
car.
Rodney Lee Dixon, Jr. was charged in the City of Norfolk
with driving under the influence (DUI), third offense within the
past five years, in violation of Code § 18.2-270(C); driving on
a suspended license, in violation of Code § 18.2-272; and
refusing to submit to a breath or blood alcohol test, in
violation of Code § 18.2-268.3. Before trial in the circuit
court, Dixon filed a motion to suppress certain statements he
made to the arresting officer, claiming a violation of his
rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution and Code
of Virginia. The circuit court denied the motion.
Dixon entered a conditional guilty plea to all the charges,
reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress. See Code § 19.2-254. The circuit court accepted
Dixon’s pleas and sentenced him to a total of six years’
imprisonment and a $1,000 fine, five years and $500 of which
were suspended. The court also suspended Dixon’s driver’s
license for one year.
The Court of Appeals, in an unpublished order, denied
Dixon’s petition for appeal of his convictions for DUI and
driving on a suspended license. Dixon v. Commonwealth, Record
No. 3261-03-1 (July 29, 2004). The Court stated that Dixon was
not in police custody at the time he made incriminating
statements to the police and that, therefore, the circuit court
did not err in denying the motion to suppress. The Court also
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Dixon’s
appeal of the circuit court’s judgment on the charge of refusing
to submit to a breath or blood alcohol test, and transferred
that case to this Court.
We consolidated Dixon’s appeal of the circuit court’s
judgment on the refusal charge with his appeal of his criminal
convictions from the Court of Appeals. Under established
principles of appellate review, we will state the evidence in
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the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing
party in the circuit court. Murphy v. Commonwealth, 264 Va.
568, 570, 570 S.E.2d 836, 837 (2002); McCain v. Commonwealth,
261 Va. 483, 486, 545 S.E.2d 541, 543 (2001).
On February 23, 2003, at about 2:40 a.m., Virginia State
Trooper Christopher S. Jackson arrived at the scene of a motor
vehicle accident and fire on Interstate Route 64 in Norfolk. As
Trooper Jackson approached officers from the Norfolk Police
Department who initially had responded to the accident scene,
Jackson saw that the officers had placed handcuffs on Dixon and
were standing near him. Trooper Jackson observed that Dixon
appeared “upset,” was acting “unruly” toward the officers, and
had a “strong odor” of an alcoholic beverage emanating from his
person.
After the Norfolk officers removed the existing handcuffs,
Trooper Jackson placed his own set of handcuffs on Dixon,
thereby securing Dixon’s hands behind his back. Jackson then
placed Dixon in the front passenger seat of his patrol car and
locked the car door. Jackson told Dixon that he was not under
arrest but “was being detained for investigative reasons [and]
for [Dixon’s and Trooper Jackson’s] safety.”
After verifying Dixon’s name and date of birth, Trooper
Jackson began questioning Dixon about the accident. Jackson
asked Dixon whether he was operating the vehicle that caught
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fire, and whether he “had anything to drink during the evening.”
Dixon replied that he had consumed four or five beers about an
hour earlier, and that he had “pulled” his car over to the side
of the road because the car was malfunctioning.
Trooper Jackson administered several “field sobriety
tests,” some of which Dixon refused to complete. Dixon also
refused to submit to a preliminary breath alcohol test. At that
point, Trooper Jackson informed Dixon that he was under arrest
and advised him of his Miranda rights.
Before trial, Dixon filed a motion to suppress the
statements he made to Trooper Jackson about his alcohol
consumption and operation of the vehicle. Dixon argued that he
was in police custody when he was handcuffed and locked in the
patrol car and, thus, that any statements he gave before being
advised of his Miranda rights were obtained in violation of the
Fifth Amendment.
The circuit court denied Dixon’s motion. The court
concluded that Trooper Jackson had reasonable suspicion that
Dixon had been involved in criminal activity, and that Jackson’s
actions in securing the handcuffs on Dixon and placing him in
the locked patrol car did not convert the investigative
detention into a custodial arrest.
In its order denying Dixon’s petition for appeal of his
criminal convictions, the Court of Appeals stated that Dixon was
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not in custody when he made the incriminating statements because
Trooper Jackson repeatedly advised Dixon that he was not under
arrest, and placed him in handcuffs due to concerns for safety
and possible escape. The Court concluded that, therefore,
Trooper Jackson was not required to advise Dixon of his Miranda
rights before questioning him about the accident.
On appeal to this Court, Dixon argues that his Fifth
Amendment rights were violated because a reasonable person in
his situation would have concluded that he was not free to leave
the scene of the accident. According to Dixon, the conduct of
the officers at the scene converted what normally would be
considered an investigative detention into a custodial arrest.
Dixon contends that he was subjected to custodial interrogation,
within the meaning of Miranda, because he was placed in
handcuffs and involuntarily locked in the patrol car before
being questioned by the police.
In response, the Commonwealth argues that Trooper Jackson’s
actions were consistent with an investigative detention
permitted under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and were
necessary under the circumstances. The Commonwealth asserts
that reasonable restraint is permissible during an investigative
detention, and that Trooper Jackson placed Dixon in handcuffs
for safety reasons due to Dixon’s “hostile" and “defiant"
attitude. The Commonwealth also contends that it was necessary
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to place Dixon in the locked patrol car because of the dangerous
highway location and Dixon’s prior attempts to leave the scene.
Thus, the Commonwealth argues that under the circumstances
presented, the circuit court correctly concluded that Dixon was
not in police custody at the time he made the incriminating
statements.
In resolving this issue, we review settled principles of
constitutional law that govern our inquiry. Under Miranda,
before a suspect in police custody may be questioned by law
enforcement officers, the suspect must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has the right to have an
attorney, either retained or appointed, present to assist him.
384 U.S. at 444. Statements obtained by law enforcement
officers in violation of this rule generally will be subject to
exclusion for most proof purposes in a criminal trial. Id. at
479; see Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994). But
see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (exception for second
statement obtained as a result of prior, unwarned statement);
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (public safety
exception); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (impeachment
exception).
The safeguards required by Miranda must be afforded to a
suspect as soon as the police have restricted his freedom of
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action to a “degree associated with formal arrest.” Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984) (quoting California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983)); see Stansbury, 511 U.S. at
322; Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 605, 450 S.E.2d 124,
129 (1994). Therefore, “[i]f a motorist who has been detained
pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment
that renders him ‘in custody’ for practical purposes, he will be
entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by
Miranda.” Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440; see Oregon v. Mathiason,
429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
Because the determination whether a suspect is “in custody”
requires an objective focus, the only relevant inquiry is how a
reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would have
understood his circumstances. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442; see
Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323-25; George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va.
264, 272, 411 S.E.2d 12, 17 (1991). Thus, the subjective
perspective of either the suspect or the interrogating police
officer has no bearing on the issue whether the suspect was “in
custody” at the time he was questioned by the police.
Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324; Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442; George,
242 Va. at 272, 411 S.E.2d at 17.
As the Supreme Court observed in Berkemer, the ordinary
traffic stop is more analogous to a “Terry stop” than to
restrictions associated with a formal arrest. 468 U.S. at 439.
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Because both ordinary traffic stops and “Terry stops” are
comparatively brief and noncoercive in nature, the Supreme Court
has held that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such
stops generally are not “in custody” for purposes of the Miranda
rule. Id. at 440. However, because a suspect may be “in
custody” for purposes of Miranda before he actually has been
arrested, we consider the circumstances of Dixon’s detention
under the test stated by the Supreme Court in Berkemer to
determine whether a reasonable person in Dixon’s position would
have concluded that his freedom was being curtailed to a degree
associated with a formal arrest. Id. at 442; see Stansbury, 511
U.S. at 322; Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125; Burket, 248 Va. at 605,
450 S.E.2d at 129; George, 242 Va. at 272, 411 S.E.2d at 17.
This detention occurred around 3:00 a.m. on the shoulder of
an interstate highway. Although Trooper Jackson told Dixon that
he was not under arrest, Jackson secured Dixon’s hands in
handcuffs behind his back and placed him in the front seat of
the locked patrol car. Jackson informed Dixon that he was being
detained for investigative and safety considerations. We
conclude that under these circumstances, a reasonable person in
Dixon’s position would have understood that his freedom was
being restricted to a degree associated with a formal arrest.
See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442; Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322;
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Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125; Burket, 248 Va. at 605, 450 S.E.2d at
129; George, 242 Va. at 272, 411 S.E.2d at 17.
Our conclusion in this regard is influenced most strongly
by the combined factors of Dixon being restrained in handcuffs
and being locked in a police patrol car. While the presence of
either of these factors, in the absence of the other, may not
result in a curtailment of freedom ordinarily associated with a
formal arrest, the presence of both factors compels the
conclusion that a reasonable person subjected to both restraints
would conclude that he was in police custody.
This holding is in accord with decisions from several other
states which, under varying other circumstances, have concluded
that a suspect was “in custody” for purposes of the Miranda rule
after being placed in handcuffs and secured in a police patrol
car. See State v. Frank, 986 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Idaho Ct. App.
1999); Gibson v. State, 733 N.E.2d 945, 953 (Ind. Ct. App.
2000); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 716 N.E.2d 1036, 1038 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1999); State v. Johnston, 572 S.E.2d 438, 441 (N.C. Ct. App.
2002). The decisions of these courts, and our holding today,
reflect the observation in Berkemer that although the
determination whether a suspect is in custody for purposes of
Miranda is not an “easily administered” rule, the rule serves
well to protect both the constitutional rights of detained
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citizens and the legitimate interests of law enforcement. See
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 441.
Accordingly, under the facts and circumstances before us,
we hold that Trooper Jackson was required to give Miranda
warnings to Dixon before questioning him, and that the circuit
court erred in denying Dixon’s motion to suppress with regard to
the criminal charges pending against him. Because the charge of
refusing to submit to a breath or blood alcohol test, Code
§ 18.2-268.3, is civil, rather than criminal in nature, see
Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 290, 170 S.E.2d 199, 202
(1969), our holding does not affect the circuit court’s
adjudication of that charge.*
For these reasons, we will affirm the circuit court’s
judgment on the refusal charge. We will reverse the Court of
Appeals’ judgment on the criminal convictions under Code § 18.2-
270(C) and Code § 18.2-272, and remand the criminal charges for
a new trial, if the Commonwealth so elects, in accordance with
the principles expressed in this opinion.
Record No. 041996 - Affirmed and final judgment.
Record No. 041952 - Reversed and remanded.
*
Dixon’s counsel conceded at oral argument that our
resolution of the issue whether the circuit court erred in
denying the motion to suppress would not affect the circuit
court’s judgment on the refusal charge.
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