PRESENT: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Kinser, Lemons, and Agee,
JJ., and Compton, S.J.
ROBERT MICHAEL McMINN OPINION BY
SENIOR JUSTICE A. CHRISTIAN COMPTON
v. Record No. 030286 January 16, 2004
SCOTT CHRISTOPHER ROUNDS, ET AL.
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY
Burke F. McCahill, Judge
In this civil action based upon an alleged assault and
battery in which the defense of self-defense was raised, the
sole question presented is whether the trial court erred in
admitting testimonial evidence of a prior, specific act of
alleged assaultive or combative behavior on the part of the
plaintiff.
Plaintiff Robert Michael McMinn filed a motion for judgment
against defendants Scott Christopher Rounds and Pops II
Incorporated, t/a Broos, seeking damages for personal injuries
allegedly sustained on July 12, 2000. The plaintiff claimed he
was assaulted and battered by Rounds, a Broos employee, in an
altercation while an invitee upon the premises of Broos, a
restaurant and bar located in Sterling. In grounds of defense,
the defendants denied liability to the plaintiff and, among
other things, pled that Rounds acted in self defense during the
altercation.
Although the plaintiff sought recovery upon several
theories, the case eventually was submitted to a jury upon the
claim that, "without just cause or provocation," Rounds "struck
and with force of arms assaulted the plaintiff."
The jury found in favor of the defendants. Upon
consideration of the plaintiff's motion to set the verdict
aside, the court entered judgment on the verdict in a November
2002 order, from which the plaintiff appeals.
A detailed recitation of the facts is unnecessary to
present the issue we decide. The plaintiff was among a group of
persons attending a meeting of an investment club on the
premises of Broos restaurant and bar during the evening of the
day in question. Before and during the meeting, many in the
group, including the plaintiff, consumed various quantities of
alcoholic beverages.
After some time, the plaintiff decided to leave the
premises. An argument ensued involving a Broos waitress and the
plaintiff over how his share of the "tab" could be paid.
Eventually, defendant Rounds, the Broos bartender, became
involved. According to the evidence, as the bartender was
"escorting" the plaintiff "out the door" amid foul language, a
fight took place between the two resulting in injury to the
plaintiff.
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During their testimony, the plaintiff and Rounds each
claimed that the other was the aggressor in the tussle. Denying
he cursed or threatened anyone, the plaintiff testified that, as
he was leaving the premises, Rounds "in a fairly agitated state,
. . . came rushing up behind me." The plaintiff stated: "The
next thing I know I'm on the ground with my arm twisted behind
my back, and Mr. Rounds has me by the throat with his hand,
pretty much a choke-hold."
Rounds, on the other hand, testified that during "the later
part of the evening," the plaintiff, who Rounds did not know,
became "argumentative," used vulgar language toward the
waitress, and appeared to be intoxicated. According to Rounds,
he told the plaintiff twice to leave the premises. As he was
walking out of the premises, the plaintiff "turned around and
struck me with his hands on one side of my face and one side of
my chest," Rounds said. The defendant stated he then put his
arms around the plaintiff's chest "and yelled at him to tell him
to calm down. At that point, . . . he was starting to fight at
me and . . . our feet got tangled up and we both just fell to
the floor backwards."
Over the plaintiff's objection, the trial court permitted
the defendants to present evidence of an incident involving the
plaintiff occurring in Loudoun County on December 17, 1996,
about three and one-half years prior to the event sued upon. In
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that incident, according to the testimony, the plaintiff was
operating a motor vehicle that was stopped behind another
vehicle at an intersection. The plaintiff was "honking his horn
and flipping [the other driver] the bird and screaming."
As the other vehicle was driven into a nearby apartment
complex, the plaintiff followed, and according to the other
driver, "pulled around and cut me off and pulled out right in
front of me." The plaintiff then "jumped out and just
immediately attacked [the other driver]," proceeding "to beat
him up." The evidence showed that the plaintiff "was
intoxicated . . . very violent and aggressive."
On appeal, the plaintiff contends that the trial court
erred "in allowing evidence of a single dissimilar instance of
prior aggressive behavior by McMinn." The plaintiff says, "In
the face of a plea of self-defense, evidence of prior acts by
the victim which are sufficiently probative of the issue of whom
was the aggressor . . . is admissible under Virginia law if
connected in time and circumstances to the assault and battery
in issue." Here however, the plaintiff argues, the trial court
erred in admitting the evidence "not merely because the earlier
event was remote in time, but because that single prior episode
was not sufficiently similar to bear any relevance to the
incident in question."
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The defendants say "the basis upon which the evidence of
the prior incident was offered in this particular case was for
the purpose of establishing McMinn's character, i.e. - a
propensity to undertake unprovoked physical attacks against
individuals when consuming alcohol." The defendants argue that
the trial court "properly considered whether or not there was a
nexus of relevancy between the prior conduct or character of
McMinn and his behavior on the night of the incident giving rise
to this litigation, and after determining that such nexus
existed, properly allowed the jury to consider the evidence."
We do not agree.
Initially, we dispose of a procedural matter. We reject
the defendants' contention that the plaintiff waived his
objection to the evidence in question by not objecting to an
amended instruction on the subject offered by the defendants. A
procedural waiver may occur when the trial court is not afforded
an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issue presented.
Wright v. Norfolk and W. Ry. Co., 245 Va. 160, 167-70, 427
S.E.2d 724, 728-29 (1993).
On numerous occasions before, during, and after the trial,
the plaintiff made known to the trial court his objection to
admission of the evidence. At those stages of the proceeding,
the trial court was afforded full opportunity to rule
intelligently on the issue. Plaintiff's attorney merely
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responded, "That's fine, Your Honor," when the tendered
instruction was amended. Thus, there was no waiver. See King
v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 576, 582, 570 S.E.2d 863, 866 (2002);
WJLA-TV v. Levin, 264 Va. 140, 159, 564 S.E.2d 383, 394 (2002);
Chawla v. BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616, 622-23, 499 S.E.2d
829, 832-33 (1998).
We now consider the substantive issue. Preliminarily, we
note "there is a vast difference between reputation and
character, and our chief means of ascertaining character is by
evidence of general reputation." Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 141
Va. 541, 562, 127 S.E. 368, 375 (1925). Quoting Henry Ward
Beecher, the Court has said: " 'Character is what one really
is; reputation is what others believe him to be.' " Zirkle v.
Commonwealth, 189 Va. 862, 871, 55 S.E.2d 24, 29 (1949).
In Virginia, the rule in criminal cases is that, when a
defendant adduces evidence of self-defense, proof of specific
acts is admissible to show the character of the victim for
turbulence and violence, even when the defendant is unaware of
such character. Barnes v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 24, 25-26, 197
S.E.2d 189, 190 (1973); Stover v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 789,
794, 180 S.E.2d 504, 508 (1971). When admissible, such evidence
bears upon the questions of who was the aggressor or what was
the reasonable apprehension of the defendant for his safety.
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Upon the question of who was the aggressor, the issue is
what the victim probably did, and evidence of recent acts of
violence toward third persons ought to be received, if connected
in time, place, and circumstance with the crime, as to likely
characterize the victim's conduct toward the defendant.
Randolph v. Commonwealth, 190 Va. 256, 265, 56 S.E.2d 226, 230
(1949). See Burford v. Commonwealth, 179 Va. 752, 766-67, 20
S.E.2d 509, 515 (1942); Rasnake v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 677,
697-98, 115 S.E. 543, 549-50 (1923). We perceive no sound
reason why this rule for criminal cases should not be applied
under the special circumstances of this civil case.
As we have said, the rule speaks of multiple acts, not a
single act. The crucial question then becomes whether only one
specific act of alleged aggressiveness and violent conduct was
admissible for the purpose of establishing the plaintiff's
character. We hold that it was not.
A single act of bad conduct does not establish one's
unfavorable character. While evidence of a series of bad acts
may collectively be admissible to establish poor character, the
conduct in a single incident is insufficient. See Zirkle v.
Commonwealth, 189 Va. at 871, 55 S.E.2d at 29 (extrinsic proof
of specific act of bad conduct inadmissible to rebut testimony
tending to establish good reputation of accused for personal
traits of character involved).
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Indeed, this Court has so ruled in the context of a civil
case. In Homestead Fire Ins. Co. v. Ison, 110 Va. 18, 65 S.E.
463 (1909), the trial court refused to admit evidence of one
Craft upon the general character of the plaintiff. In affirming
the lower court's action, this Court said: "General reputation
among the people who know the man is the issue in such a case.
The witness Craft expressly states that he knows nothing about
the reputation of the [plaintiff] in this sense. All he
professed to know was his special reputation formed on a single
occasion. . . ." Id. at 25, 65 S.E. at 466.
Neither Barnes nor Stover, primarily relied upon by the
defendants, is authority for the admission of the evidence in
question; those cases deal with proof of multiple prior acts to
establish character.
In Barnes, the defendant and the victim had been drinking
beer and liquor prior to the victim being shot and killed by the
defendant, who pled self-defense. The trial court refused to
admit the testimony of the victim's wife and a rehabilitation
counselor about their knowledge of the victim's "drinking
problem" and "aggressive tendencies" when intoxicated. 214 Va.
at 25, 197 S.E.2d at 190. Reversing the trial court, this Court
stated that the evidence of prior drinking activity was
admissible to support the defendant's statement in justification
of the homicide. Id. at 26, 197 S.E.2d at 190. The Court set
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forth the rule as follows: "[When], as here, there is evidence
that the victim was intoxicated at the time of the shooting,
evidence of his character . . . for turbulence when in such
condition is admissible on the issue of self-defense." Id.
Barnes, however, involved proof of multiple acts of drinking,
not just a single incident.
In Stover, deciding an issue under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), this Court reversed a conviction when there had
been suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the
accused. The nondisclosed items were statements of complaining
witnesses concerning prior incidents of violence. In the course
of ruling on the Brady question, the Court said: "[When] an
accused adduces evidence that he acted in self-defense, evidence
of specific acts is admissible to show the disposition and
character for turbulence and violence of the deceased and of
complaining witnesses." 211 Va. at 794, 180 S.E.2d at 508. The
Court stated that defendant "was denied the opportunity to show
that he was set upon by persons who had recently committed acts
of violence evidencing turbulence of disposition." Id. at 795-
96, 180 S.E.2d at 509. Again, the Court spoke of specific
"acts," not a single "act."
Consequently, because the trial court committed reversible
error in admitting the evidence in question, we will annul the
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judgment in favor of the defendants and will remand the case for
a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.
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