Present: All the Justices
TRAVIS EUGENE DANIELS, NO. 304441
v. Record No. 022195 PER CURIAM
October 31, 2003
WARDEN OF THE RED ONION STATE PRISON
UPON A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
In this habeas corpus case, Travis Eugene Daniels, the
petitioner, previously filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in the trial court in which he was convicted of various
felony offenses and sentenced to a period of incarceration of 33
years in prison. Prior to a consideration of the merits of that
petition, the trial court entered an order of nonsuit at
Daniels’ request and dismissed that petition. 1 On September 23,
2002, invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court, Daniels
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against the Warden
of the Red Onion State Prison, challenging the legality of his
convictions in the trial court. The dispositive issue before us
is whether this petition is procedurally barred by the provision
of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) that “[n]o writ shall be granted on the
basis of any allegation the facts of which petitioner had
knowledge at the time of filing any previous petition.” See
1
Daniels also filed a habeas petition in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which
subsequently was dismissed at his request. The fact of the
federal court habeas petition does not impinge upon our analysis
of this case.
Dorsey v. Angelone, 261 Va. 601, 604, 544 S.E.2d 350, 352
(2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 924 (2001)(holding that a habeas
petition that was “withdrawn” by the petitioner barred the
filing of a subsequent petition).
Daniels does not dispute that his initial habeas petition,
which asserted a generalized claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, contained inadequate allegations of fact to support the
specific issues he now raises in his current petition to this
Court. Rather, Daniels contends that dismissal of his habeas
petition is not warranted because the nonsuit of his first
habeas petition did not invoke the bar of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2).
Daniels notes that unlike the “withdrawal” of the habeas
petition in Dorsey, the dismissal of his prior habeas petition
by nonsuit was pursuant to the statutory right provided by Code
§ 8.01-380. Thus, Daniels contends that, as would be permitted
in any other civil case, he is entitled to commence a new
proceeding on the same cause without limitation on the
introduction of new claims and allegations of fact. 2 This is so,
2
Challenging the rationale of Dorsey, Daniels also contends
that a proper interpretation of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) would bar
the filing of a subsequent habeas petition only where there had
been a decision on the merits of a prior petition, and he urges
this Court to reconsider the holding in Dorsey and overturn that
decision. Since the decision in Dorsey was announced, the
General Assembly has met twice in regular session and has not
acted to amend Code § 8.01-654 to alter our decision in that
case. “‘Under these circumstances, the construction given to
the statute is presumed to be sanctioned by the legislature and
2
he asserts, because “[a] nonsuit does not involve a decision on
the merits, rather it ‘simply [puts] an end to the present
action, but is no bar to a subsequent action for the same
cause.’ ” Sheets v. Castle, 263 Va. 407, 413, 559 S.E.2d 616,
620 (2002) (quoting Payne v. Buena Vista Extract Co., 124 Va.
296, 311, 98 S.E. 34, 39 (1919)).
The Attorney General, on behalf of the Warden, responds
that, for purposes of resolving the successive petitions issue
in this case, the holding of Dorsey controls. The Attorney
General asserts that there is no significant distinction between
a habeas petition which is “withdrawn” on the petitioner’s
motion and one which is the subject of a voluntary nonsuit by
the petitioner. We agree with the Attorney General.
In Dorsey, we held that:
The statutory language [of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2)]
is plain and unambiguous, clearly limiting the right
of a prisoner to file successive petitions for writs
of habeas corpus. The key provisions of this
statutory language focus on “the time of filing” the
first habeas petition.
The statutory language could not be more
explicit; it means what it says. At the time of
filing the initial petition, the prisoner must include
“all” claims the facts of which are known to the
prisoner. And, no habeas relief will be granted based
therefore becomes obligatory upon the courts.’” Cochran v.
Commonwealth, 258 Va. 604, 607, 521 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1999),
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1075 (2000) (quoting Vansant and Gusler,
Inc. v. Washington, 245 Va. 356, 361, 429 S.E.2d 31, 33-34
(1993)). Accordingly, we decline Daniels’ invitation that we
revisit our decision in Dorsey.
3
upon “any” allegation the facts of which the prisoner
had knowledge at the time of filing any previous
petition.
Dorsey, 261 Va. at 603-04, 544 S.E.2d at 352.
Daniels correctly contends that generally the effect of a
first voluntary nonsuit pursuant to Code § 8.01-380 is to put an
end to a case without prejudice and without a decision on the
merits, and the fact of the former suit places no impediment on
the claims or allegations that may be raised in a timely filed
subsequent action on the same cause. However, Code § 8.01-380
is a statute of general application for all civil cases. By
contrast, Code § 8.01-654 is a specific statute, narrow in
scope, applying only to petitions for writs of habeas corpus.
To the extent that these code sections can be said to be
facially in conflict in the context of the present case, our
resolution of that conflict is guided by a well established
rule. “The rule is that ‘when one statute speaks to a subject
in a general way and another deals with a part of the same
subject in a more specific manner, the two should be harmonized,
if possible, and where they conflict, the latter prevails.’”
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 1, 22-23, 419 S.E.2d 606, 618
(1992) (quoting Virginia National Bank v. Harris, 220 Va. 336,
340, 257 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1979)).
Applying this rule and the rationale of Dorsey that “the
key provisions of [Code § 8.01-654(B)(2)] focus on ‘the time of
4
filing’ the first habeas petition” and that at “the time of
filing the initial petition, the prisoner must include ‘all’
claims the facts of which are known to the prisoner,” the
provisions of Code § 8.01-654(B)(2) and those of Code § 8.01-380
may be readily harmonized. Simply put, the provisions of Code
§ 8.01-654(B)(2) require a prisoner to include all claims that
he intends to bring before the court in his first habeas
petition. Regardless of the manner in which that habeas
petition is resolved, he may not thereafter file a subsequent
habeas petition that seeks relief based upon any allegations of
fact that were known to him at the time of the initial filing
and not included therein. Accordingly, Code § 8.01-654(B)(2)
does not conflict with a prisoner’s right to seek a nonsuit
under Code § 8.01-380, but having elected to take a nonsuit
under the latter statute, the former statute bars him from
raising in a subsequent petition those issues which he knew of
and could have raised in the first petition, but failed to
assert.
In this case, the allegations of fact that form the basis
of his claims challenging the legality of his convictions
unquestionably were known to Daniels at the time he filed his
first habeas petition in the trial court, but were not raised
therein. Accordingly, Daniels’ petition for a writ of habeas
corpus will be dismissed.
5
Dismissed.
6