Quatannens v. Tyrrell

Present: All the Justices

STEPHEN D. QUATANNENS, ET AL.

v. Record No. 032562 OPINION BY JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
September 17, 2004
ROBERT E. TYRRELL, JR., ET AL.

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA
J. Howe Brown, Jr., Judge

In this appeal, we consider the evidentiary requirement

to sustain a claim of adverse possession in a dispute over a

narrow strip of land between adjoining landowners.

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

Stephen D. Quatannens and Eileen A. Quatannens ("the

Quatannens") reside at 217 S. Alfred Street in Alexandria,

Virginia. Robert E. Tyrrell, Jr. and his wife, Jeanne M.

Hauch, ("the Tyrrells") reside at 219 S. Alfred Street,

Alexandria, Virginia. In dispute is the ownership of a strip

of land 100 feet long and ranging from approximately eight to

20 inches wide, running the length of the adjoining parcels of

property. The strip of land contains a small portion of a

room of the Quatannens' house, part of a brick walkway, part

of a paved parking area, and one side of a brick arch over the

walkway at the front of the Quatannens' house, all of which

have existed since at least 1976. The remainder of the strip

appears to contain some vegetation.
 The Quatannens purchased their property in October, 1995.

Eileen Quatannens testified that the Quatannens had not

intended to possess any property that they did not own and

were unaware of any boundary issues until the fall of 2001

when the Tyrrells asserted their claim. Although the

Quatannens had been given a plat of the property at the time

of purchase, they testified that they had not reviewed it.

The Quatannens filed a bill of complaint for injunctive relief

and to quiet title in the Circuit Court.

At a bench trial, two previous owners of 217 S. Alfred

Street testified that they presumed that the strip belonged to

them and carried out such activities as gardening, storage,

handball, and walking on the disputed land. A prior owner of

219 S. Alfred Street, the Tyrrells' property, testified in a

deposition that he believed that his property ended at the

wall of the home at 219 S. Alfred Street and that the property

at 217 S. Alfred Street encompassed the strip of land in

dispute.

Jeanne Hauch was the sole witness for the Tyrrells. She

testified that she and her husband had "bought the plat" at

219 S. Alfred Street. She admitted that she had not asserted

any claims toward the disputed property before October 2001.

The trial court found that the Quatannens "had not

established that their possession was 'hostile,' as the

2
possession had been by mistake for the majority of the period"

and stated that it further found for the Tyrrells "for the

reasons stated [in the Tyrrells’] closing argument," which

were that "i) the acts of Plaintiffs in using the disputed

land had been insufficient to establish possession, ii) that

there had not been actual notice to the Defendants and their

predecessors, and iii) that adverse possession could not be by

mistake." The trial court denied the Quatannens' motion to

reconsider.

II. Analysis

On appeal, the Quatannens contend that the trial court

erred in denying their claim of adverse possession on three

grounds:

a) that "the trial court erred in not finding for

plaintiffs as to adverse possession due to lack of

actual notice to defendants and their predecessors;"

b) that "the trial court erred in finding that the acts

of plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest were

not sufficient to establish possession;" and,

c) that "the trial court erred in finding that the

plaintiffs could not adversely possess because they

did not have a hostile intent to take the land in

dispute from another."

3
 The trial court's opinion and the arguments of the

Tyrrells appear to conflate all the elements of adverse

possession into hostile intent. The facts of the case are

largely undisputed. In determining the proper application of

the law of adverse possession to the facts of this case, we

review the trial court's decision de novo. Turner v. Caplan,

268 Va. 122, 125, 596 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2004) (questions of law

subject to de novo review); Barter Found. v. Widener, 267 Va.

80, 90, 592 S.E.2d 56, 60 (2003) (regarding mixed questions of

law and fact, a trial court's application of law is subject to

de novo review); see also Carmody v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 234

Va. 198, 201, 361 S.E.2d 128, 130 (1987).

A. Prior Cases

The doctrine of adverse possession in Virginia has a long

history. Many cases are fact-specific and their resolution

may turn on only one or two of the elements of adverse

possession.

In Taylor v. Burnsides, 42 Va. (1 Gratt.) 165, 190

(1844), the Court held that "the elements of an adversary

possession . . . consist of an exclusive, actual, continued

possession, under a colourable claim of title." The Court

emphasized that possession must be exclusive and viewed it as

a necessity that "when the rightful owner is in actual

possession, that he should be disseised or ousted, and

4
continually thereafter kept out by the hostile claimant."

When the rightful owner is not in actual possession and the

land appears vacant, the Court opined, "[S]till it is

indispensable that [possession] should be not the less

exclusive in its commencement and continuance. Though the

adverse claimant cannot in such case turn out, he must shut

out the rightful owner." Id. at 190.

This Court in Taylor also emphasized the "actual" nature

of the possession. The opinion states that, actual possession

is "absolute dominion and enjoyment of the property." Id. We

noted that actual possession might be accomplished "by

residence, cultivation, improvement, or other open, notorious

and habitual acts of ownership." Id. at 192.

In Turpin v. Saunders, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 27 (1879), an

appeal of an action of ejectment, the plaintiffs to the

ejectment claimed adverse possession of the subject land. The

defendants claimed that their predecessor in interest had

leased the land in question to a tenant. The plaintiffs

claimed that the same tenant had a prior lease for the same

land from the plaintiffs' predecessor in interest. The lease

between the defendants' predecessor and the tenant was reduced

to writing while the lease between the plaintiffs' predecessor

and the tenant was not written and had not been widely

publicized. In fact, the tenant had concealed the prior lease

5
from the defendants' predecessor. Id. at 31-33. We held that

the tenant's lease with the plaintiff's predecessor could not

be used to establish adverse possession because "possession

must be not only with claim of title, but it must be visible

and notorious, and not secret and clandestine . . . the

occupation must be of that nature and notoriety that the owner

may be presumed to know the adverse possession." Id. at 34.

As we said in Turpin,

the plaintiff's claim of possession is lacking
in one of the most essential elements to render
it adversary in its character. Simpkins,
although in the actual occupation of the
premises, did not claim title in himself or in
Saunders. On the contrary, he accepted a lease
from Cecil, and claimed to hold under him.

Id. at 35.

In Christian v. Bulbeck, 120 Va. 74, 90 S.E. 661 (1916),

we undertook to clarify the law on the subject of adverse

possession by mistake. After extensive review of earlier

Virginia cases and cases from other jurisdictions, we

concluded that:

[T]he correct rule, and the rule in Virginia,
[is that] where the proof is that the location
of the line in question was caused in the first
instance by a mistake as to the true boundary,
the other facts and circumstances in the case
must negative by a preponderance of evidence
the inference which will otherwise arise that
there was no definite and fixed intention on
the part of the possessor to occupy, use and
claim as his own[,] the land up to a particular
and definite line on the ground. That is to

6
 say, on the whole proof a case must be
presented in which the preponderance of
evidence as to the character of the possession,
how held, how evidenced on the ground, how
regarded by the adjoining land owner, etc.,
etc., supplies the proof that the definite and
positive intention on the part of the possessor
to occupy, use and claim as his own the land up
to a particular and definite line on the ground
existed, coupled with the requisite possession,
for the statutory period, in order to ripen
title under the statute. Whether the positive
and definite intention to claim as one's own
the land up to a particular and definite line
on the ground existed, is the practical test in
such cases.

Id. at 110-111, 90 S.E. at 672. We further explained:

The collateral question whether the possessor
would have claimed title, claimed the land as
his own, had he believed the land involved did
not belong to him, but to another, that is, had
he not been mistaken as to the true boundary
line called for in his chain of title, is not
the proximate but an antecedent question, which
is irrelevant and serves only to confuse ideas.

Id. at 111, 90 S.E. at 672. Citing an earlier case with

approval, we then stated that "[i]n Virginia, proof of an

expressed intention to claim title is not necessary." Id. at

107, 90 S.E. at 671 (citing Haney v. Breeden, 100 Va. 781,

783-84, 42 S.E. 916, 917 (1902)).

In LaDue v. Currell, 201 Va. 200, 110 S.E.2d 217 (1959),

we examined the types of acts sufficient to establish adverse

possession. In a dispute between neighboring landowners in

Centreville, Virginia, the Court explained that "[t]he usual

kind of actual possession relied upon is occupancy, use or

7
residence upon the premises for the statutory period of time,

evidenced by cultivation, enclosure, or erection of

improvements, or other plainly visible, continuous and

notorious manifestation or exclusive possession in keeping

with the character and adaptability of the land." Id. at 207,

110 S.E.2d at 222. We held that:

No precise rule of general application can
be laid down . . . acts of dominion over
the land must, to be effective as against
the true owner, be so open, notorious, and
hostile as to put an ordinarily prudent
person on notice of the fact that his
lands are in the adverse possession of
another. A mere temporary use of the
property by a trespasser at intervals,
whether such intervals are remote or
frequent, is not enough.

Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). Applying

this broad rule, we held that on an unenclosed, unimproved

area of land, "periodical or occasional cultivation and mowing

of the grass . . . for the purpose of appearance" was not

enough to establish adverse possession. Id.

A concise restatement of the rule and an explanation of

each element of adverse possession were provided in Grappo v.

Blanks, 241 Va. 58, 400 S.E.2d 168 (1991). We held:

To establish title to real property by adverse
possession, a claimant must prove actual,
hostile, exclusive, visible, and continuous
possession, under a claim of right, for the
statutory period of 15 years. A claimant has
the burden of proving all the elements of

8
 adverse possession by clear and convincing
evidence.

Use and occupation of property, evidenced by
fencing the property, constitutes proof of
actual possession. One is in hostile
possession if his possession is under a claim
of right and adverse to the right of the true
owner. One's possession is exclusive when it
is not in common with others. Possession is
visible when it is so obvious that the true
owner may be presumed to know about it.
Possession is continuous only if it exists
without interruption for the statutory period.

Id. at 61-62, 400 S.E.2d at 170-71 (citations omitted). In

Grappo, we also defined the terms "claim of right," "claim of

title," and "claim of ownership" as synonyms meaning

a possessor's intention to appropriate and use
the land as his own to the exclusion of all
others. That intention need not be expressed
but may be implied by a claimant's conduct.
Actual occupation, use, and improvement of the
property by the claimant, as if he were in fact
the owner, is conduct that can prove a claim of
right.

Id. at 62, 400 S.E.2d at 171. Where a landowner enclosed

three acres of his neighbor's land in addition to his own in a

fence, and "zealously examined his boundary fence for damage"

the landowner was found to have earned title to the fenced

land by adverse possession. Id. at 62-63, 400 S.E.2d at 171.

We had occasion to consider the relationship between

permissive use and adverse possession in Mary Moody Northen,

Inc. v. Bailey, 244 Va. 118, 418 S.E.2d 882 (1992). In that

case, Jim Bailey, the father of the plaintiffs claiming

9
adverse possession, lived in a log cabin situated on the land

of a charitable foundation for 36 years. All parties agreed

that Bailey had lived on the land openly and continuously and

that the legal titleholders knew of Bailey's occupancy. Id.

at 120, 418 S.E.2d at 883-84. However, during the time of

Bailey's occupancy, Bailey communicated with the owners "on a

number of occasions" and even "acquiesced in the request of

the foundation that he get firewood from fallen trees rather

than by chopping down trees." Id. at 121, 418 S.E.2d at 884.

The Court held that "[w]here, as here, the legal title holder

is operating on the assumption that one living on its land is

doing so with its permission, and does not interfere with that

occupancy, it would be manifestly unjust to allow that

occupancy to ripen into an ownership interest through the

silence or inaction of the occupant." Id. at 122, 418 S.E.2d

at 885. The protestations of Bailey against the erection of a

fence by the foundation, which interfered with access to his

home, could not "be characterized fairly as an affirmative

statement of an adverse claim" sufficient to provide notice to

the owner that Bailey now claimed ownership of the land.

Instead, the Court held "it is more indicative of occupancy by

permission." Id. His protestations expressed "need for his

family" not a claim of right. Id. at 123, 418 S.E.2d at 885.

10
 In Chaney v. Haynes, 250 Va. 155, 458 S.E.2d 451 (1995),

we revisited the subject of mistake as it relates to the

establishment of a prescriptive easement. The plaintiffs,

Haynes and others, had been granted an express easement for

access over land that had been subdivided. The easement

actually ran over land owned by Josephine Erwin, but the

grantees had been using a path over land owned by Chaney at

the time of the suit, under the mistaken belief that it was

the path described in the express easement. Id. at 156-58,

458 S.E.2d at 452-53. We held:

The essence of an adverse use is the
intentional assertion of a claim hostile to the
ownership right of another. Use of property,
under the mistaken belief of a recorded right,
cannot be adverse as long as such mistake
continues. The present record shows that the
plaintiffs based their use of Chaney's land
solely on their mistaken belief that it was the
land described in their express easement.
Thus, the plaintiffs have failed to prove that
a prescriptive easement was established.

Id. at 159, 458 S.E.2d at 453-54 (citations omitted). We

distinguished Chaney from other prescriptive easement cases

because, in other cases, "prescriptive easements had been

established when the evidence showed, among other things, that

both of the easement claimants held a general belief [that]

they had the right to use the ways at issue." Id. at 160, 458

S.E.2d at 454. The claimants in other cases did not assert

that their "right derived from an express easement." Id.

11
 Three years later, we considered another case involving

"the effect of a mistake as to the location of an actual

boundary line upon the intent to hold disputed land

adversely." Hollander v. World Mission Church, 255 Va. 440,

441, 498 S.E.2d 419, 420 (1998). In Hollander, a church and

its adjoining property owners both claimed possession of a

strip of land between their properties. The trial court found

that the adjoining owners had established all elements of

adverse possession except "adverse or hostile possession."

Id. at 441, 498 S.E.2d at 420. According to the evidence,

"the claimants intended to claim title to the land extending

to [a tree line] as a part of the property they thought was

conveyed to them." Id. at 442, 498 S.E.2d at 420. Relying on

Christian v. Bulbeck, the Hollander court specifically

distinguished Chaney on the ground that "the claimants in this

case based their claim not only on the deed descriptions, but

also on their belief that their property line ran to the line

of woods." Id. at 443, 498 S.E.2d at 421. Consequently, we

reversed the judgment of the trial court and held "that the

claimants' possession was accompanied by the requisite adverse

or hostile intent." Id.

Finally, in Kim v. Douval Corp., 259 Va. 752, 529 S.E.2d

92 (2000), we once again addressed the issue of possession by

permission. Kim was a landowner's suit to eject a car wash

12
business from a parcel of land. The car wash's use of the

land began in the 1960s and included the installation of

lighting, asphalt, signage, fencing, and vacuums on the land.

Id. at 754-55, 529 S.E.2d at 93-94. The only "genuinely

disputed [issue] at trial" was "whether Douval's possession

was 'hostile' under a claim of right." Id. at 757, 529 S.E.2d

at 95. We quoted from Grappo for the definition of "hostile,"

and defined "claim of right" as referring "to the intent of a

claimant to use land as the claimant's own to the exclusion of

all others." Id. at 757, 529 S.E.2d at 95 (quoting Grappo,

241 Va. at 62, 400 S.E.2d at 171). We explained, "[W]here the

original entry on another's land was by agreement or

permission, possession regardless of its duration

presumptively continues as it began, in the absence of an

explicit disclaimer." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

We observed that the evidence and permissible inferences from

the evidence were in dispute as to the nature of possession

and use at the beginning of the car wash's occupancy. Because

the jury had resolved the inferences favorably to the owner,

we held that the trial court "erred in setting aside the jury

verdict." Id. at 758, 529 S.E.2d at 96.

B. Application

13
 As stated in the cases discussed above, in Virginia,

adverse possession requires proof, by clear and convincing

evidence, of possession that is:

1) actual,

2) hostile or adverse,

3) exclusive,

4) visible or open and notorious,

5) continuous for a period of 15 years,* and

6) under a claim of right.

A single act or piece of evidence may tend to prove more than

one element of adverse possession. For example, "occupation,

use and improvement of the property . . . can prove a claim of

right," Grappo, 241 Va. at 62, 400 S.E.2d at 171.

"[O]ccupation, use and improvement" may also prove actual

possession. Taylor, 42 Va. at 192; LaDue, 201 Va. at 207, 110

S.E.2d at 222. Similarly, occupation, use, and improvement

may also be used to establish exclusivity and visibility.

1. Hostile Possession

In dispute in this case is the hostility of the

Quatannens' possession of the land to the legal title of the

Tyrrells. In Taylor, 42 Va. at 190, it is clear that actual,

exclusive, and visible possession without permission

necessarily meant that the claimant's interest was hostile to

14
that of the legal titleholder. More recently, in Grappo, 241

Va. at 62, 400 S.E.2d at 171, we defined hostile possession as

possession "under a claim of right and adverse to the right of

the true owner." In other words, the possessor must profess,

through words or actions, a belief that he is entitled to use

the land and prevent others from using it in a manner that

precludes the legal owner from exercising his rights over the

property. If possession is hostile, the legal owner and the

possessor cannot simultaneously exercise control over the

land. Thus, permission negates hostile possession. See Mary

Moody Northen, 244 Va. at 122, 418 S.E.2d at 885. In narrow

circumstances, mistake may also negate hostile possession.

Where a mistake occurs in determining the location of a

boundary line described in a deed and the claimant has not

proved "the definite and positive intention . . . to occupy,

use and claim as his own the land up to a particular and

definite line on the ground," then the claimant cannot

establish adverse possession. See Christian, 120 Va. at 110-

111, 90 S.E. at 672. See also Chaney, 250 Va. at 159, 458

S.E.2d at 453-54. However, when a claimant mistakenly

believes that a particular "line on the ground" represents the

extent of his or her own land and treats all the land within

the line on the ground as his or her own in a manner that

*
Code § 8.01-236.

15
satisfies the other requirements of adverse possession −

particularly actual, exclusive, and visible possession − then

the hostility requirement is generally satisfied.

The Quatannens have provided clear and convincing proof

that they possessed "the positive and definite intention to

claim as [their] own the land up to a particular and definite

line on the ground." Christian, 120 Va. at 111, 90 S.E. at

672. They provided evidence that previous owners of 219 S.

Alfred Street had believed that the disputed land belonged to

the owners of 217 S. Alfred Street. The Quatannens and two

previous owners of 217 S. Alfred Street testified that they

believed that their property included the disputed land. They

proceeded to use the land in a manner consistent with

ownership, including gating the land, building a structure on

the land, and making other improvements to the land. Neither

the Tyrrells nor any predecessor in title ever made any claims

to the land before October 2001, despite the Quatannens'

actual, open, and exclusive use of the land.

The testimony of Eileen Quatannens that the Quatannens

had not intended to possess any property that they did not own

is irrelevant because, "[t]he collateral question whether the

possessor would have claimed title, claimed the land as his

own, had he believed the land involved did not belong to him,

but to another, that is, had he not been mistaken as to the

16
true boundary line called for in his chain of title, is not

the proximate but an antecedent question, which is irrelevant

and serves only to confuse ideas." Christian, 120 Va. at 111,

90 S.E. at 672. All of the other evidence at trial proves

that the Quatannens and their predecessors had a definite and

positive intention to occupy, use, and claim the land − so much

so that the true legal owners believed that the possessors

owned the land. Therefore, the hostile character of the

Quatannens' possession has not been undercut by the fact that

they mistakenly believed the land was theirs. To the extent

that the trial court concluded otherwise, it erred.

The Tyrrells maintain that the Quatannens did not prove

that the original use of the disputed land by previous owners

of 217 S. Alfred Street was not by permission. According to

the Tyrrells, the Quatannens had to prove that none of their

predecessors had used the strip of land by permission in order

to claim adverse possession. This interpretation and

application of the law of adverse possession is incorrect.

Permission is properly viewed as a defense to a claim of

adverse possession. As such, the defendant to the claim has

the burden of proof. In Mary Moody Northen, the defendant

produced the testimony of its employees to show that the

claimants' possession began and continued by permission. 244

Va. at 121, 418 S.E.2d at 884. The defendant also produced

17
evidence that both it and the claimants' father behaved toward

the land and each other in a manner consistent with the fact

that the father's possession of the land was by permission.

Id. at 121-22, 418 S.E.2d at 884-85.

The Tyrrells also cited Kim for the proposition that a

presumption of permission exists wherever "the record does not

indicate the circumstances under which . . . possession of the

disputed strip . . . began." 259 Va. at 757, 529 S.E.2d at

95. In that appeal from a jury verdict, we reviewed the

evidence and held that "conflicting inferences [could] be

drawn from the evidence" as to whether possession began with

permission or not. Id. at 758, 529 S.E.2d at 96. Thus, Kim

applies very narrowly to its own facts.

In this case, there was no evidence that the possession

of the disputed land by the owners of 217 S. Alfred Street

began with permission from the owners of 219 S. Alfred Street.

The owners of 219 S. Alfred Street, including the Tyrrells

before 2001, were not "operating on the assumption that" the

owners of 217 S. Alfred Street were using the land with

permission. Mary Moody Northen, 244 Va. at 122, 418 S.E.2d at

885. A claimant cannot be expected to prove the non-existence

of permission by evidence in most cases. It was up to the

Tyrrells to produce evidence of permission, which they failed

to do. Therefore, to the extent that the trial court premised

18
its finding that the Quatannens' possession of the land was

not hostile on the fact that the Quatannens failed to prove

that the possession did not begin with permission, the trial

court erred.

2. Actual Notice

"Actual" notice of possession to the legal titleholder,

in the sense of oral or written communications, is not

required in order to establish ownership by adverse

possession. What must be "actual" is the possession itself.

See, e.g., Taylor, 42 Va. at 190, 192.

An owner is presumed to be on notice when the possessor's

acts of dominion over the land are open and notorious,

visible, and hostile. LaDue, 201 Va. at 207, 110 S.E.2d at

222; Grappo, 241 Va. at 62, 400 S.E.2d at 171. A possessor is

not required to explicitly state to an owner that it is in

possession of the owner's land. See, e.g., Turpin, 73 Va. at

34.

The Quatannens' actions were open and notorious, visible,

and hostile. Certainly, the construction of a room of the

house, a brick archway, and a walkway could not be more

obvious. Enclosure and improvement of these types are acts

that are clearly open, notorious, and hostile. See LaDue, 201

Va. at 207, 110 S.E.2d at 222. Therefore, the Tyrrells and

their predecessors had adequate notice of the Quatannens'

19
possession and the trial court erred in finding that the

Tyrrells were entitled to "actual" notice in some written or

oral form.

3. Sufficiency of the Quatannens' Acts

The uses made of the disputed land by the Quatannens and

their predecessors were sufficient to establish adverse

possession. The Quatannens' uses of the land are consistent

with the uses that have been found sufficient to establish

adverse possession in other cases.

The Quatannens and their predecessors clearly had actual

possession of the land. They demonstrated their "absolute

dominion and enjoyment of the property" by making significant

improvements to it including the room, the brick arch, the

walkway, and the parking area. They and their predecessors

have also cultivated vegetation on the land and used the land

for recreational activities. These types of uses have

repeatedly been found sufficient to show actual possession.

See, e.g., Taylor, 42 Va. at 192; LaDue, 201 Va. at 207, 110

S.E.2d at 222; Grappo, 241 Va. at 62-63, 400 S.E.2d at 171.

In order to have exclusive possession, a claimant must

"shut out the rightful owner." Taylor, 42 Va. at 190. In

this case, the room built on the disputed land clearly shuts

out the Tyrrells. The gate under the brick arch is used for

the same purpose. That these structures do not exclude the

20
Tyrrells from the entirety of the disputed land does not

destroy the Quatannens' claim of adverse possession.

"Possession may be more manifest to a part, than as to the

rest; but in reference to the whole, possession of part is

possession of the entire tract or parcel." Id. at 190-91.

The Quatannens' evidence satisfied the element of exclusive

possession.

According to the evidence presented at trial, the room,

the brick arch, and the brick walkway on the disputed strip of

land have all existed for at least 28 years. This evidence

more than satisfies the requirement that the possession be

continuous for a period of 15 years. During this time, the

Quatannens and their predecessors, through the actions

repeatedly described, occupied, used, and improved the land as

if they owned it, satisfying the requirement that they possess

the land "under a claim of right." Grappo, 241 Va. at 61-62,

400 S.E.2d at 170-71.

The Tyrrells argue that because one of the Quatannens'

predecessors leased the property at 217 S. Alfred Street and

none of the tenants testified, that the Quatannens could not

establish possession for the statutory period. This argument

is without merit because, irrespective of the tenants'

actions, the room of the house, the brick arch, and the brick

walkway existed throughout that time. The actions of the

21
Quatannens and their predecessors have satisfied all the

elements necessary to establish ownership through adverse

possession.

III. Conclusion

The trial court erred in concluding that the Quatannens

failed to establish ownership of the disputed land by adverse

possession. We will reverse the judgment of the trial court

and remand for entry of judgment for the Quatannens and such

other action necessary to establish their title.

Reversed and remanded.

22